Wednesday, October 06, 2004
Cheney is Scum: Even Fox News Reports It
VP's Claim About Meeting Edwards Debunked
Wednesday, October 06, 2004
CLEVELAND — Vice President Dick Cheney (search) said Tuesday night that the debate with Democratic Sen. John Edwards (search) marked the first time they had met. In fact, the two had met at least three times previously.
Cheney made the remark while accusing Edwards of frequent absences from Senate votes.
"Now, in my capacity as vice president, I am the president of Senate, the presiding officer. I'm up in the Senate most Tuesdays when they're in session. The first time I ever met you was when you walked on the stage tonight," Cheney told Edwards during the debate.
On Feb. 1, 2001, the vice president thanked Edwards by name at a Senate prayer breakfast and sat beside him during the event.
On April 8, 2001, Cheney and Edwards shook hands when they met off-camera during a taping of NBC's "Meet the Press," moderator Tim Russert said Wednesday on "Today."
On Jan. 8, 2003, the two met when the first-term North Carolina senator accompanied Elizabeth Dole to her swearing-in by Cheney as a North Carolina senator, Edwards aides also said.
Edwards didn't forget their prayer-breakfast meeting. The Democratic vice presidential candidate noted the discrepancy at a post-debate rally in a Cleveland park, calling it an example of Cheney "still not being straight with the American people."
"The vice president said that the first time I met Senator Edwards was tonight when we walked on the stage. I guess he forgot the time we sat next to each other for a couple hours about three years ago. I guess he forgot the time we met at the swearing in of another senator. So, my wife Elizabeth reminded him on the stage," Edwards said as the crowd roared.
According to Edwards' staff, Cheney replied, "Oh, yeah."
"She reminded him about the truth," Edwards told the crowd, "and come November, we're going to remind him that the American people do not want four more years of George W. Bush."
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Fahrenheit 9/11 An Iraqi Perspective
Wednesday, September 15, 2004
Fahrenheit 9/11...
August was a hellish month. The heat was incredible. No one remembers Baghdad ever being quite this hot- I think we broke a new record somewhere in mid-August.
The last few days, Baghdad has been echoing with explosions. We woke up to several loud blasts a few days ago. The sound has become all too common. It’s like the heat, the flies, the carcasses of buildings, the broken streets and the haphazard walls coming up out of nowhere all over the city… it has become a part of life. We were sleeping on the roof around three days ago, but I had stumbled back indoors at around 5 am when the electricity returned and was asleep under the cool air of an air-conditioner when the first explosions rang out.
I tried futilely to cling to the last fragments of a fading dream and go back to sleep when several more explosions followed. Upon getting downstairs, I found E. flipping through the news channels, trying to find out what was going on. “They aren’t nearly fast enough,” he shook his head with disgust. “We’re not going to know what’s happening until noon.”
But the news began coming in much sooner. There were clashes between armed Iraqis and the Americans on Haifa Street- a burned out hummer, some celebrating crowds, missiles from helicopters, a journalist dead, dozens of Iraqis wounded, and several others dead. The road leading to the airport has seen some action these last few days- more attacks on troops and also some attacks on Iraqi guard. The people in the areas surrounding the airport claim that no one got any sleep the whole night.
The areas outside of Baghdad aren’t much better off. The south is still seeing clashes between the Sadir militia and troops. Areas to the north of Baghdad are being bombed and attacked daily. Ramadi was very recently under attack and they say that they aren’t allowing the wounded out of the city. Tel Affar in the north of the country is under siege and Falloojeh is still being bombed.
Everyone is simply tired in Baghdad. We’ve become one of those places you read about in the news and shake your head thinking, “What’s this world coming to?” Kidnappings. Bombings. Armed militias. Extremists. Drugs. Gangs. Robberies. You name it, and we can probably tell you several interesting stories.
So how did I spend my 9/11? I watched Michael Moore’s movie, Fahrenheit 9/11. I’ve had bootleg CD version since early August. (Grave apologies to Michael Moore- but there’s no other way we can see it here…) The copy has been sitting in a drawer with a bunch of other CDs. One of my cousins brought it over one day and said that while it was brilliant, it was also quite depressing and distressing all at once. I had been avoiding it because, quite frankly, I cannot stand to see Bush for five minutes straight- I wasn’t sure how I’d cope with almost two hours.
Three days ago, I took it out while the house was relatively quiet- no cousins, no cousins’ children, parents busy watching something or another, and E. asleep in front of the air conditioner for the next three hours.
The CD was surprisingly clear. I had expected some fuzziness and bad sound quality- it was fine. Someone had made the copy inside a movie theater. I could tell because in the background, there was a ringing mobile phone a couple of times and some annoying person in the front kept getting up to adjust his seat.
I was caught up in the film from the first moment, until the very last. There were moments, while watching, when I could barely breathe. I wasn’t surprised with anything- there was nothing that shocked me- all of the stuff about the Bush family and their Saudi friends was old news. It was the other stuff that had an impact- seeing the reactions of Americans to the war, seeing the troops in Iraq being interviewed, seeing that American mother before and after she lost her son in Iraq.
Ah, that mother. How she made me angry in the beginning. I couldn’t stand to see her on screen- convincing the world that joining the army was the ideal thing to do- perfectly happy that her daughter and son were ‘serving’ America- nay, serving, in fact, the world by joining up. I hated her even more as they showed the Iraqi victims- the burning buildings, the explosions, the corpses- the dead and the dying. I wanted to hate her throughout the whole film because she embodied the arrogance and ignorance of the people who supported the war.
I can’t explain the feelings I had towards her. I pitied her because, apparently, she knew very little about what she was sending her kids into. I was angry with her because she really didn’t want to know what she was sending her children to do. In the end, all of those feelings crumbled away as she read the last letter from her deceased son. I began feeling a sympathy I really didn’t want to feel, and as she was walking in the streets of Washington, looking at the protestors and crying, it struck me that the Americans around her would never understand her anguish. The irony of the situation is that the one place in the world she would ever find empathy was Iraq. We understand. We know what it’s like to lose family and friends to war- to know that their final moments weren’t peaceful ones… that they probably died thirsty and in pain… that they weren’t surrounded by loved ones while taking their final breath.
When she asked why her son had been taken and that he had been a good person… why did this have to happen to him? I kept wondering if she ever gave a second thought to the Iraqi victims and whether it ever occurred to her that Iraqi parents perhaps have the same thoughts as the try to dig their children out from under the rubble of fallen homes in Falloojeh, or as they attempt to stop the blood flowing out of a gaping hole in the chest of a child in Karbala.
