Flopping Aces � Able Danger Hearing Transcript

Flopping Aces � Able Danger Hearing Transcript

The following is the transcript of the Able Danger hearings that we’re held on Feb 15th:
Jim Saxton:
The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets this afternoon in joint session with our colleagues from the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to explore the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) project known as Able Danger. This is an oversight hearing conducted by the two subcommittees of jurisdiction with the goal of determining whether Able Danger represented a missed opportunity to avert the tragedy of September 11. Our purpose is to find out what happened, and let members draw their own conclusions from the testimony presented.
The Able Danger story is complex—no single individual has first hand knowledge of all the relevant events. The subcommittees, guided by our friend and colleague Curt Weldon, who has devoted much study to this issue, have invited a wide range of witnesses to testify in both open and closed session. Each has a piece of the narrative to relate. As in any complex mosaic, no one had the benefit of the whole picture. I caution the witnesses to tell the committees what they have first hand knowledge of, and not speculate about events of which they have no direct evidence. Even though we have assembled many key witnesses, some few have left government service and have declined to appear for personal reasons. We reached out to every relevant witness made known to us so that we could hear all the evidence. We are, after all, the primary committee of jurisdiction for this program and are ultimately responsible for its oversight.
Members must decide for themselves what to believe from the testimony presented today—there will be some inconsistencies. Having reviewed the totality of the evidence, I do not believe that Able Danger represents a major blunder by SOCOM, the Army, or any presidential administration. Rather, I think it is yet another example of the many pointed out by the 9/11 Commission of the federal government’s inability to integrate intelligence information effectively and take appropriate action. It is conceivable that Able Danger, if fully and aggressively pursued and vigorously acted upon, could have provided key intelligence that may have averted 9/11. It’s easy to say that today, with the benefit of clear hindsight; we can and have said the same thing about other missed opportunities—the 9/11 Commission report lists many across the federal government. Put in its proper perspective, Able Danger, despite its promise, was a new, untested program just beginning to forge a niche in the intelligence community. At the time the alleged chart with Mohammed Atta was produced, no Able Danger product was used for operational purposes.
Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of 9/11 to drive home our inability to share information among federal agencies. To our credit, we have acted to correct these deficiencies by enacting the Intelligence Reform Act, creating a Director of National Intelligence, and establishing a cross cutting National Counter Terrorism Center. Further, the Able Danger project started by SOCOM in 1999 was brought to the headquarters in Tampa and continues to this day, under a different name, thanks to the far sighted leadership of General Pete Schoomaker. Far from being a sad story, I think a critical examination of the facts shows that the federal government has made much progress, and that SOCOM in particular was astute enough to press ahead even before 9/11.
Terry Everett:
As a member of both the House Armed Services and Intelligence committees, I am keenly interested in data mining and its importance to our intelligence community in conducting the war on terrorism.
At the outset, I believe it is important to highlight the key objectives of this hearing:
To better understand the Joint Chiefs tasking of Special Operations Command in late 1999 to conduct an information operations campaign against Al Qaeda, and The tools used by the Able Danger team to map out the Al Qaeda network and how that information was shared.
I have heard numerous reports that Mohammed Atta’s name was known before 9/11 but have not heard a definitive answer as to what significance his name and photo might have had in warning the United States of an impending attack. Even if Mohammed Atta’s name did show up in the Able Danger project, what was the significance of this information to the intelligence community? I hope to learn more on this today.
I also note that there is an on-going Department of Defense Inspector General investigation associated with certain aspects of the Able Danger. I know that we will all be careful to stay clear of matters that are the subject of this investigation as well as ensuring we avoid the discussion of classified material while in open session.
I want to commend my colleague, Curt Weldon, for his interest and hard work in this area.
