Tuesday, November 08, 2005

Enforcing the Holocaust Belief:

Newsletter No 263

JustinLogan.com: The Continuing Realist-Neocon War

JustinLogan.com: The Continuing Realist-Neocon War

Spelunking Through the Chaos: Aussies 'foil terror attack,' while police state expands

Spelunking Through the Chaos: Aussies 'foil terror attack,' while police state expands

Predicable hooey from V. Hanson on Hugh Hewitt

Radio Blogger: "what happens to a society that doesn't ask the immigrant to integrate"

September 11: Evidence to the Contrary

September 11: Evidence to the Contrary

Great, great Video Here!

Humint Events Online: Back to Basics About 9/11

Humint Events Online: Back to Basics About 9/11

Back to Basics About 9/11
All the stuff I've been doing lately on 9/11 has been research into weird physical aspects of 9/11 being an inside job. Some of the stuff I've found may mean nothing, or it may be something important. It's hard to know for sure with the limited data we have in the public domain. Basically, I have been trying to develop a new working model for the attacks, and while I think I have a good idea for certain things, other aspects are less clear-- like what hit exactly the WTC towers. But I want to go back and refresh everyone, including myself, of WHY I think 9/11 was an inside job.1) there were many, many of warnings of the attacks before they happened, and some apparently were very specific.2) there is the fact that the Pakistani ISI is friendly with both Al Qaeda AND the CIA, and thus the CIA HAD to know what was coming (the wiring of money from ISI chief Ahmed to Atta shortly before the attacks is one aspect of this). 3) there were the unusual put options on American and United stocks before the attacks.4) there was a GODDAMNED LIVE-FLY HIJACKING DRILL BEING RUN ON 9/11 BY NORAD. If that doesn't make you think something strange happened that day, nothing will.5) there was the complete lack of air defenses on 9/11.6) there was the lack of warnings to pilots and FAA controllers about hijackings.7) there were the terror hijacking drills run before 9/11.8) there were the plane-into building drills run by the Pentagon and also by NORAD before 9/11.9) there was the GODDAMNED PLANE INTO BUILDING DRILL BEING RUN ON 9/11 BY THE NRO. Again, if that doesn't make you suspcious about 9/11, nothing will.10) there was the horribly blatant Condi Rice LIE about not imagining terrorists using planes as missiles. She knows and was covering up the truth.11) there is the fact that intelligence agencies and the defense department were tracking and most likely protecting the hijackers.12) there was the Operation Northwoods plot, which showed the lengths the Pentagon would go to start a war.13) there is the history of state-sponsored synthetic terrorism throughout the ages.14) there was the quick clean up of ground zero and the sham of the NIST collapse analysis.15) there is the suppression of NYFD witness testimony to bombs in the WTC.16) there is the strong evidence that the WTC towers were brought down by explosives.17) there is the unlikelihood of the hijackings themselves-- surprise attacks with knives and boxcutters18) there is the extreme unlikelihood that the terrorists could pilot the planes as effectively as they were supposed to have.19) there is the absolutely bizarre nature of the flight 93 crash and the mystery of the many phone calls from that flight.20) there was the complete white-wash that was the US government's 9/11 commission.And I could go on and on.The point is, there are many many reasons to think 9/11 was an inside job.NOW-- I am looking for physical signs and indications that would help me figure out exactly what happened. Perhaps I can even find a new "smoking gun".So, that is what I am up to. I hope I haven't wandered too far into la-la land. I don't think I have,

Feds: Senior Wal-Mart Execs. Knew Illegal Immigrants Were Cleaning Stores� | The Huffington Post

Feds: Senior Wal-Mart Execs. Knew Illegal Immigrants Were Cleaning Stores� | The Huffington Post

mparent7777: Bill Grigsby: A Culture Of Lies

mparent7777: Bill Grigsby: A Culture Of Lies

Video from France: In photograph, a policeman in plain clothes shooting at a young person

Translated version of http://www.afrik.com/article8965.html

The FBI is supposed to be investigating the Niger forgeries, but it hasn't bothered to interview

TAPPED: November 2005 Archives

Talking Points Memo: by Joshua Micah Marshall: November 06, 2005 - November 12, 2005 Archives

Talking Points Memo: by Joshua Micah Marshall: November 06, 2005 - November 12, 2005 Archives

The Hill reports that Emilia DiSanto, chief investigator for Finance Committee Chairman, Sen. Chuck Grassley, was accosted outside her home last Wednesday evening and beaten repeatedly with a baseball bat. The article says she was later "treated for significant upper-body injuries [and] nine staples were needed to close her head wound."

Investigators seem to believe that the attack was related to her work on the hill.

Believe What We Say, Not What We Do

Politics of Dissent

Postman Patel: "We do not torture" ...sneh ...sneh ...

Postman Patel: "We do not torture" ...sneh ...sneh ...

News Hounds: Infotainment for the Attention-Span-Impaired

News Hounds: Infotainment for the Attention-Span-Impaired

News Hounds: Is Fox More Dangerous In What They Report Or In What They Don't Report?

News Hounds: Is Fox More Dangerous In What They Report Or In What They Don't Report?

The Wrong Journalistic Decision

The Wrong Journalistic Decision

ZNet |U.S. | Vice President Lied As White House Sought To Defuse Leak Inquiry

ZNet |U.S. | Vice President Lied As White House Sought To Defuse Leak Inquiry

Webster Tarpley Video from Wingtv.net, 9/11/2001 Truth
Posted by Picasa

JustinLogan.com: Hacktacular!

JustinLogan.com: Hacktacular!

Hacktacular!
If you thought President Bush's nomination of Daniel Pipes to a position at the US Institute for Peace was bad....

Humint Events Online: Details of the First Hit

Humint Events Online: Details of the First Hit

Monday, November 07, 2005

Details of the First Hit
All right, so maybe the strange shadows that appear on the face of the WTC (in particular see frames 56 and 57) are simply from the complex play of sunlight on the wings and body of the plane as it approaches and enters the tower.But what accounts for the odd pimple that appears to the left of where the left wingtip hits? Moreover, does the plane ever entirely go in the building, or does the tail turn into a explosive cloud?What a striking difference between the first and second hits-- where with the first hit, an explosion forms immediately at the site of impact whereas with the second hit, the explosion comes out the other side of the building first. Granted, part of this difference is that the first plane is hitting the core dead-on, whereas the second plane avoids the core. However, the second plane STILL rams into multiple concrete and steel floor slabs at a perpendicular angle, and these should present a significant obstacle.UPDATE: there is also a suspicious explosive "pimple" that develops on the right side of the plane-- see frames 73 and 74 here. The reason these "pimples" are suspicious is because they devleop at the ends of the wings, away from where the explosion should be. These pimples are sort of like independent explosions, almost as if someone was trying to enlarge the hole the plane's wings made.
posted by Spooked at 10:17 AM

2 Comments:
PerpetualYnquisitive said...
Here are a couple of pictures that are of interest.
http://911review.com/attack/wtc/imgs/wtc_plane1.jpg
http://www.vvm.com/~cdhoit/AT_WTC_AAflt11impact2_Naudet.jpg
If you have the Naudet brothers DVD, I suggest that you watch the first impact frame by frame. Watch the dark band at the top of both of the towers, you can see what I am describing in the two pictures above.
8:02 PM
Spooked said...
I think I know what you're talking about. There's clearly some weird stuff there going on.