The flashes of the bombing of Iraq and the victims were more painful than I thought they would be. We lived through it, but seeing it on a screen is still a torment. I thought that this last year and a half had somehow made me a little bit tougher when it came to seeing Iraq being torn apart by bombs and watching foreign troops destroy the country- but the wound is still as raw as ever. Watching those scenes was like poking at a gash with sharp stick- it hurt.
All in all, the film was… what is the right word for it? Great? Amazing? Fantastic? No. It made me furious, it made me sad and I cried more than I’d like to admit… but it was brilliant. The words he used to narrate were simple and to the point. I wish everyone could see the film. I know I'll be getting dozens of emails from enraged Americans telling me that so-and-so statement was exaggerated, etc. But it really doesn't matter to me. What matters is the underlying message of the film- things aren't better for Americans now than they were in 2001, and they certainly aren't better for Iraqis.
Three years ago, Iraq wasn't a threat to America. Today it is. Since March 2003, over 1000 Americans have died inside of Iraq... and the number is rising. In twenty years time, upon looking back, how do Americans think Iraqis are going to remember this occupation?
I constantly wonder, three years after 9/11, do Americans feel safer? When it first happened, there was a sort of collective shock in Iraq. In 2002, there was a sort of pity and understanding- we’ve been through the same. Americans could hardly believe what had happened, but the American government brings this sort of grief upon nations annually… suddenly the war wasn’t thousands of kilometers away, it was home.
How do we feel about it this year? A little bit tired.
We have 9/11’s on a monthly basis. Each and every Iraqi person who dies with a bullet, a missile, a grenade, under torture, accidentally- they all have families and friends and people who care. The number of Iraqis dead since March 2003 is by now at least eight times the number of people who died in the World Trade Center. They had their last words, and their last thoughts as their worlds came down around them, too. I’ve attended more wakes and funerals this last year, than I’ve attended my whole life. The process of mourning and the hollow words of comfort have become much too familiar and automatic.
September 11… he sat there, reading the paper. As he reached out for the cup in front of him for a sip of tea, he could vaguely hear the sound of an airplane overhead. It was a bright, fresh day and there was much he had to do… but the world suddenly went black- a colossal explosion and then crushed bones under the weight of concrete and iron… screams rose up around him… men, women and children… shards of glass sought out tender, unprotected skin … he thought of his family and tried to rise, but something inside of him was broken… there was a rising heat and the pungent smell of burning flesh mingled sickeningly with the smoke and the dust… and suddenly it was blackness.
9/11/01? New York? World Trade Center?
No.
9/11/04. Falloojeh. An Iraqi home.
Fahrenheit 9/11...
August was a hellish month. The heat was incredible. No one remembers Baghdad ever being quite this hot- I think we broke a new record somewhere in mid-August.
The last few days, Baghdad has been echoing with explosions. We woke up to several loud blasts a few days ago. The sound has become all too common. It’s like the heat, the flies, the carcasses of buildings, the broken streets and the haphazard walls coming up out of nowhere all over the city… it has become a part of life. We were sleeping on the roof around three days ago, but I had stumbled back indoors at around 5 am when the electricity returned and was asleep under the cool air of an air-conditioner when the first explosions rang out.
I tried futilely to cling to the last fragments of a fading dream and go back to sleep when several more explosions followed. Upon getting downstairs, I found E. flipping through the news channels, trying to find out what was going on. “They aren’t nearly fast enough,” he shook his head with disgust. “We’re not going to know what’s happening until noon.”
But the news began coming in much sooner. There were clashes between armed Iraqis and the Americans on Haifa Street- a burned out hummer, some celebrating crowds, missiles from helicopters, a journalist dead, dozens of Iraqis wounded, and several others dead. The road leading to the airport has seen some action these last few days- more attacks on troops and also some attacks on Iraqi guard. The people in the areas surrounding the airport claim that no one got any sleep the whole night.
The areas outside of Baghdad aren’t much better off. The south is still seeing clashes between the Sadir militia and troops. Areas to the north of Baghdad are being bombed and attacked daily. Ramadi was very recently under attack and they say that they aren’t allowing the wounded out of the city. Tel Affar in the north of the country is under siege and Falloojeh is still being bombed.
Everyone is simply tired in Baghdad. We’ve become one of those places you read about in the news and shake your head thinking, “What’s this world coming to?” Kidnappings. Bombings. Armed militias. Extremists. Drugs. Gangs. Robberies. You name it, and we can probably tell you several interesting stories.
So how did I spend my 9/11? I watched Michael Moore’s movie, Fahrenheit 9/11. I’ve had bootleg CD version since early August. (Grave apologies to Michael Moore- but there’s no other way we can see it here…) The copy has been sitting in a drawer with a bunch of other CDs. One of my cousins brought it over one day and said that while it was brilliant, it was also quite depressing and distressing all at once. I had been avoiding it because, quite frankly, I cannot stand to see Bush for five minutes straight- I wasn’t sure how I’d cope with almost two hours.
Three days ago, I took it out while the house was relatively quiet- no cousins, no cousins’ children, parents busy watching something or another, and E. asleep in front of the air conditioner for the next three hours.
The CD was surprisingly clear. I had expected some fuzziness and bad sound quality- it was fine. Someone had made the copy inside a movie theater. I could tell because in the background, there was a ringing mobile phone a couple of times and some annoying person in the front kept getting up to adjust his seat.
I was caught up in the film from the first moment, until the very last. There were moments, while watching, when I could barely breathe. I wasn’t surprised with anything- there was nothing that shocked me- all of the stuff about the Bush family and their Saudi friends was old news. It was the other stuff that had an impact- seeing the reactions of Americans to the war, seeing the troops in Iraq being interviewed, seeing that American mother before and after she lost her son in Iraq.
Ah, that mother. How she made me angry in the beginning. I couldn’t stand to see her on screen- convincing the world that joining the army was the ideal thing to do- perfectly happy that her daughter and son were ‘serving’ America- nay, serving, in fact, the world by joining up. I hated her even more as they showed the Iraqi victims- the burning buildings, the explosions, the corpses- the dead and the dying. I wanted to hate her throughout the whole film because she embodied the arrogance and ignorance of the people who supported the war.
