| July 15, 2006
Much of the discussion here and elsewhere about Israel's attacks in Lebanon has been over whether Israel has the right to do what it is doing. The bigger question, I believe, is whether what Israel is doing will actually work. Will it achieve its objectives? Will it free the captives and strike a hard blow to Hezbollah? And what happens if you bomb the living crap out of someone and they don't bend? What happens when you trigger a 'shock and awe' campaign but the other side isn't sufficiently shocked or awed? In the last few days, here has been some very sober analysis on that dilemma, which the United States currently faces in Iraq.
First, David Ignatius in Friday's Washington Post: Israeli and American doctrine is premised on the idea that military force will deter adversaries. But as more force has been used in recent years, the deterrent value has inevitably gone down. That's the inner spring of this crisis: The Iranians (and their clients in Hezbollah and Hamas) watch the American military mired in Iraq and see weakness. They are emboldened rather than intimidated. The same is true for the Israelis in Gaza. Rather than reinforcing the image of strength, the use of force (short of outright, pulverizing invasion and occupation) has encouraged contempt. And Helena Cobban, from her blog: I think he is right to link Israel's doctrine with the US's in this way. Both rely heavily on a unilateralist application of "shock and awe" tactics in order to bludgeon their opponents into political submission. But what happens if you apply massive "shock and awe" tactics and the opponents don't submit? Then, it seems to me, you end up looking really bloodthirsty, and also rather stupid. (As the US military posture now does, in Iraq.) Cobban makes another good point about how and why this latest conflict may have come about: In the Middle East, recent events have faced an inexperienced national leadership with a tough test-- and so far, they have been failing it. I'm talking about Ehud 'the hair trigger' Olmert, Israel's recently elected Prime Minister, a man with almost no previous experience of strategic affairs, and his Defense Minister Amir Peretz (even less.) I think this makes the current crisis more volatile than it would have been if-- say-- Ariel Sharon were still actively on the scene. Sharon was a pugnacious bulldozer of a military (and political) commander, it is true. But he did have a learning curve. Olmert and Peretz, by contrast, still have a lot to prove (and, I think, even more to learn.) I agree that if Ariel Sharon were still prime minister, this action in Lebanon would not be going on. Sharon's disastrous 1982 invasion did eventually teach him something. It also taught a lesson to Yitzhak Rabin, who launched his own attacks on Lebanon in 1993. A mere two years after that -- and only three days before Rabin was assassinated, he was on TV being questioned about why he doesn't just order more attacks against targets in Lebanon that had been harassing Israel. Whoever is prepared to go to war in Lebanon once again and pay a more painful price than we paid in 1982, 1983, 1984, until mid-1985, let him do so. I will not do it. I know that Israel faces tough enemies; I know that without a political solution, we will not put an end to the pain of casualties in Lebanon... We must know that without a political solution with Syria there will be no solution to the terror from Lebanon." Rabin, Sharon ... each learned some very hard lessons late in their lives about the utility of force. Sending in the bombers will satisfy the popular outcry for vengeance. It will make your poll numbers go up in the short term. But it will not necessarily achieve anything lasting. Olmert has yet to learn this lesson -- but he will. Bush is incapable of learning this lesson. Which brings us to what I believe is the root cause of the current problem -- the lack of any international peace initiative in the Middle East. And the fault of that lies directly with Bush and his Yee Haw brand of foreign policy. Bush even undercut his own secretary of state this week. Condi was making statements about how "all sides" in the conflict need to cool it. Bush then comes out and gives Israel the green light to blaze away -- undermining the only real success he has had in the Middle East, the new government in Lebanon. There is only one way to solve this problem for once and for all - and that is through a negotiated settlement that gives the Palestinians a viable state with most of their land back and gives Israel real security guarantees. Bush came into office mocking Clinton's attempts to do just that and downgraded the whole peace process. Since then, he has dipped his feet in the water, but he has yet to plunge in. And it is now to the point that the United States' traditional role as the only "honest broker" between the two sides has been vastly eroded. But that's hard work. For Bush, bombs solve all problems. Back to Ignatius in the Post: The way to blunt Hamas is to build a strong Palestinian Authority that delivers benefits for the Palestinian people. The way to curb Hezbollah is to build up the Lebanese government and army. One way to boost the Lebanese government (and deflate Hezbollah) would be to negotiate the return of the Israeli-occupied territory known as Shebaa Farms. That chance is lost for now, but the Bush administration should find other ways to enhance Siniora's authority. All of which brings me to my conclusion, which is to reiterate what I think would be the elements of a successful peace initiative: 1. Israel should dismantle most of its West Bank settlements, withdraw to the 1967 border with a few adjustments, dismantle its nuclear arsenal and recognize a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. 2. In exchange, Israel would become a full member of NATO and the European Union. Any attack on Israel, including terrorist attacks, would trigger NATO intervention. NATO troops to be permanently stationed in Israel. All of the Middle East -- from Morocco to Iran -- to be declared a nuclear-free zone. The Golan Heights would be returned to Syria as a demilitarized zone with NATO monitors. 3. Arab League members to recognize Israel, normalize relations, dismantle Hezbollah, halt the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda by radical clerics and designate a small percentage of oil revenues for the development of the West Bank and Gaza. 4. Palestinian claims to land inside Israel to be abrogated. No right of return. In exchange, displaced Palestinians to be allowed to resettle in the United States, Europe or other Middle East nations such as Jordan. 5. Jerusalem to become a separate city-state with sovereignty controlled by the United Nations. UN to move Geneva offices to Jerusalem and maintain a police force. Access to religious sites for all believers to be guaranteed. It won't happen, of course. But it spreads the pain around, which is the necessary formula for peace.
--By Quaoar
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