IntoxiNation: Stop Your Whining Tom Delay-News, views and opinions about the dirty politics surrounding our right sided government.

IntoxiNation: Stop Your Whining Tom Delay-News, views and opinions about the dirty politics surrounding our right sided government.

A tale of two generals

Left I on the News

WSJ.com - Beware a 'Digital Munich'

WSJ.com - Beware a 'Digital Munich'

Blogger Thoughts: Pure Hooey

Joe's Dartblog: Misunderstanding Conservatism

Joe's Dartblog: Misunderstanding Conservatism

The Blog | Matt Brown: Standing Up to President Bush in Rhode Island | The Huffington Post

The Blog | Matt Brown: Standing Up to President Bush in Rhode Island | The Huffington Post

Godless Mom in the Bible Belt: The Face of Evil

Godless Mom in the Bible Belt: The Face of Evil

George Washington's Blog: Wouldn't You have Spoken Up?

George Washington's Blog: Wouldn't You have Spoken Up?

During the afternoon of 9/11, the Mayor of New York city and the Governor of New York state held a press conference. Reporters asked 2 interesting questions:"Is there anything to indicate that there could be MORE BOMBS, more planes out there?" "So, the only National Guard we'll see will be in lower Manhattan, in the BOMB site area?" Neither the Mayor nor the Governor corrected the reporters by stating that there weren't any bombs, and that -- instead -- the twin towers had collapsed due solely to airplane and fire damage. If you were a high-level official trying to calm down the public in a major crisis (which is part of the job description) and there weren't in fact bombs in the world trade centers, wouldn't you have corrected the reporters in order to kill unfounded rumors and minimize panic? Doesn't this lack of a statement amount to an acknowledgment that the Mayor and Governor believed there were bombs in the twin towers?By way of analogy, imagine that 10 witnesses say they saw Mike shoot Joe. In a press conference, a reporter asks the police chief if police know why Mike shot Joe, and the chief answers without correcting the reporter. In other words, the police chief does not answer by saying something like "No no, Fred shot Joe" or "we don't know who shot Joe yet, we've just started investigating". Isn't that further circumstantial evidence that tends to show that Mike shot Joe? Doesn't the silence in the face of bomb-related questions help corroborate the numerous eyewitness statements of bombs in the trade centers, such as the following:A reporter for USA Today stated that the FBI believed that bombs in the buildings brought the buildings down;The NY Fire Department Chief of Safety stated there were "bombs" and "secondary devices", which caused the explosions in the buildings;A NYC firefighters who witnessed attacks stated that it looked like there were bombs in the buildings;A NYC firefighter stated "On the last trip up a bomb went off. We think there was bombs set in the building";An MSNBC reporter stated that police had found a suspicious device "and they fear it could be something that might lead to another explosion" and the police officials believe "that one of the explosions at the world trade center . . . may have been caused by a van that was parked in the building that may have had some kind of explosive device in it, so their fear is that there may have been explosive devices planted either in the building or in the adjacent area";A NYC firefighter stated "the south tower . . . exploded . . . At that point a debate began to rage because the perception was that the building looked like it had been taken out with charges . . . many people had felt that possibly explosives had taken out 2 World Trade";Assistant Fire Commissioner stated “I thought . . . before . . . No. 2 came down, that I saw low-level flashes. . . . I . . . saw a flash flash flash . . . [at] the lower level of the building [not up where the fire was]. You know like when they . . . blow up a building ... ?" -- and a lieutenant firefighter the Commisioner spoke with independently verified the flashes;A firefighter said “[T]here was just an explosion. It seemed like on television [when] they blow up these buildings. It seemed like it was going all the way around like a belt, all these explosions”;Another firefigther stated "it almost sounded like bombs going off, like boom, boom, boom, like seven or eight"; A paramedic said "at first I thought it was -- do you ever see professional demolition where they set the charges on certain floors and then you hear pop pop pop pop pop -- thats exactly what because thought it was"; A police officer noted "People were saying, 'There’s another one and another one.' I heard reports of secondary bomb explosions ..."; A firefighter stated "there was an explosion in the south tower, which . . . just blew out in flames . . . One floor under another after another and when it hit about the fifth floor, I figured it was a bomb, because it looked like a synchronized deliberate kind of thing. I was there in '93" (referring to 1993 bombing of world trade center;A firefighter stated "it looked like sparkling around one specific layer of the building . . . Then the building started to come down. My initial reaction was that this was exactly the way it looks when they show you those implosions on TV";Dan Rather said that collapse was "reminiscent of those pictures we've all seen [when] a building was deliberately destroyed by well-placed dynamite to knock it down" (CNN's Aaron Brown and a Fox News reporter also made similar comments);A British newspaper stated "some eyewitnesses reported hearing another explosion just before the structure crumbled. Police said that it looked almost like a 'planned implosion'";One ABC reporter stated it looked like a controlled demolition; another ABC reporter stated "anyone who has ever watched a building being demolished on purpose knows that if you're going to do this you have to get at the under-infrastructure of the building to bring it down";A reporter for WNYC radio said "The reporters were trying to figure out what had happened. We were thinking bombs had brought the buildings down";A Wall Street Journal reporter said "I heard this metallic roar, looked up and saw what I thought was just a peculiar site of individual floors, one after the other exploding outward. I thought to myself, "My God, they’re going to bring the building down." And they, whoever they are, HAD SET CHARGES . . . . I saw the explosions"; andA facilities manager in the north tower "was convinced that there were bombs planted all over the place and someone was sitting at a control panel pushing detonator buttons".You can view links to the source materials for all eyewitness quotes at www.911Proof.com.The 9/11 Commission Report did not even once mention the word "explosion" or "bomb". The mainstream media hasn't touched the evidence of bombs in the trade center. Democratic and republican politicans smear anyone who even raises the issue as a conspiracy nut. Isn't it time that we faced the elephant in the living room? Can our democracy survive if we don't?

Jihad - Riots NOT spontaneous? ...

Jihad - Riots NOT spontaneous? ...

Ezra Klein: More Signs of Our System's Impending Collapse

Ezra Klein: More Signs of Our System's Impending Collapse

Ezra Klein: Life According to LaRouche

Ezra Klein: Life According to LaRouche

Disinformation :: Illuminati Conspiracy Part One: A Precise Exegesis On The Available Evidence

Disinformation :: Illuminati Conspiracy Part One: A Precise Exegesis On The Available Evidence

DysBUSHtopia: B. Foley: GITMO -- Torture is US

DysBUSHtopia: B. Foley: GITMO -- Torture is US

Bush meltdown: Belated justice or coup d'�tat?

Bush meltdown: Belated justice or coup d'�tat?

Vice president lied as White House sought to defuse leak inquiry

Vice president lied as White House sought to defuse leak inquiry

David Swanson: the Bush-Cheney Ethics Refresher Course, a Syllabus

David Swanson: the Bush-Cheney Ethics Refresher Course, a Syllabus

Use of chemical weapons by the US military in Iraq. Veteran admits: Bodies melted away before us.

Use of chemical weapons by the US military in Iraq. Veteran admits: Bodies melted away before us.