I can’t explain the feelings I had towards her. I pitied her because, apparently, she knew very little about what she was sending her kids into. I was angry with her because she really didn’t want to know what she was sending her children to do. In the end, all of those feelings crumbled away as she read the last letter from her deceased son. I began feeling a sympathy I really didn’t want to feel, and as she was walking in the streets of Washington, looking at the protestors and crying, it struck me that the Americans around her would never understand her anguish. The irony of the situation is that the one place in the world she would ever find empathy was Iraq. We understand. We know what it’s like to lose family and friends to war- to know that their final moments weren’t peaceful ones… that they probably died thirsty and in pain… that they weren’t surrounded by loved ones while taking their final breath.
When she asked why her son had been taken and that he had been a good person… why did this have to happen to him? I kept wondering if she ever gave a second thought to the Iraqi victims and whether it ever occurred to her that Iraqi parents perhaps have the same thoughts as the try to dig their children out from under the rubble of fallen homes in Falloojeh, or as they attempt to stop the blood flowing out of a gaping hole in the chest of a child in Karbala.
The flashes of the bombing of Iraq and the victims were more painful than I thought they would be. We lived through it, but seeing it on a screen is still a torment. I thought that this last year and a half had somehow made me a little bit tougher when it came to seeing Iraq being torn apart by bombs and watching foreign troops destroy the country- but the wound is still as raw as ever. Watching those scenes was like poking at a gash with sharp stick- it hurt.
All in all, the film was… what is the right word for it? Great? Amazing? Fantastic? No. It made me furious, it made me sad and I cried more than I’d like to admit… but it was brilliant. The words he used to narrate were simple and to the point. I wish everyone could see the film. I know I'll be getting dozens of emails from enraged Americans telling me that so-and-so statement was exaggerated, etc. But it really doesn't matter to me. What matters is the underlying message of the film- things aren't better for Americans now than they were in 2001, and they certainly aren't better for Iraqis.
Three years ago, Iraq wasn't a threat to America. Today it is. Since March 2003, over 1000 Americans have died inside of Iraq... and the number is rising. In twenty years time, upon looking back, how do Americans think Iraqis are going to remember this occupation?
I constantly wonder, three years after 9/11, do Americans feel safer? When it first happened, there was a sort of collective shock in Iraq. In 2002, there was a sort of pity and understanding- we’ve been through the same. Americans could hardly believe what had happened, but the American government brings this sort of grief upon nations annually… suddenly the war wasn’t thousands of kilometers away, it was home.
How do we feel about it this year? A little bit tired.
We have 9/11’s on a monthly basis. Each and every Iraqi person who dies with a bullet, a missile, a grenade, under torture, accidentally- they all have families and friends and people who care. The number of Iraqis dead since March 2003 is by now at least eight times the number of people who died in the World Trade Center. They had their last words, and their last thoughts as their worlds came down around them, too. I’ve attended more wakes and funerals this last year, than I’ve attended my whole life. The process of mourning and the hollow words of comfort have become much too familiar and automatic.
September 11… he sat there, reading the paper. As he reached out for the cup in front of him for a sip of tea, he could vaguely hear the sound of an airplane overhead. It was a bright, fresh day and there was much he had to do… but the world suddenly went black- a colossal explosion and then crushed bones under the weight of concrete and iron… screams rose up around him… men, women and children… shards of glass sought out tender, unprotected skin … he thought of his family and tried to rise, but something inside of him was broken… there was a rising heat and the pungent smell of burning flesh mingled sickeningly with the smoke and the dust… and suddenly it was blackness.
9/11/01? New York? World Trade Center?
No.
9/11/04. Falloojeh. An Iraqi home.
Definition of Iyad Allawi
Link shows same text as below:
Our Man in Baghdad
Definition of Iyad Allawi
Dr. Iyad Allawi (اياد علاوي) (born 1945) is the interim Prime Minister of Iraq. A prominent Iraqi-British neurologist and Iraqi exile political activist, the Shia Muslim became a member of the Iraq Interim Governing Council, which was created following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He became Iraq's first head of government since Saddam Hussein when the council dissolved on June 1, 2004 and named him Prime Minister of the Iraq interim government.
A former Ba'athist, Allawi set up and leads the CIA-supported Iraqi National Accord which carried out bombings in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the INA provided intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction to MI6. Allawi is also alleged to have personally executed six Iraqi prisoners in June 2004 to "send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents".
Allawi has lived about half of his life in the UK and retains British citizenship.
Contents [showhide]
1 Allawi's early life
2 Early political career
3 The Iraqi National Accord
4 Political career following the invasion
5 Interim Prime Minister
6 See also
7 External links
Allawi's early life
Allawi was born in 1945 to a prominent Shia merchant family; his grandfather helped to negotiate Iraq's independence from Britain, and his father was an MP. In the 1960s, he studied at medical school in Baghdad, where he first met Saddam Hussein.
Early political career
Allawi was an active supporter of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in its early days when it was still banned. In 1971, he moved to London in order to continue his medical education. Some have reported this as an exile, but some of Allawi's old counterparts have claimed that he continued to serve the Baath Party, and the Iraqi secret police, searching out enemies of the regime. During this time he was president of the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. Seymour Hersh quotes former CIA officer Vincent Cannistraro: "[...] Allawi has blood on his hands from his days in London [...] he was a paid Mukhabarat agent for the Iraqis, and he was involved in dirty stuff." A Middle Eastern diplomat confirmed that Allawi was involved with a Mukhabarat "hit team" that killed Baath Party dissenters in Europe. However, he resigned from the Baath party for undisclosed reasons in 1975. [1] (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040628fa_fact)
At first Saddam, then Iraq's deputy president, pressured Allawi, who was in contact with senior military and party officers that were increasingly critical of Saddam, to rejoin Ba'ath. In 1978, friends told Allawi that his name was on a liquidation list. In February 1978 Allawi was awoken in bed one night by an intruder in his Surrey home, who proceeded to attack him with an axe. The intruder left, convinced that Allawi was dead. He survived the attempted murder, and spent the next year in hospital recovering from his injuries. It is presumed that the attack was an assassination attempt ordered by Saddam Hussein. [2] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23-2004Jan30.html)
The Iraqi National Accord
While still recovering in hospital from the assassination attempt, Allawi started organising an opposition network that would topple Saddam. Through the 1980s he built this network, recruiting Iraqis while traveling as a businessman.
In December 1990, Allawi announced the Iraqi National Accord (INA). The main sponsors of INA were the British, but they received secret backing from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States. The group consisted mainly of former military personnel who had defected from Saddam Hussein's Iraq to instigate a military coup. Allawi was recruited by the CIA in 1992 as a counterpoint to the more well-known CIA asset Ahmed Chalabi, and because of the INA's links in the Ba'athist establishment. According to former CIA officers, Allawi's INA organised terrorist attacks in Iraq between 1992 and 1995, allegedly including the bombing of a cinema and a school bus that killed school children. This campaign never posed a threat to Saddam Hussein's rule, but was designed to test INA's capability to effect regime change. [3] (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/09/politics/09ALLA.html?ex=1087747955&ei=1&en=c040fed2685e7eb8) [4] (http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=5270).
A military coup was planned for 1996, in which Iraqi generals were to lead their units against Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein. The CIA supported the plot, code-named DBACHILLES, and added Iraqi officers that were not part of INA. The plan ended in disaster as it had been infiltrated by agents loyal to Saddam. US support was also questionable - requests by the CIA station chief in Amman for American air support were refused by the Clinton administration. Many participants were executed. Lands and factories belonging to the Allawi family were confiscated, even their graveyard in Najaf was demolished. According to Allawi, his family lost $250 million worth of assets. [5] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23-2004Jan30_2.html) US support for INA did not deteriorate, receiving $6 million covert aid in 1996 and 5$ million in 1995 (according to books by David Wurmser as well as Andrew and Patrick Cockburn).[6] (http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=agdsULUSsCdo&refer=europe)
Beginning in 2003, Allawi paid prominent Washington lobbyists and New York publicity agents more than $300,000 to give him access to Washington policy-makers and journalists. The funds passed through his ally in the UK, Mashal Nawab.
Allawi channelled the report from an Iraqi officer claiming that Iraq could deploy its supposed weapons of mass destruction within "45 minutes" to British Intelligence. [7] (http://politics.guardian.co.uk/kelly/story/0,13747,1131993,00.html) This claim featured prominently in the September Dossier which the British government released in 2002 to gain public support for the Iraq invasion. In the aftermath of the war, the "45 minute claim" was also at the heart of the confrontation between the British government and the BBC, and the death of David Kelly later examined by Lord Hutton. Giving evidence to the Hutton Inquiry, the head of MI6 Richard Dearlove suggested that the claim related to battlefield weapons rather than weapons of mass destruction.[8] (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/16/1063625031302.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true) An Allawi spokesman admitted in January 2004 that the claim was a "crock of shit."[9] (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1-1126480,00.html)
Political career following the invasion
Allawi was appointed to the Iraqi Governing Council following his return from exile after the fall of Saddam in 2003. He held the rotating presidency of the interim governing council during October of 2003. In April 2004, Allawi reportedly resigned as head of the IGC security committee over concerns for US bombing of Fallujah, according to a letter published in INA's newspaper.[10] (http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=agdsULUSsCdo&refer=europe)
In December 2003, he flew to CIA headquarters in Langley together with fellow INA official Nouri Badran to discuss detailed plans for setting up a domestic secret service. The agency was to be headed by Badran, a former Ba'athist who served Saddam as an ambassador until 1990, and, controversially, recruit many agents of Saddam's Mukhabarat. [11] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A54518-2003Dec10¬Found=true) When the Iraqi National Intelligence Service was set up in March 2004, its designated director was Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed al-Shehwani, another former Ba'athist exile with ties to INA.
Allawi is related to Ahmed Chalabi, another prominent former exile and now disgraced U.S. ally, through his sister. The interim minister of trade Ali Allawi is Chalabi's sister's son as well as Iyad Allawi's cousin. The relationship between Chalabi and Allawi has been described as alternating between rivals and allies.[12] (http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/29/1085641749684.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true) In addition, Nouri Badran, interim Minister of Interior, is married to Iyad Allawi's sister.[13] (http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=144)
Interim Prime Minister
On May 28, 2004, he was chosen by the council to be the Interim Prime Minister of Iraq to govern the country beginning with the United States' handover of sovereignty (June 30, 2004) until national elections, scheduled for early 2005. Although many believe the decision was reached largely on the advice of United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, the New York Times reported that Brahimi only endorsed him reluctantly after pressure from U.S. officials. (In response to a question about the role of the U.S. in Allawi's appointment, Brahimi replied: “I sometimes say, I'm sure he doesn't mind me saying that, Bremer is the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature. Nothing happens without his agreement in this country.” [14] (http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2004/585/585p15.htm) Two weeks later, Brahimi announced his resignation, due to "great difficulties and frustration". [15] (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/438248.html))
At the time of his nomination, Allawi was often described in the US mainstream media as a moderate Shia, a member of Iraq's majority faith, chosen for his secular, pro-American views. Later, as military situation in Iraq worsened the death toll increased, coveraged became sometimes less flattering and included descriptions suggesting Allawi was Washington's puppet (e.g. Newsweek:"Iraq's New S. O. B." [16] (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5457368/), NYT: "Dance of the Marionettes" [17] (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/26/opinion/26dowd.html?hp)). The BBC attributes his nomination to being "equally mistrusted by everyone" in Iraq. [18] (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3757923.stm) A secret document written in 2002 by the British Overseas and Defence Secretariat reportedly stated that within Iraq, Allawi was seen as "a western stooge" who "lacked domestic credibility". [19] (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/24/wus124.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/09/24/ixhome.html)
On June 28 2004 (two days early), the U.S.-led coalition handed over power to Allawi and the interim government, who were sworn in later that same day. After his interim government assumed legal custody of Saddam Hussein and re-introduced capital punishment, Allawi gave assurances that he would not interfere with the trial and would accept any court decisions. In an interview with Dubai-based TV station al-Arabiya he said: "As for the execution, that is for the court to decide — so long as a decision is reached impartially and fairly." [20] (http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/World/ap20040706_164.html)