THE MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES

Today's Article: # 357

Truth About Iraqis: For the love of Israel

Truth About Iraqis: For the love of Israel

Evolution in the bible, says Vatican - The Other Side - Breaking News 24/7 - NEWS.com.au

Evolution in the bible, says Vatican - The Other Side - Breaking News 24/7 - NEWS.com.au

Led by Roberts, conservatives continued to fals ... [Media Matters]

Led by Roberts, conservatives continued to fals ... [Media Matters]

Time whitewashed Progress for America; ignored ... [Media Matters]

Time whitewashed Progress for America; ignored ... [Media Matters]

NY Times reported that anonymous "[p]eople invo ... [Media Matters]

NY Times reported that anonymous "[p]eople invo ... [Media Matters]

Brooks falsely claimed Clinton and Reagan appro ... [Media Matters]

Brooks falsely claimed Clinton and Reagan appro ... [Media Matters]

Swing State Project: VA-Gov: Republican Governor's Association Misleads for Jerry Kilgore

Swing State Project: VA-Gov: Republican Governor's Association Misleads for Jerry Kilgore

firedoglake: Why the Pressure Tactics -- Something More to Hide?

firedoglake: Why the Pressure Tactics -- Something More to Hide?

firedoglake: Will Roberts Sit in Judgment of...Himself?

firedoglake: Will Roberts Sit in Judgment of...Himself?

Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS Warning

Crooks and Liars: "power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without formulating any charge known "

power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without formulating any charge known

Crooks and Liars

BlondeSense: Regarding Torture

BlondeSense: Regarding Torture

This is a must read by Ray McGovern: Torture in Our Name (Link)Here’s something from his piece that is interesting:"President Bush and Vice President Cheney set the tone. According to counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke, it began on the evening of 9/11. Immediately after the president's 8:30 p.m. TV address to the nation, he met with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Clarke in a bunker under the East Wing of the White House. In his book, Against All Enemies, Clarke describes the president as "confident, determined, and forceful":"I want you all to understand that we are at war ... any barriers in your way, they're gone. Any money you need, you have it ... I don't care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass."The vice president tipped his hand to Tim Russert during an interview on NBC's Meet the Press on September 16, 2001. The conversation centered on the US response to 9/11. After discussing military capabilities, Cheney shifted focus:"We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side ... A lot of what needs to be done will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies ... it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal ..."Can we live through three more years of this sort of action in our country? Evil lives here now. Is there a chill running up your spine as you realize it’s worse than you thought?

From the president, a tortured answer on torture

Salon.com - War Room

We told you earlier that George W. Bush, visiting Panama today, once again refused to answer a question about the Valerie Plame case. But the Plame question was only one of two the president was asked about doings back home. And he didn't really answer the other one, either.
The second question concerned torture. As Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, as the Iraq death toll mounted, as gas prices rose and his top aide was indicted, Dick Cheney has been pretty near invisible. The Washington Post offers one reason why: The vice president has been busy waging "an intense and largely unpublicized campaign" to prevent the imposition of any limits on how the military, or at least the CIA, treats detainees in U.S. custody. Cheney's unyielding approach on the question of torture puts him at odds with everyone from Condoleezza Rice to John McCain -- and that's just on the Republican side of the equation.
The president was asked today whether he sided with Cheney. His answer: "Our country is at war, and our government has the obligation to protect the American people." To be fair, Bush did elaborate. He said that the executive branch and the legislative branch both have an obligation to protect the American people, and he insisted that "anything we do to that effort, to that end, in this effort, any activity we conduct, is within the law." Then he added: "We do not torture."
Of course, it all depends on what the meaning of "law" is. And "torture," too. The administration's lawyers have argued that the president has infinite authority during wartime. Read in that light, Bush's comments today are a sort of tautology: "Anything we do is ... is within the law" because "anything we do ... is within the law." As for torture? As former Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee taught us in a legal memorandum the Justice Department has since repudiated, at least officially, the word "torture" can be defined so narrowly that almost nothing comes within its meaning.
So what did Bush really mean today? A clue can probably be found in what he said next. Apparently referring to Cheney's efforts to fight off a ban on torture that passed the Senate by a 90-9 vote, Bush said that his administration is "working with Congress to make sure as we go forward, we make it possible -- more possible -- to do our job."
-- Tim Grieve

President Cheney - His office really does run national security. By Daniel�Benjamin

President Cheney - His office really does run national security. By Daniel Benjamin

war stories
Military analysis.President CheneyHis office really does run national security.By Daniel BenjaminPosted Monday, Nov. 7, 2005, at 5:06 PM ET


He made the case for war
It has become a cliché to say that Dick Cheney is the most powerful vice president in American history. Nonetheless, here is a prediction: When the historians really get digging into the paper entrails of the Bush administration—or possibly when Scooter Libby goes on trial—those who have intoned that phrase will still be astonished at the extent to which the Office of Vice President Dick Cheney was the center of power inside the White House—and at the grip it had on foreign and defense policy.
With a national security staff that numbered 14 last year (Al Gore usually had four or five), Cheney's office has a finger in every pie. Several of the State Department's top diplomats, including Eric Edelman, now undersecretary of defense for policy, and Victoria Nuland, now ambassador to NATO, are alums of Cheney's office. According to David L. Phillips' Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco, the dominant figure in some of the key interagency deliberations on postwar Iraq was not the State Department official who chaired them but Samantha Ravich, a former Cheney aide who has since left the government. In addition, Cheney has remarkable influence over his onetime boss, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Writing in Slate, Tim Naftali was surprised by the news in the New York Times that Cheney's office was calling the tune on how the United States treats terrorist detainees. At least as interesting was the mention in the same story that the Office of the Vice President (or OVP) had hammered out the compromise in last year's intelligence reform bill that "made clear that the new national intelligence director could not interfere in the military chain of command." Eighty percent of the nation's intelligence budget is spent within the Pentagon. So, that compromise leaves a large question mark over whether John Negroponte or his successors will have anything like the power the 9/11 commission had anticipated when it proposed sweeping intelligence reform.
Continue Article
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Cheney's connection with intelligence and, particularly, Pentagon intelligence is not exactly new. The transmission lines for many of the bogus claims in 2002 and 2003 about the purported ties between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida ran from the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense through Cheney's office. Although the Libby indictment might lead some to believe that OVP was running an apolitical enforcement operation, it was doing much more than that. Cheney's team was producing the basic justification for going to war.
News accounts have placed the origin of much of the bad intelligence in the Office of Special Plans, which was run by Abram Shulsky, a graduate-school pal of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. In fact, the bad intel came largely out of something called the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, which reported to Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith. This group consisted of just two people: Michael Maloof, a controversial former aide to Richard Perle whose security clearances were eventually suspended, and David Wurmser, a longtime neoconservative advocate of toppling Saddam Hussein. (Since late 2003, Wurmser has worked in OVP.)
The information CTEG put together was treated differently than other intelligence. Unlike other reports, CTEG's conclusions about Iraq's training of jihadists in the use of explosives and weapons of mass destruction were never distributed to the many different agencies in the intelligence community. Although CTEG analysts met once with Director George Tenet and other CIA officials, they changed no minds at the agency on the issue of Saddam and al-Qaida, and their work was never "coordinated" or cleared by the various agencies that weigh in on intelligence publications. Top officers in military intelligence who saw the report refused to concur with it.
Nonetheless, CTEG's findings were the basis for briefings in the White House and on Capitol Hill. Some of CTEG's material was leaked to the Weekly Standard, where it was published. In that form, the Feith "annex" achieved some renown as a classic in the genre of cherry-picked intelligence.
Dick Cheney was CTEG's patron. He had the group present its material at OVP and the National Security Council. He made frequent public remarks, drawing on CTEG conclusions, alleging an al-Qaida/Saddam connection. (Even after the 9/11 commission delivered its verdict that there was no collaborative relationship between the two sides, Cheney announced that the evidence of the Bin Laden-Baghdad ties was "overwhelming.") John Hannah, a Cheney aide who became the vice president's national security adviser after Libby's resignation, recycled some of the material into a draft of the speech Secretary of State Colin Powell was to give at the United Nations in February 2003—a draft that Powell threw out, calling it "bullshit."
The wide airing of CTEG material clearly irked George Tenet, who declared at one point when pressed by congressmen in 2003 that he would "talk to" Cheney about some of the claims he was making. Whatever passed between them, Cheney was not deterred. In January 2004, he told a reporter for the Rocky Mountain News that the Standard article was the "best source of information" on Saddam's ties to al-Qaida. In June 2004, Cheney was still claiming that 9/11 conspirator Mohammed Atta met an Iraqi agent in Prague.
Much is still to be learned about how intelligence was used and abused in CTEG and OVP. But one story gives a hint of what the historians may find: When I interviewed him several months ago, Powell's former chief of staff Larry Wilkerson recounted the story of a meeting in the White House situation room during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq when policymakers met with top intelligence officials from a number of agencies. After the intelligence officials made their presentations, Douglas Feith "leapt to his feet, pointed to a certain National Intelligence Officer and declared 'You people don't know what you're talking about.' "
Feith had worked for Cheney—together with Scooter Libby—when he was secretary of defense in the administration of George H.W. Bush and, according to former administration sources, was even closer to Rumsfeld than Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was. After that outburst, Feith held up a piece of paper and read aloud an account of al-Qaida's ties with Iraq in the early 1990s. Then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, a man well-known and well-liked in Washington for his gentlemanly manners, looked on, aghast at the scene. Wilkerson told me that after the end of the meeting, he got a copy of the paper and determined it was a newspaper clipping that had been retyped in the vice president's office to be presented as "intelligence."
Browbeating intelligence officials, disregard for the National Security Council's traditional leadership of the interagency process—this kind of behavior, plenty of Bush administration officials privately attest, was typical as the Cheney-Rumsfeld axis that took the country to war. "Who knows," Larry Wilkerson wondered to me, "how many other people they intimidated."
Daniel Benjamin is co-author, with Steven Simon, of The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right. He served on the National Security Council staff 1994-1999.

A DEADLY INTERROGATION

The New Yorker: PRINTABLES
A DEADLY INTERROGATION
by JANE MAYER
Can the C.I.A. legally kill a prisoner?
Issue of 2005-11-14Posted 2005-11-07
At the end of a secluded cul-de-sac, in a fast-growing Virginia suburb favored by employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, is a handsome replica of an old-fashioned farmhouse, with a white-railed front porch. The large back yard has a swimming pool, which, on a recent October afternoon, was neatly covered. In the driveway were two cars, a late-model truck, and an all-terrain vehicle. The sole discordant note was struck by a faded American flag on the porch; instead of fluttering in the autumn breeze, it was folded on a heap of old Christmas ornaments.
The house belongs to Mark Swanner, a forty-six-year-old C.I.A. officer who has performed interrogations and polygraph tests for the agency, which has employed him at least since the nineteen-nineties. (He is not a covert operative.) Two years ago, at Abu Ghraib prison, outside Baghdad, an Iraqi prisoner in Swanner’s custody, Manadel al-Jamadi, died during an interrogation. His head had been covered with a plastic bag, and he was shackled in a crucifixion-like pose that inhibited his ability to breathe; according to forensic pathologists who have examined the case, he asphyxiated. In a subsequent internal investigation, United States government authorities classified Jamadi’s death as a “homicide,” meaning that it resulted from unnatural causes. Swanner has not been charged with a crime and continues to work for the agency.
After September 11th, the Justice Department fashioned secret legal guidelines that appear to indemnify C.I.A. officials who perform aggressive, even violent interrogations outside the United States. Techniques such as waterboarding—the near-drowning of a suspect—have been implicitly authorized by an Administration that feels that such methods may be necessary to win the war on terrorism. (In 2001, Vice-President Dick Cheney, in an interview on “Meet the Press,” said that the government might have to go to “the dark side” in handling terrorist suspects, adding, “It’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal.”) The harsh treatment of Jamadi and other prisoners in C.I.A. custody, however, has inspired an emotional debate in Washington, raising questions about what limits should be placed on agency officials who interrogate foreign terrorist suspects outside U.S. territory.
This fall, in response to the exposure of widespread prisoner abuse at American detention facilities abroad—among them Abu Ghraib; Guantánamo Bay, in Cuba; and Bagram Air Base, in Afghanistan—John McCain, the Republican senator from Arizona, introduced a bill in Congress that would require Americans holding prisoners abroad to follow the same standards of humane treatment required at home by the U.S. Constitution. Prisoners must not be brutalized, the bill states, regardless of their “nationality or physical location.” On October 5th, in a rebuke to President Bush, who strongly opposed McCain’s proposal, the Senate voted 90–9 in favor of it.
Senior Administration officials have led a fierce, and increasingly visible, fight to protect the C.I.A.’s classified interrogation protocol. Late last month, Cheney and Porter Goss, the C.I.A. director, had an unusual forty-five-minute private meeting on Capitol Hill with Senator McCain, who was tortured as a P.O.W. during the Vietnam War. They argued that the C.I.A. sometimes needs the “flexibility” to treat detainees in the war on terrorism in “cruel, inhuman, and degrading” ways. Cheney sought to add an exemption to McCain’s bill, permitting brutal methods when “such operations are vital to the protection of the United States or its citizens from terrorist attack.” A Washington Post editorial decried Cheney’s visit, calling him the “Vice-President for Torture.” In the coming weeks, a conference committee of the House and the Senate will decide whether McCain’s proposal becomes law; three of the nine senators who voted against the measure are on the committee.
The outcome of this wider political debate may play a role in determining the fate of Swanner, whose name has not been publicly disclosed before, and who declined several requests to be interviewed. Passage of the McCain legislation by both Houses of Congress would mean that there is strong political opposition to the abusive treatment of prisoners, and would put increased pressure on the Justice Department to prosecute interrogators like Swanner—who could conceivably be charged with assault, negligent manslaughter, or torture. Swanner’s lawyer, Nina Ginsberg, declined to discuss his case on the record. But he has been under investigation by the Justice Department for more than a year.
Manadel al-Jamadi was captured by Navy SEALs at 2 a.m. on November 4, 2003, after a violent struggle at his house, outside Baghdad. Jamadi savagely fought one of the SEALs before being subdued in his kitchen; during the altercation, his stove fell on them. The C.I.A. had identified him as a “high-value” target, because he had allegedly supplied the explosives used in several atrocities perpetrated by insurgents, including the bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in October, 2003. After being removed from his house, Jamadi was manhandled by several of the SEALs, who gave him a black eye and a cut on his face; he was then transferred to C.I.A. custody, for interrogation at Abu Ghraib. According to witnesses, Jamadi was walking and speaking when he arrived at the prison. He was taken to a shower room for interrogation. Some forty-five minutes later, he was dead.
For most of the time that Jamadi was being interrogated at Abu Ghraib, there were only two people in the room with him. One was an Arabic-speaking translator for the C.I.A. working on a private contract, who has been identified in military-court papers only as “Clint C.” He was given immunity against criminal prosecution in exchange for his coöperation. The other person was Mark Swanner.
In the spring of 2004, the fact of pervasive prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib became public, on “60 Minutes II” and in a series of articles in these pages by Seymour M. Hersh. Photographs, taken by U.S. soldiers, that showed Iraqi prisoners being hooded, sexually humiliated, and threatened with dogs were published around the world. One of the most harrowing images was of Jamadi’s severely battered corpse, which had been wrapped in plastic and put on ice; he became known in the media as the Ice Man.
Around this time, John Helgerson, the C.I.A.’s inspector general, sent investigators to Iraq and San Diego to interview witnesses about the agency’s role in Jamadi’s death. These investigators determined that there was the possibility of criminality—the threshold level required by the intelligence agency in order for the case to be referred to the Justice Department. The agency did so, and officials in the Justice Department then forwarded the case to the office of Paul McNulty, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, which has jurisdiction over C.I.A. headquarters. The dossier has been there for more than a year. A lawyer familiar with the case, who asked not to be named, said that the Swanner file seemed to be “lying kind of fallow.”
A spokeswoman for McNulty said that he would have no comment on the case, because it was still under investigation. (Last month, President Bush nominated McNulty to the position of Deputy Attorney General, the second most powerful job in the Justice Department.) No other official in the Justice Department would discuss on the record why, more than two years after Jamadi’s death, no decision has been made about pressing charges against anyone.
A government official familiar with the case, who declined to be named, indicated that establishing guilt in the case might be complicated, because of Jamadi’s rough handling by the SEALs before he entered the custody of the C.I.A. Yet, in the past two years, several of the Navy SEALs who captured Jamadi and delivered him to C.I.A. officials have faced abuse charges in military-justice proceedings, and have been exonerated. Moreover, three medical experts who have examined Jamadi’s case told me that the injuries he sustained from the SEALs could not have caused his death.