On July 17, two Australian newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald [21] (http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/16/1089694568757.html?oneclick=true), [22] (http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0716-01.htm) and The Age [23] (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/07/16/1089694560142.html?oneclick=true), published an article alleging that one week before the handover of sovereignty, Allawi himself summarily executed six suspected insurgents at a Baghdad police station. The allegations are backed up by two independent sources [24] (http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/s1155990.htm) and the execution is said to have taken place in presence of about a dozen Iraqi police, four American security men and Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib. Mr Allawi reportedly said that the execution was to "send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents". Both Allawi's office and Naqib have denied the report. US ambassador John Negroponte did not clearly deny the allegations. Iraq's Human Rights Minister Bakhtiar Amin pledged to investigate the allegations against his PM.[25] (http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200407/s1156598.htm)
On 18. July, Iraqi militants offered a $285,000 reward for anyone who could kill Iyad Allawi. [26] (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3904151.stm)
During the summer of 2004, Allawi took several controversial decisions. He announced the creation of General Security Directorate, a domestic spy agency, recruiting at least some agents of Saddam Hussein's secret police, and whose main role is to counter-act terrorist groups and the Iraqi resistance. He gave himself the powers to declare martial law [27] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33260-2004Jul7.html). He closed the Iraqi office of al-Jazeera and nominated Ibrahim Janabi a former Ba'athist and Mukhabarat officer to head the newly created media ragulator. He also took moves to eliminate Muqtada al-Sadr from the scene. [28] (http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5709446/site/newsweek/)
See also
Iraq interim government
External links
Dow Jones Newswire, 24 January 2004 (http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004012400040000&Take=1)
Profile in The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1227176,00.html)
Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks - The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/09/politics/09ALLA.html?ex=1087747955&ei=1&en=c040fed2685e7eb8)
Profile on al-Jazeera (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6C99B500-2F8E-4558-9746-C315C59F1978.htm)
Profile in The Times (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1-1126480,00.html)
Short biography on middleeastreference.org.uk (http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqministers.html#alawi)
Disinfopedia entry (http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Iyad_Allawi)
Al-Sadr: Allawi team worse than Saddam (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6051C98D-2CE1-4DFF-A7B5-051065602EBD.htm) (Aljazeera)
Iraqi cleric slams war coverage under Allawi (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/12F048D0-893A-4DC4-AF97-4A779F160FFF.htm) (Monday 23 August 2004, Aljazeera)
Our Man in Baghdad
Definition of Iyad Allawi
Dr. Iyad Allawi (اياد علاوي) (born 1945) is the interim Prime Minister of Iraq. A prominent Iraqi-British neurologist and Iraqi exile political activist, the Shia Muslim became a member of the Iraq Interim Governing Council, which was created following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He became Iraq's first head of government since Saddam Hussein when the council dissolved on June 1, 2004 and named him Prime Minister of the Iraq interim government.
A former Ba'athist, Allawi set up and leads the CIA-supported Iraqi National Accord which carried out bombings in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the INA provided intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction to MI6. Allawi is also alleged to have personally executed six Iraqi prisoners in June 2004 to "send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents".
Allawi has lived about half of his life in the UK and retains British citizenship.
Contents [showhide]
1 Allawi's early life
2 Early political career
3 The Iraqi National Accord
4 Political career following the invasion
5 Interim Prime Minister
6 See also
7 External links
Allawi's early life
Allawi was born in 1945 to a prominent Shia merchant family; his grandfather helped to negotiate Iraq's independence from Britain, and his father was an MP. In the 1960s, he studied at medical school in Baghdad, where he first met Saddam Hussein.
Early political career
Allawi was an active supporter of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in its early days when it was still banned. In 1971, he moved to London in order to continue his medical education. Some have reported this as an exile, but some of Allawi's old counterparts have claimed that he continued to serve the Baath Party, and the Iraqi secret police, searching out enemies of the regime. During this time he was president of the Iraqi Student Union in Europe. Seymour Hersh quotes former CIA officer Vincent Cannistraro: "[...] Allawi has blood on his hands from his days in London [...] he was a paid Mukhabarat agent for the Iraqis, and he was involved in dirty stuff." A Middle Eastern diplomat confirmed that Allawi was involved with a Mukhabarat "hit team" that killed Baath Party dissenters in Europe. However, he resigned from the Baath party for undisclosed reasons in 1975. [1] (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040628fa_fact)
At first Saddam, then Iraq's deputy president, pressured Allawi, who was in contact with senior military and party officers that were increasingly critical of Saddam, to rejoin Ba'ath. In 1978, friends told Allawi that his name was on a liquidation list. In February 1978 Allawi was awoken in bed one night by an intruder in his Surrey home, who proceeded to attack him with an axe. The intruder left, convinced that Allawi was dead. He survived the attempted murder, and spent the next year in hospital recovering from his injuries. It is presumed that the attack was an assassination attempt ordered by Saddam Hussein. [2] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23-2004Jan30.html)
The Iraqi National Accord
While still recovering in hospital from the assassination attempt, Allawi started organising an opposition network that would topple Saddam. Through the 1980s he built this network, recruiting Iraqis while traveling as a businessman.
In December 1990, Allawi announced the Iraqi National Accord (INA). The main sponsors of INA were the British, but they received secret backing from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States. The group consisted mainly of former military personnel who had defected from Saddam Hussein's Iraq to instigate a military coup. Allawi was recruited by the CIA in 1992 as a counterpoint to the more well-known CIA asset Ahmed Chalabi, and because of the INA's links in the Ba'athist establishment. According to former CIA officers, Allawi's INA organised terrorist attacks in Iraq between 1992 and 1995, allegedly including the bombing of a cinema and a school bus that killed school children. This campaign never posed a threat to Saddam Hussein's rule, but was designed to test INA's capability to effect regime change. [3] (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/09/politics/09ALLA.html?ex=1087747955&ei=1&en=c040fed2685e7eb8) [4] (http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=5270).
A military coup was planned for 1996, in which Iraqi generals were to lead their units against Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein. The CIA supported the plot, code-named DBACHILLES, and added Iraqi officers that were not part of INA. The plan ended in disaster as it had been infiltrated by agents loyal to Saddam. US support was also questionable - requests by the CIA station chief in Amman for American air support were refused by the Clinton administration. Many participants were executed. Lands and factories belonging to the Allawi family were confiscated, even their graveyard in Najaf was demolished. According to Allawi, his family lost $250 million worth of assets. [5] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23-2004Jan30_2.html) US support for INA did not deteriorate, receiving $6 million covert aid in 1996 and 5$ million in 1995 (according to books by David Wurmser as well as Andrew and Patrick Cockburn).[6] (http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=agdsULUSsCdo&refer=europe)
Beginning in 2003, Allawi paid prominent Washington lobbyists and New York publicity agents more than $300,000 to give him access to Washington policy-makers and journalists. The funds passed through his ally in the UK, Mashal Nawab.
Allawi channelled the report from an Iraqi officer claiming that Iraq could deploy its supposed weapons of mass destruction within "45 minutes" to British Intelligence. [7] (http://politics.guardian.co.uk/kelly/story/0,13747,1131993,00.html) This claim featured prominently in the September Dossier which the British government released in 2002 to gain public support for the Iraq invasion. In the aftermath of the war, the "45 minute claim" was also at the heart of the confrontation between the British government and the BBC, and the death of David Kelly later examined by Lord Hutton. Giving evidence to the Hutton Inquiry, the head of MI6 Richard Dearlove suggested that the claim related to battlefield weapons rather than weapons of mass destruction.[8] (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/16/1063625031302.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true) An Allawi spokesman admitted in January 2004 that the claim was a "crock of shit."[9] (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1-1126480,00.html)
Political career following the invasion
Allawi was appointed to the Iraqi Governing Council following his return from exile after the fall of Saddam in 2003. He held the rotating presidency of the interim governing council during October of 2003. In April 2004, Allawi reportedly resigned as head of the IGC security committee over concerns for US bombing of Fallujah, according to a letter published in INA's newspaper.[10] (http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=agdsULUSsCdo&refer=europe)
In December 2003, he flew to CIA headquarters in Langley together with fellow INA official Nouri Badran to discuss detailed plans for setting up a domestic secret service. The agency was to be headed by Badran, a former Ba'athist who served Saddam as an ambassador until 1990, and, controversially, recruit many agents of Saddam's Mukhabarat. [11] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A54518-2003Dec10¬Found=true) When the Iraqi National Intelligence Service was set up in March 2004, its designated director was Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed al-Shehwani, another former Ba'athist exile with ties to INA.
Allawi is related to Ahmed Chalabi, another prominent former exile and now disgraced U.S. ally, through his sister. The interim minister of trade Ali Allawi is Chalabi's sister's son as well as Iyad Allawi's cousin. The relationship between Chalabi and Allawi has been described as alternating between rivals and allies.[12] (http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/29/1085641749684.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true) In addition, Nouri Badran, interim Minister of Interior, is married to Iyad Allawi's sister.[13] (http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=144)
Interim Prime Minister
On May 28, 2004, he was chosen by the council to be the Interim Prime Minister of Iraq to govern the country beginning with the United States' handover of sovereignty (June 30, 2004) until national elections, scheduled for early 2005. Although many believe the decision was reached largely on the advice of United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, the New York Times reported that Brahimi only endorsed him reluctantly after pressure from U.S. officials. (In response to a question about the role of the U.S. in Allawi's appointment, Brahimi replied: “I sometimes say, I'm sure he doesn't mind me saying that, Bremer is the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature. Nothing happens without his agreement in this country.” [14] (http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2004/585/585p15.htm) Two weeks later, Brahimi announced his resignation, due to "great difficulties and frustration". [15] (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/438248.html))
At the time of his nomination, Allawi was often described in the US mainstream media as a moderate Shia, a member of Iraq's majority faith, chosen for his secular, pro-American views. Later, as military situation in Iraq worsened the death toll increased, coveraged became sometimes less flattering and included descriptions suggesting Allawi was Washington's puppet (e.g. Newsweek:"Iraq's New S. O. B." [16] (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5457368/), NYT: "Dance of the Marionettes" [17] (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/26/opinion/26dowd.html?hp)). The BBC attributes his nomination to being "equally mistrusted by everyone" in Iraq. [18] (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3757923.stm) A secret document written in 2002 by the British Overseas and Defence Secretariat reportedly stated that within Iraq, Allawi was seen as "a western stooge" who "lacked domestic credibility". [19] (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/24/wus124.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/09/24/ixhome.html)
On June 28 2004 (two days early), the U.S.-led coalition handed over power to Allawi and the interim government, who were sworn in later that same day. After his interim government assumed legal custody of Saddam Hussein and re-introduced capital punishment, Allawi gave assurances that he would not interfere with the trial and would accept any court decisions. In an interview with Dubai-based TV station al-Arabiya he said: "As for the execution, that is for the court to decide — so long as a decision is reached impartially and fairly." [20] (http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/World/ap20040706_164.html)
On July 17, two Australian newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald [21] (http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/16/1089694568757.html?oneclick=true), [22] (http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0716-01.htm) and The Age [23] (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/07/16/1089694560142.html?oneclick=true), published an article alleging that one week before the handover of sovereignty, Allawi himself summarily executed six suspected insurgents at a Baghdad police station. The allegations are backed up by two independent sources [24] (http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/s1155990.htm) and the execution is said to have taken place in presence of about a dozen Iraqi police, four American security men and Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib. Mr Allawi reportedly said that the execution was to "send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents". Both Allawi's office and Naqib have denied the report. US ambassador John Negroponte did not clearly deny the allegations. Iraq's Human Rights Minister Bakhtiar Amin pledged to investigate the allegations against his PM.[25] (http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200407/s1156598.htm)
On 18. July, Iraqi militants offered a $285,000 reward for anyone who could kill Iyad Allawi. [26] (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3904151.stm)
During the summer of 2004, Allawi took several controversial decisions. He announced the creation of General Security Directorate, a domestic spy agency, recruiting at least some agents of Saddam Hussein's secret police, and whose main role is to counter-act terrorist groups and the Iraqi resistance. He gave himself the powers to declare martial law [27] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33260-2004Jul7.html). He closed the Iraqi office of al-Jazeera and nominated Ibrahim Janabi a former Ba'athist and Mukhabarat officer to head the newly created media ragulator. He also took moves to eliminate Muqtada al-Sadr from the scene. [28] (http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5709446/site/newsweek/)
See also
Iraq interim government
External links
Dow Jones Newswire, 24 January 2004 (http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004012400040000&Take=1)
Profile in The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1227176,00.html)
Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks - The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/09/politics/09ALLA.html?ex=1087747955&ei=1&en=c040fed2685e7eb8)
Profile on al-Jazeera (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6C99B500-2F8E-4558-9746-C315C59F1978.htm)
Profile in The Times (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1-1126480,00.html)
Short biography on middleeastreference.org.uk (http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqministers.html#alawi)
Disinfopedia entry (http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Iyad_Allawi)
Al-Sadr: Allawi team worse than Saddam (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6051C98D-2CE1-4DFF-A7B5-051065602EBD.htm) (Aljazeera)
Iraqi cleric slams war coverage under Allawi (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/12F048D0-893A-4DC4-AF97-4A779F160FFF.htm) (Monday 23 August 2004, Aljazeera)
Did Cheny Break the Law on 9/11
From Salon
Did Cheney break the law on 9/11?For months the Bush administration fiercely resisted having the president and vice president testify before the 9/11 Commission. It was only under intense public pressure that the two leaders eventually agreed to do so -- and then only under the conditions that they would testify jointly, would not speak to the commission under oath, and that there would be no written material or transcript allowed from the session.