Fred Hitz, who served as the C.I.A.’s inspector general from 1990 to 1998, and who is now a lecturer in public and international affairs at Princeton University, said of Bush Administration officials, “I just think they’re playing stall ball.” He told me that he had no inside knowledge of the Swanner case, but he believes that, for numerous reasons, ranging from protecting national security to avoiding political embarrassment, Administration officials “would be opposed to any accountability in this case. They want it to disappear off the screen.” (A spokesman for the C.I.A. said that its internal investigation into Jamadi’s death was “nearly complete,” making it “inappropriate to discuss any of the details.”)
John Radsan, a lawyer formerly in the C.I.A’s Office of General Counsel, says, “Along with the usual problems of dealing with classified information in a criminal case, this could open a can of worms if a C.I.A. official in this case got indicted—a big fat can of worms about what set of rules apply to people like Jamadi. The sixty-four-thousand-dollar question is: What has been authorized? Can the C.I.A. torture people? A case like this opens up Pandora’s box.”
Since September 11, 2001, the C.I.A.’s treatment and interrogation of terrorist suspects has remained almost entirely hidden from public view. Human-rights groups estimate that some ten thousand foreign suspects are being held in U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, and other countries. A small but unknown part of this population is in the custody of the C.I.A., which, as Dana Priest reported recently in the Washington Post, has operated secret prisons in Thailand and in Eastern Europe. It is also unclear how seriously the agency deals with allegations of prisoner abuse. The C.I.A. tends to be careful about following strict legal procedures, including the briefing of the top-ranking members of the congressional intelligence committees on its covert activities. But experts could recall no instance of a C.I.A. officer being tried in a public courtroom for manslaughter or murder. Thomas Powers, the author of two books about the C.I.A., told me, “I’ve never heard of anyone at the C.I.A. being convicted of a killing.” He added that a case such as Jamadi’s had awkward political implications. “Is the C.I.A. capable of addressing an illegal killing by its own hands?” he asked. “My guess is not.” Whereas the military has subjected itself to a dozen internal investigations in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal, and has punished more than two hundred soldiers for wrongdoing, the agency has undertaken almost no public self-examination.
The C.I.A. has reportedly been implicated in at least four deaths of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq, including that of Jamadi, and has referred eight potentially criminal cases involving abuse and misconduct to the Justice Department. In March, Goss, the C.I.A.’s director, testified before Congress that “we don’t do torture,” and the agency’s press office issued a release stating, “All approved interrogation techniques, both past and present, are lawful and do not constitute torture. . . . C.I.A. policies on interrogation have always followed legal guidance from the Department of Justice. If an individual violates the policy, then he or she will be held accountable.”
Yet the government has brought charges against only one person affiliated with the agency: David Passaro, a low-level contract employee, not a full-fledged C.I.A. officer. In 2003, Passaro, while interrogating an Afghan prisoner, allegedly beat him with a flashlight so severely that he eventually died from his injuries. In two other incidents of prisoner abuse, the Times reported last month, charges probably will not be brought against C.I.A. personnel: the 2003 case of an Iraqi prisoner who was forced head first into a sleeping bag, then beaten; and the 2002 abuse of an Afghan prisoner who froze to death after being stripped and chained to the floor of a concrete cell. (The C.I.A. supervisor involved in the latter case was subsequently promoted.)
One reason these C.I.A. officials may not be facing charges is that, in recent years, the Justice Department has established a strikingly narrow definition of torture. In August, 2002, the department’s Office of Legal Counsel sent a memo on interrogations to the White House, which argued that a coercive technique was torture only when it induced pain equivalent to what a person experiencing death or organ failure might suffer. By implication, all lesser forms of physical and psychological mistreatment—what critics have called “torture lite”—were legal. The memo also said that torture was illegal only when it could be proved that the interrogator intended to cause the required level of pain. And it provided interrogators with another large exemption: torture might be acceptable if an interrogator was acting in accordance with military “necessity.” A source familiar with the memo’s origins, who declined to speak on the record, said that it “was written as an immunity, a blank check.” In 2004, the “torture memo,” as it became known, was leaked, complicating the nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney General; as White House counsel, Gonzales had approved the memo. The Administration subsequently revised the guidelines, using language that seemed more restrictive. But a little-noticed footnote protected the coercive methods permitted by the “torture memo,” stating that they did not violate the “standards set forth in this memorandum.”
The Bush Administration has resisted disclosing the contents of two Justice Department memos that established a detailed interrogation policy for the Pentagon and the C.I.A. A March, 2003, classified memo was “breathtaking,” the same source said. The document dismissed virtually all national and international laws regulating the treatment of prisoners, including war-crimes and assault statutes, and it was radical in its view that in wartime the President can fight enemies by whatever means he sees fit. According to the memo, Congress has no constitutional right to interfere with the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, including making laws that limit the ways in which prisoners may be interrogated. Another classified Justice Department memo, issued in August, 2002, is said to authorize numerous “enhanced” interrogation techniques for the C.I.A. These two memos sanction such extreme measures that, even if the agency wanted to discipline or prosecute agents who stray beyond its own comfort level, the legal tools to do so may no longer exist. Like the torture memo, these documents are believed to have been signed by Jay Bybee, the former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, but written by a Justice Department lawyer, John Yoo, who is now a professor of law at Berkeley.
For nearly a year, Democratic senators critical of alleged abuses have been demanding to see these memos. “We need to know what was authorized,” Carl Levin, a Democrat from Michigan, told me. “Was it waterboarding? The use of dogs? Stripping detainees? . . . The refusal to give us these documents is totally inexcusable.” Levin is a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is supposed to have an oversight role in relation to the C.I.A. “The Administration is getting away with just saying no,” he went on. “There’s no claim of executive privilege. There’s no claim of national security—we’ve offered to keep it classified. It’s just bullshit. They just don’t want us to know what they’re doing, or have done.”
By the summer of 2003, the insurgency against the U.S. occupation of Iraq had grown into a confounding and lethal insurrection, and the Pentagon and the White House were pressing C.I.A. agents and members of the Special Forces to get the kind of intelligence needed to crush it. On orders from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Geoffrey Miller, who had overseen coercive interrogations of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo, imposed similar methods at Abu Ghraib. In October of that year, however—a month before Jamadi’s death—the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion stating that Iraqi insurgents were covered by the Geneva Conventions, which require the humane treatment of prisoners and forbid coercive interrogations. The ruling reversed an earlier interpretation, which had concluded, erroneously, that Iraqi insurgents were not protected by international law.