It was clearly the behavior of leaders who aimed to keep an airtight grip on the narrative of their minute-by-minute actions on that fateful day. A new report in Vanity Fair magazine reveals why Bush and Cheney may have wanted to remain in firm control of their story.
In its November issue (obtained by War Room), the magazine reports that after Bush and Cheney's all but hermetically sealed session with the 9/11 Commission, some of the bipartisan investigators remained highly skeptical of the duo's testimony that Cheney cleared his order with the president on 9/11 to have U.S. fighter jets shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft.
"Some members of the 9/11 commission and its staff are convinced that Cheney acted on his own -- before receiving the president's approval -- which would mean he broke the chain of command and, by exceeding his constitutional powers, acted unlawfully," the story says. "The final report of the 9/11 commission stops just short of saying that the conversation with the president before Cheney gave the order never happened ... the report goes as far as to say 'there is no documentary evidence for this call ...' Only after Cheney twice issued a shootdown order is there clear evidence that he called Bush and received authorization to order fighter jets to shoot down hijacked aircraft."
As one commission member told Vanity Fair on condition of anonymity, the panel was concerned about how to handle the politically explosive issue: "We purposely did not reach a conclusion. We just laid it out. Some people may read what we wrote and conclude the authorization call had not preceded the [shootdown] order. People can come to their own conclusion. We didn't want to be in the position of saying the president and the vice president were lying to us."
Bob Kerrey, the former Democratic senator from Nebraska and an outspoken member of the 9/11 commission, said: "We don't see that it happened the way he [Cheney] recalled it."
And one commissioner told the magazine (also anonymously) that the panel's members simply did not buy Cheney's account. "We tried to work out language that allows the reader to get that," he said, "without saying the vice president did not tell the truth."
Indeed, as the article further details, the bipartisan panel was forced to perform some linguistic acrobatics on the issue, after the White House applied intense pressure:
"A series of staff statements issued by the commission, as well as the final report, were first sent to the White House for review. The draft of staff statement No. 17, dealing with the shootdown, brought an angry letter from [White House counsel Alberto] Gonzales, objecting to the wording. Cheney also telephoned both [9/11 Commission leaders Thomas] Kean and [Lee] Hamilton, complaining vociferously about the language.
"Philip Zelikow, the commission's executive director, confirmed that changes were made, and approved by the commissioners, in both the staff statement and the final report after the White House letter was received and Cheney made his phone calls. But Zelikow said 'our fundamental judgment' had not changed. 'Which is the President and Vice President have offered an account. Their account could be true but we can't find corroborating documentary evidence to prove conclusively that it is true.'"
Such corroborating evidence of an earlier call to the president, the article adds, could not be found in two different sets of personal notes kept by Lynne Cheney and Lewis "Scooter" Libby -- both of whom accompanied the vice president in the secure bunker under the White House that morning -- nor in seven different phone logs kept by various White House operations, from the Secret Service to the White House Military Office.
-- Mark Follman
[14:07 PDT, Oct. 5, 2004]
Did Cheney break the law on 9/11?For months the Bush administration fiercely resisted having the president and vice president testify before the 9/11 Commission. It was only under intense public pressure that the two leaders eventually agreed to do so -- and then only under the conditions that they would testify jointly, would not speak to the commission under oath, and that there would be no written material or transcript allowed from the session.
It was clearly the behavior of leaders who aimed to keep an airtight grip on the narrative of their minute-by-minute actions on that fateful day. A new report in Vanity Fair magazine reveals why Bush and Cheney may have wanted to remain in firm control of their story.
In its November issue (obtained by War Room), the magazine reports that after Bush and Cheney's all but hermetically sealed session with the 9/11 Commission, some of the bipartisan investigators remained highly skeptical of the duo's testimony that Cheney cleared his order with the president on 9/11 to have U.S. fighter jets shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft.
"Some members of the 9/11 commission and its staff are convinced that Cheney acted on his own -- before receiving the president's approval -- which would mean he broke the chain of command and, by exceeding his constitutional powers, acted unlawfully," the story says. "The final report of the 9/11 commission stops just short of saying that the conversation with the president before Cheney gave the order never happened ... the report goes as far as to say 'there is no documentary evidence for this call ...' Only after Cheney twice issued a shootdown order is there clear evidence that he called Bush and received authorization to order fighter jets to shoot down hijacked aircraft."
As one commission member told Vanity Fair on condition of anonymity, the panel was concerned about how to handle the politically explosive issue: "We purposely did not reach a conclusion. We just laid it out. Some people may read what we wrote and conclude the authorization call had not preceded the [shootdown] order. People can come to their own conclusion. We didn't want to be in the position of saying the president and the vice president were lying to us."
Bob Kerrey, the former Democratic senator from Nebraska and an outspoken member of the 9/11 commission, said: "We don't see that it happened the way he [Cheney] recalled it."
And one commissioner told the magazine (also anonymously) that the panel's members simply did not buy Cheney's account. "We tried to work out language that allows the reader to get that," he said, "without saying the vice president did not tell the truth."
Indeed, as the article further details, the bipartisan panel was forced to perform some linguistic acrobatics on the issue, after the White House applied intense pressure:
"A series of staff statements issued by the commission, as well as the final report, were first sent to the White House for review. The draft of staff statement No. 17, dealing with the shootdown, brought an angry letter from [White House counsel Alberto] Gonzales, objecting to the wording. Cheney also telephoned both [9/11 Commission leaders Thomas] Kean and [Lee] Hamilton, complaining vociferously about the language.
"Philip Zelikow, the commission's executive director, confirmed that changes were made, and approved by the commissioners, in both the staff statement and the final report after the White House letter was received and Cheney made his phone calls. But Zelikow said 'our fundamental judgment' had not changed. 'Which is the President and Vice President have offered an account. Their account could be true but we can't find corroborating documentary evidence to prove conclusively that it is true.'"
Such corroborating evidence of an earlier call to the president, the article adds, could not be found in two different sets of personal notes kept by Lynne Cheney and Lewis "Scooter" Libby -- both of whom accompanied the vice president in the secure bunker under the White House that morning -- nor in seven different phone logs kept by various White House operations, from the Secret Service to the White House Military Office.
-- Mark Follman
[14:07 PDT, Oct. 5, 2004]
To Torture or Not?
MSNBC.com
To Torture or Not?
President Bush backs ‘rendering’ suspects—then backs off
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Michael Hirsh
Newsweek
Updated: 4:06 p.m. ET Oct. 5, 2004
Oct. 5 - President Bush today distanced himself from his administration’s quiet effort to push through a law that would make it easier to send captured terror suspects to countries where torture is used. The proposed law, recently tacked onto a much larger bill despite the fallout from last spring’s interrogation scandal, is seen as an attempt to counter a recent Supreme Court decision that would free some terror detainees being held without trial.
In a letter published in The Washington Post, White House legal counsel Alberto Gonzales said the president “did not propose and does not support” a provision to the House bill that removes legal protections from suspects preventing their “rendering” to foreign governments known to torture prisoners. Gonzales said Bush “has made clear that the United States stands against and will not tolerate torture.”
But John Feehery, spokesman for House Speaker Dennis Hastert, who introduced the bill last Friday, said the provision had actually been requested by the Department of Homeland Security. “For whatever reason,” Feehery said, “the White House has decided they don’t want to take this on because they’re afraid of the political implications.”
He said the provision, mainly laid out in Section 3032 and 3033 , was designed as a way of addressing the problem created by last summer’s Supreme Court decision. The justices ruled that the administration couldn’t detain people indefinitely without trial or charges. As a result, the government has ordered the release of suspects such as Yaser Hamdi, a dual citizen of the United States and Saudi Arabia who was captured in Afghanistan and held for three years as an enemy combatant.
Now, Feehery said, “we’ve got a situation where we’ve got these people in the country who ought not to be in the country. We have to release them because of the Supreme Court case. So Homeland Security wanted this provision.”
Department of Homeland Security spokesman Garrison Courtney said he believed the proposed legislation was little more than a “clarification” of existing law. But some human-rights groups vehemently disagreed. The New York Bar Association, in a statement, said current U.S. regulations enacted under the Convention against Torture prohibit deporting any individual to a country where “more likely than not” the person will be tortured. A person can be deported only after a finding that torture is no longer likely cut . By contrast, the bar association said, the new bill would actually “mandate deportation of such an individual to a country even if it is certain that [he] would be tortured there.”
The provision amounts to “a tacit approval of torture,” the association said, and “is particularly shocking in the aftermath of the recent revelations of torture by U.S. personnel in Iraq.”
Responding to the Bar Association's criticism, Jeff Lungren of the House Judiciary Committee said some 500 detainees have been released since the summer because of the Supreme Court decision. He said the bill wwas necessary because "the safety and security of the American public is being subjugated to the interests of serious criminals and terrorists."
Feehery said Hastert still supported the provision in spite of Gonzales’ letter. The letter was written in response to a Sept. 30 story in The Washington Post that quoted Feehery as saying the Justice Department “really wants and supports” the provision, which is only a tiny part of a giant-intelligence reform bill.
Feehery told Newsweek on Tuesday that, at the time he spoke to the Post reporter, he believed that Justice had sought the provision, but now believes it actually was DHS. Justice spokesman Mark Corallo also said it was Homeland Security’s call. “It’s their issue,” Corallo said. “They’re the immigration people now. Not us.”
© 2004 Newsweek, Inc.
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6185393/site/newsweek/
To Torture or Not?
President Bush backs ‘rendering’ suspects—then backs off
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Michael Hirsh
Newsweek
Updated: 4:06 p.m. ET Oct. 5, 2004
Oct. 5 - President Bush today distanced himself from his administration’s quiet effort to push through a law that would make it easier to send captured terror suspects to countries where torture is used. The proposed law, recently tacked onto a much larger bill despite the fallout from last spring’s interrogation scandal, is seen as an attempt to counter a recent Supreme Court decision that would free some terror detainees being held without trial.
In a letter published in The Washington Post, White House legal counsel Alberto Gonzales said the president “did not propose and does not support” a provision to the House bill that removes legal protections from suspects preventing their “rendering” to foreign governments known to torture prisoners. Gonzales said Bush “has made clear that the United States stands against and will not tolerate torture.”
But John Feehery, spokesman for House Speaker Dennis Hastert, who introduced the bill last Friday, said the provision had actually been requested by the Department of Homeland Security. “For whatever reason,” Feehery said, “the White House has decided they don’t want to take this on because they’re afraid of the political implications.”
He said the provision, mainly laid out in Section 3032 and 3033 , was designed as a way of addressing the problem created by last summer’s Supreme Court decision. The justices ruled that the administration couldn’t detain people indefinitely without trial or charges. As a result, the government has ordered the release of suspects such as Yaser Hamdi, a dual citizen of the United States and Saudi Arabia who was captured in Afghanistan and held for three years as an enemy combatant.
Now, Feehery said, “we’ve got a situation where we’ve got these people in the country who ought not to be in the country. We have to release them because of the Supreme Court case. So Homeland Security wanted this provision.”
Department of Homeland Security spokesman Garrison Courtney said he believed the proposed legislation was little more than a “clarification” of existing law. But some human-rights groups vehemently disagreed. The New York Bar Association, in a statement, said current U.S. regulations enacted under the Convention against Torture prohibit deporting any individual to a country where “more likely than not” the person will be tortured. A person can be deported only after a finding that torture is no longer likely cut . By contrast, the bar association said, the new bill would actually “mandate deportation of such an individual to a country even if it is certain that [he] would be tortured there.”
The provision amounts to “a tacit approval of torture,” the association said, and “is particularly shocking in the aftermath of the recent revelations of torture by U.S. personnel in Iraq.”
Responding to the Bar Association's criticism, Jeff Lungren of the House Judiciary Committee said some 500 detainees have been released since the summer because of the Supreme Court decision. He said the bill wwas necessary because "the safety and security of the American public is being subjugated to the interests of serious criminals and terrorists."
Feehery said Hastert still supported the provision in spite of Gonzales’ letter. The letter was written in response to a Sept. 30 story in The Washington Post that quoted Feehery as saying the Justice Department “really wants and supports” the provision, which is only a tiny part of a giant-intelligence reform bill.
Feehery told Newsweek on Tuesday that, at the time he spoke to the Post reporter, he believed that Justice had sought the provision, but now believes it actually was DHS. Justice spokesman Mark Corallo also said it was Homeland Security’s call. “It’s their issue,” Corallo said. “They’re the immigration people now. Not us.”
© 2004 Newsweek, Inc.
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6185393/site/newsweek/
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