As a result of these contradictory mandates from Washington, the rules of engagement at Abu Ghraib became muddy, and the tactics grew increasingly ad hoc. Jeffrey H. Smith, a former general counsel of the C.I.A., told me, “Abu Ghraib has its roots at the top. I think this uncertainty about who was and who was not covered by the Geneva Conventions, and all this talk that they’re all terrorists, bred the climate in which this kind of abuse takes place.”
At Abu Ghraib, the confusion over interrogation and detention methods was compounded by the fact that C.I.A. officials worked side by side with U.S. military people. Colonel Janis Karpinski, a former commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, which oversaw the administration of Abu Ghraib during the period of widespread abuse, has said that C.I.A. officers, along with contract interpreters and some military-intelligence officers, did not wear uniforms when they visited the prison, and it was not clear, even to her, what they were doing there. “I thought most of the civilians there were interpreters, but there were some civilians I didn’t know,” she told Seymour Hersh. “I called them disappearing ghosts. . . . They were always bringing in somebody for interrogation, or waiting to collect somebody going out.” C.I.A. officials, unlike members of the Army and the Navy, are not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which prohibits “cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of” prisoners.
Walter Diaz, a military policeman, was on guard duty at Abu Ghraib the morning that Jamadi was delivered to the prison. He told me, “The O.G.A.”— “other government agencies,” initials commonly used to protect the identity of the C.I.A.—“would bring in people all the time to interview them. We had one wing, Tier One Alpha, reserved for the O.G.A. They’d have maybe twenty people there at a time.” He went on, “They were their prisoners. They’d get into a room and lock it up. We, as soldiers, didn’t get involved. We’d lock the door for them and leave. We didn’t know what they were doing.” But, he recalled, “we heard a lot of screaming.”
Considering this level of secrecy, it’s doubtful that any details would have emerged about the C.I.A.’s role in Jamadi’s death had it not been for a strange and tangential chain of events. Three months after Jamadi died, Jeffrey Hopper, a Navy SEAL who had been assigned to carry out joint operations with the C.I.A. in Baghdad, was accused of stealing another SEAL’s body armor. Hopper, who had been nicknamed Klepto by the unit, was expelled from the Special Forces. When he was dismissed, he told authorities that he knew of far worse offenses committed by other SEALs, and he cited the abuse of several prisoners, including Jamadi. His accusations formed the basis of multiple charges against several SEALs, which led to the court-martial of Lieutenant Andrew Ledford, the commander of the platoon that captured Jamadi, for, among other things, allowing his troops to assault the prisoner. Last May, Ledford was acquitted of any wrongdoing; but during the hearings, which were open, a number of troubling facts spilled out, hinting at the C.I.A.’s role in Jamadi’s death.
Seth Hettena, an Associated Press reporter based in San Diego, California, attended the hearings. The courtroom testimony, he reported, indicated that Jamadi, before arriving at Abu Ghraib, was interrogated “in a rough manner” by a combination of SEALs and C.I.A. personnel in “the Romper Room,” a tiny space in the Navy camp at Baghdad International Airport. Swanner was among those present. One of the SEALs testified that after Jamadi was handcuffed a C.I.A. interrogator rammed “his arm up against the detainee’s chest, pressing on him with all his weight.” According to a recent report by John McChesney on National Public Radio, a C.I.A. guard who witnessed the scene later told investigators that, after stripping Jamadi and dousing him in cold water, a C.I.A. interrogator threatened to “barbecue” him if he didn’t talk. Jamadi reportedly moaned, “I’m dying, I’m dying.” The interrogator replied, “You’ll be wishing you were dying.”
Court testimony also established that Jamadi was “body-slammed” by the SEALs into the back of a Humvee before being delivered to Abu Ghraib. During this time, he was handcuffed. “Was he a threat?” a Navy prosecutor asked one of the SEALs on trial. “No, ma’am,” the SEAL conceded.
Soon after the Associated Press published Hettena’s Romper Room story, two unidentified officials, evidently from the C.I.A., appeared in the courtroom. From that point on, Hettena told me, the officials, who did not give their names, protested when the testimony touched on matters sensitive to the C.I.A. In many instances, reporters and other members of the public were required to leave the courtroom. On another occasion, an unidentified C.I.A. witness testified from behind a blue curtain. Several areas of questioning by defense lawyers for the SEALs were ruled off limits. When one of the defense lawyers, Matthew Freedus, asked a witness, “What position was Jamadi in when he died?,” the C.I.A. representatives protested, saying that the answer was classified. The same objection was made when a question was asked about the role that water had played in Jamadi’s interrogation.
By late last spring, the SEALs’ reputations had been tarnished by the exposure of their rough treatment of Jamadi, but they were cleared of the gravest abuse charges. The question of who was responsible for Jamadi’s death remained unanswered. Milt Silverman, one of the defense attorneys, told me, “Who killed Jamadi? I know it wasn’t any of the SEALs. . . . That’s why their cases got dismissed.” Frank Spinner, a civilian lawyer who represented Ledford, said, “There’s a stronger case against the C.I.A. than there is against Ledford. But the military’s being hung out to dry while the C.I.A. skates. I want a public accounting, whether in a trial, a hearing before a congressional committee, or a public report. There’s got to be something more meaningful than sticking the case in a Justice Department drawer.”
Spinner and several of the other defense lawyers learned more about the C.I.A.’s role in Jamadi’s death than they were supposed to know, owing to a classification error made by the agency. The C.I.A. sent hundreds of pages of material on Jamadi’s death to the Navy; much of it was classified, and all of it was marked unclassified. The pages were passed on to the civilian lawyers, who read them carefully. The agency, after realizing its mistake, demanded that the lawyers return the classified material, and subsequently sealed virtually all the court records relating to the case. Some of the C.I.A. documents, however, were seen by a source familiar with the case, who shared their contents with me.
Manadel al-Jamadi arrived at Abu Ghraib naked from the waist down, according to an eyewitness, Jason Kenner, an M.P. with the 372nd Military Police Company. In a statement to C.I.A. investigators, Kenner recalled that Jamadi had been stripped of his pants, underpants, socks, and shoes, arriving in only a purple T-shirt and a purple jacket, and with a green plastic sandbag completely covering his head. Nevertheless, Kenner told C.I.A. investigators, “the prisoner did not appear to be in distress. He was walking fine, and his speech was normal.” The plastic “flex cuffs” on Jamadi’s wrists were so tight, however, that Kenner had trouble cutting them off when they were replaced with steel handcuffs and Jamadi’s hands were secured behind his back.
Staff Sergeant Mark Nagy, a reservist in the 372nd Military Police Company, was also on duty at Abu Ghraib when Jamadi arrived. According to the classified internal documents, he told C.I.A. investigators that Jamadi seemed “lucid,” noting that he was “talking during intake.” Nagy said that Jamadi was “not combative” when he was placed in a holding cell, and that he “responded to commands.” In Nagy’s opinion, there was “no need to get physical with him.”
Kenner told the investigators that, “minutes” after Jamadi was placed in the holding cell, an “interrogator”—later identified as Swanner—began “yelling at him, trying to find where some weapons were.” Kenner said that he could see Jamadi through the open door of the holding cell, “in a seated position like a scared child.” The yelling went on, he said, for five or ten minutes. At some point, Kenner said, Swanner and his translator “removed the prisoner’s jacket and shirt,” leaving him naked. He added that he saw no injuries or bruises. Soon afterward, the M.P.s were told by Swanner and the translator to “take the prisoner to Tier One,” the agency’s interrogation wing. The M.P.s dressed Jamadi in a standard-issue orange jumpsuit, keeping the sandbag over his head, and walked him to the shower room there for interrogation. Kenner said that Jamadi put up “no resistance.”
On the way, Nagy noticed that Jamadi was “groaning and breathing heavily, as if he was out of breath.” Walter Diaz, the M.P. who had been on guard duty at the prison, told C.I.A. investigators that Jamadi showed “no distress or complaints on the way to the shower room.” But he told me that he, too, noticed that Jamadi was having “breathing problems.” An autopsy showed that Jamadi had six fractured ribs; it is unclear when they were broken. The C.I.A. officials in charge of Jamadi did not give him even a cursory medical exam, although the Geneva Conventions require that prisoners receive “medical attention.”
“Jamadi was basically a ‘ghost prisoner,’ ” a former investigator on the case, who declined to be named, told me. “He wasn’t checked into the facility. People like this, they just bring ’em in, and use the facility for interrogations. The lower-ranking enlisted guys there just followed the orders from O.G.A. There was no booking process.”
According to Kenner’s testimony, when the group reached the shower room Swanner told the M.P.s that “he did not want the prisoner to sit and he wanted him shackled to the wall.” (No explanation for this decision is recorded.) There was a barred window on one wall. Kenner and Nagy, using a pair of leg shackles, attached Jamadi’s arms, which had been placed behind his back, to the bars on the window.
The Associated Press quoted an expert who described the position in which Jamadi died as a form of torture known as “Palestinian hanging,” in which a prisoner whose hands are secured behind his back is suspended by his arms. (The technique has allegedly been used in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) The M.P.s’ sworn accounts to investigators suggest that, at least at first, Jamadi was able to stand up, without pain: autopsy records show that he was five feet ten, and, as Diaz explained to me, the window was about five feet off the ground. The accounts concur that, while Jamadi was able to stand without discomfort, he couldn’t kneel or sit without hanging painfully from his arms. Once he was secured, the M.P.s left him alone in the room with Swanner and the translator.
Less than an hour later, Diaz said, he was walking past the shower room when Swanner came out and asked for help, reportedly saying, “This guy doesn’t want to coöperate.” According to the NPR report, one of the C.I.A. men told investigators that he called for medical help, but there is no available record of a doctor having been summoned. When Diaz entered the shower room, he said, he was surprised to see that Jamadi’s knees had buckled, and that he was almost kneeling. Swanner, he said, wanted the soldiers to reposition Jamadi, so that he would have to stand more erectly. Diaz called for additional help from two other soldiers in his company, Sergeant Jeffery Frost and Dennis Stevanus. But after they had succeeded in making Jamadi stand for a moment, as requested, by hitching his handcuffs higher up the window, Jamadi collapsed again. Diaz told me, “At first I was, like, ‘This guy’s drunk.’ He just dropped down to where his hands were, like, coming out of his handcuffs. He looked weird. I was thinking, He’s got to be hurting. All of his weight was on his hands and wrists—it looked like he was about to mess up his sockets.”
Swanner, whom Diaz described as a “kind of shabby-looking, overweight white guy,” who was wearing black clothing, was apparently less concerned. “He was saying, ‘He’s just playing dead,’ ” Diaz recalled. “He thought he was faking. He wasn’t worried at all.” While Jamadi hung from his arms, Diaz told me, Swanner “just kept talking and talking at him. But there was no answer.”
Frost told C.I.A. investigators that the interrogator had said that Jamadi was just “playing possum.” But, as Frost lifted Jamadi upright by his jumpsuit, noticing that it was digging into his crotch, he thought, This prisoner is pretty good at playing possum. When Jamadi’s body went slack again, Frost recalled commenting that he “had never seen anyone’s arms positioned like that, and he was surprised they didn’t just pop out of their sockets.”
Diaz, sensing that something was wrong, lifted Jamadi’s hood. His face was badly bruised. Diaz placed a finger in front of Jamadi’s open eyes, which didn’t move or blink, and deduced that he was dead. When the men lowered Jamadi to the floor, Frost told investigators, “blood came gushing out of his nose and mouth, as if a faucet had been turned on.”
Swanner, who had seemed so unperturbed, suddenly appeared “surprised” and “dumbfounded,” according to Frost. He began talking about how Jamadi had fought and resisted the entire way to the prison. He also made calls on his cell phone. Within minutes, Diaz said, four or five additional O.G.A. officers, also dressed in black, arrived on the scene.
Dr. Steven Miles, a medical ethicist at the University of Minnesota, who is writing a study of U.S. medical practices during the war on terrorism, has examined the Jamadi incident extensively. He recently recounted to me what happened that morning: “An Iraqi medical doctor working with the C.I.A. confirmed Jamadi’s death. Captain Donald Reese, the commander of Abu Ghraib M.P.s, came to the shower room and heard Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, the commander of military intelligence at the prison, say, ‘I am not going down for this alone.’ ”
C.I.A. personnel ordered that Jamadi’s body be kept in the shower room until the next morning. The corpse was packed in ice and bound with tape, apparently in an attempt to slow its decomposition and, Miles believes, to try to alter the perceived time of death. The ice was already melting when Specialist Sabrina Harman posed for pictures while stooping over Jamadi’s body, smiling and giving the thumbs-up sign. The next day, a medic inserted an I.V. in Jamadi’s arm, put the body on a stretcher, and took it out of the prison as if Jamadi were merely ill, so as to “not upset the other detainees.” Other interrogators, Miles said, “were told that Jamadi had died of a heart attack.” (There is no medical evidence that Jamadi experienced heart failure.) A military-intelligence officer later recounted that a local taxi-driver was paid to take away Jamadi’s body.
Before leaving, Frost told investigators, Swanner confided that he “did not get any information out of the prisoner.” C.I.A. officials took with them the bloodied hood that had covered Jamadi’s head; it was later thrown away. “They destroyed evidence, and failed to preserve the scene of the crime,” Spinner, the lawyer for one of the Navy SEALs, said.
The next day, Swanner gave a statement to Army investigators, stressing that he hadn’t laid a hand on Jamadi, and hadn’t done anything wrong. “Clint C.,” the translator, also said that Swanner hadn’t beaten Jamadi. “I don’t think anybody intended the guy to die,” a former investigator on the case, who asked not to be identified, told me. But he believes that the decision to shackle Jamadi to the window reflected an intent to cause suffering. (Under American and international law, intent is central to assessing criminality in war-crimes and torture cases.) The C.I.A., he said, “put him in that position to get him to talk. They took it that pain equals coöperation.”
The autopsy, performed by military pathologists five days later, classified Jamadi’s death as a homicide, saying that the cause of death was “compromised respiration” and “blunt force injuries” to Jamadi’s head and torso. But it appears that the pathologists who performed the autopsy were unaware that Jamadi had been shackled to a high window. When a description of Jamadi’s position was shared with two of the country’s most prominent medical examiners—both of whom volunteered to review the autopsy report free, at the request of a lawyer representing one of the SEALs—their conclusion was different. Miles, independently, concurred.
One of those examiners, Dr. Michael Baden, who is the chief forensic pathologist for the New York State Police, told me, “What struck me was that Jamadi was alive and well when he walked into the prison. The SEALs were accused of causing head injuries before he arrived, but he had no significant head injuries—certainly no brain injuries that would have caused death.” Jamadi’s bruises, he said, were no doubt painful, but they were not life-threatening. Baden went on, “He also had injuries to his ribs. You don’t die from broken ribs. But if he had been hung up in this way and had broken ribs, that’s different.” In his judgment, “asphyxia is what he died from—as in a crucifixion.” Baden, who had inspected a plastic bag of the type that was placed over Jamadi’s head, said that the bag “could have impaired his breath, but he couldn’t have died from that alone.” Of greater concern, he thought, was Jamadi’s position. “If his hands were pulled up five feet—that’s to his neck. That’s pretty tough. That would put a lot of tension on his rib muscles, which are needed for breathing. It’s not only painful—it can hinder the diaphragm from going up and down, and the rib cage from expanding. The muscles tire, and the breathing function is impaired, so there’s less oxygen entering the bloodstream.” A person in such a state would first lose consciousness, he said, and eventually would die. The hood, he suggested, would likely have compounded the problem, because the interrogators “can’t see his face if he’s turning blue. We see a lot about a patient’s condition by looking at his face. By putting that goddam hood on, they can’t see if he’s conscious.” It also “doesn’t permit them to know when he died.” The bottom line, Baden said, is that Jamadi “didn’t die as a result of any injury he got before getting to the prison.”
Dr. Cyril Wecht, a medical doctor and a lawyer who is the coroner of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and a former president of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, independently reached the same conclusion. The interpretation put forward by the military pathologists, he said, “didn’t fit with their own report. They said he died of blunt-force trauma, yet there was no significant evidence of trauma to the head.” Instead, Wecht believes that Jamadi “died of compromised respiration,” and that “the position the body was in would have been the cause of death.” He added, “Mind you, I’m not a critic of the Iraq war. But I don’t think we should reduce ourselves to the insurgents’ barbaric levels.”
Walter Diaz told me, “Someone should be charged. If Jamadi was already handcuffed, there was no reason to treat the guy the way they did—the way they hung him.” Diaz said he didn’t know if Swanner had intended to torture Jamadi, or whether the death was accidental. But he was troubled by the government’s inaction, and by what he saw as the agency’s attempt at a coverup. “They tried to blame the SEALs. The C.I.A. had a big role in this. But you know the C.I.A.—who’s going to go against them?”
According to Jeffrey Smith, the former general counsel of the C.I.A., now a private-practice lawyer who handles national-security cases, a decision to prosecute Swanner “would probably go all the way up to the Attorney General.” Critics of the Administration, such as John Sifton, a lawyer for Human Rights Watch, question whether Alberto Gonzales, who became Attorney General last year, has too many conflicts of interest to weigh the case against Swanner fairly. Sifton said, “It’s hard to imagine the current leadership pursuing these guys, because the head of the Justice Department, Alberto Gonzales, is centrally implicated in crafting the policies that led to the abuse.” He suggested that the prudent thing for Gonzales to do would be to “recuse himself from such a decision, and leave it to a deputy, or a career officer.”
But there are political conflicts here, too. It is in the office of Paul McNulty—whose nomination to become Gonzales’s deputy will soon be presented to Congress, and who was a Republican congressional staff member before being named a U.S. Attorney—that the Jamadi case has stalled. And Alice Fisher, the new head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, got that job only under a recess appointment; during her confirmation hearings, Fisher, who previously handled counter-terrorism cases for the department, refused to provide all the information requested about her knowledge of C.I.A. prisoner abuse, and Congress did not approve her nomination.
Even more troubling is the possibility that, under the Bush Administration’s secret interrogation guidelines, the killing of Jamadi might not have broken any laws. Jeffrey Smith says it’s possible that the Office of Legal Counsel’s memos may have opened too many loopholes for interrogators like Swanner, “making prosecution somehow too hard to do.” Smith added, “But, even under the expanded definition of torture, I don’t see how someone beaten with his hands bound, who then died while hanging—how that could be legal. I’d be embarrassed if anyone argued that it was.”
Senator Richard Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, served on the Senate Intelligence Committee until January. Before his tenure ended, he looked at the full, classified set of photographs from Abu Ghraib. In a recent interview at his office in the Capitol, he said, “You can’t imagine what it’s like to go to a closed room where you have a classified briefing, and stand shoulder to shoulder with your colleagues in the Senate, and see hundreds and hundreds of slides like those of Abu Ghraib, most of which have never been publicly disclosed. I had a sick feeling when I left.” He went on, “It was then that I began to have suspicions that something significant was happening at the highest levels of the government when it came to torture policy.”
Since then, Durbin has been trying to close the loopholes that allow government personnel to engage in brutal interrogations. Last year, he introduced an amendment to the defense-authorization bill affirming that the C.I.A. was covered by U.S. laws forbidding torture and the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of prisoners. But his effort met intense resistance from the Bush Administration, and the amendment did not pass. Durbin tried other legislative stratagems, without much success. Eventually, John McCain took up Durbin’s cause—which led to last month’s confrontation with Cheney and Goss. The Abu Ghraib scandal seems not to have chastened Cheney or any other Administration officials; in fact, they are for the first time arguing openly and explicitly that C.I.A. personnel should be exempt from standards that apply to every other American.
“I’m concerned that the government isn’t going forward on these prosecutions,” Durbin said of the C.I.A. cases. “It’s really hard to follow the Administration’s policies here. I think the world was very simple before 9/11. We knew what the law was, and I understood it to apply to everyone in the government. Now there’s real uncertainty. There’s a shadow over our nation that needs lifting.”

Illegal Immigration's Dirty Secret

Illegal Immigration's Dirty Secret

TomDispatch - Tomgram: Mark Engler on the War Woes of Business

TomDispatch - Tomgram: Mark Engler on the War Woes of Business

News Flash to Bush: Many Moderate Muslims Share al-Qaeda's Goal of a Caliphate

News Flash to Bush: Many Moderate Muslims Share al-Qaeda's Goal of a Caliphate

Blogger Thoughts: No thoughts, just throw out for your consideration.

mparent7777: If Fox News Had Been Around Throughout History

mparent7777: If Fox News Had Been Around Throughout History

Althouse: "So many of the brightest stars in the conservative legal firmament are Catholics."

Althouse: "So many of the brightest stars in the conservative legal firmament are Catholics."

Blogger Thoughts: Woo hoo, Catholics are going to save us all!