Stephen Cambone:
Good afternoon, Chairman Saxton, Chairman Everett, and members of the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats & Capabilities Subcommittee and the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
You invited us here this afternoon to discuss the planning activity known as Able Danger. Congressman Weldon informed me of his interest in Able Danger in August of last year. As a result of our conversation, I initiated a review of what the Department knew, or did not know, about Able Danger.
The review team involved more than 90 DoD and contract personnel who spent an estimated 6,500 manhours conducting significant document and data searches, interviewing over 50 individuals, and interacting withMembers and Staff of this and other Committees. The review was conducted Department-wide with the full cooperation of all relevant DoD organizations, as well as two contractor firms: Orion, which provided opensourceresearch support to the Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and Raytheon, which supported USSOCOM with all-source analysis.
The review team was comprised of individuals from my office, the Army’s G2, the office of the DoD General Counsel, and staff officers from the Joint Staff, USSOCOM, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. None ofthem had first-hand knowledge of Able Danger.
Members of the review team are here with me today. (Introduce team members - Mr. Tom Gandy from the Army’s G2, CAPT Hal Dronberger, formerly of the Joint Staff, and CDR Christopher Chope, formerly of USSOCOM.)
The review did not uncover a chart or charts with information on 911 hijacker Mohammed Atta that pre-dated the 911 attack. Nor did the review discover any data - hard copy or soft - that provided information on Attaprior to the 911 attacks. That said, we do not have evidence to tell you definitively whether such a chart existed or not.
The review did not find that the Department deliberately failed to share Able Danger information with the FBI.The review did not find that Able Danger information was inappropriately destroyed. Rather, the destruction of Able Danger information was done in accordance with Departmental regulations and procedures.
What was “Able Danger?” It is helpful to establish the evolution of Able Danger.
In late December 1998, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified the need to develop asymmetric capabilities to deter transnational terrorist organizations. He believed that a comprehensive DoD strategy andsupporting campaign plan were needed to leverage DoD capabilities and enhance ongoing interagency efforts against terrorism. In October 1999, USSOCOM was formally tasked by the Joint Staff to develop such acampaign plan. “Able Danger” was the unclassified name for the project.
The initial focus of the project was the identification and exploitation of vulnerabilities associated with A1 Qaeda’s command and control infrastructure, its leadership and supporting organizations. To assist in theeffort, USSOCOM explored the use of analytic tools and methodologies available in the 1999-2000 timeframe that could assist it in:
identifLing linkages and patterns in large volumes of data; and, reviewing those links and patterns against previous, known activities for indications and warning of possible hture activity.
To perform this “nodal analysis,” USSOCOM requested support from a number of organizations and businesses during various phases of the effort and with varying degrees of success:
The Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC), Dahlgren, Virginia, had computerized analytic tools. We were told that JWAC collaboration with USSOCOM began in December 1999 and ended in January-February 2000 because it produced indeterminate results that did not meet USSOCOM’s needs.
The Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity (or LIWA), at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, had the capability desired by USSOCOM and was approached for support in early 2000. Orion, a commercial firm, provided support to LIWA during this time. Orion produced multiple pattern analysis and cluster analysis charts in support of LIWA. Wewere told that Orion responded to specific requirements from LIWA and that Orion employees were not “read onto” Able Danger. We were also told that LIWA supported USSOCOM on Able Danger with analytic products only for a brief period in early 2000. Later, we will discuss the reasons for the termination of LIWA’s support. It wasduring this period that the Atta chart - with his name and/or picture - was said to have been provided to USSOCOM.
In March 2000, Commander USSOCOM decided to develop an organic data mining capability. In July 2000, a Raytheon facility was set up in Garland, Texas, working in direct support of USSOCOM.
Recall, the purpose of the Able Danger effort was a campaign plan. In November 2000, the Garland effort was terminated and resources shifted to development of a draft of that campaign plan - this occurred just after thebombing of the USS Cole. USSOCOM’s deadline for the plan’s production, December 2000, was looming. The draft plan was delivered to the Joint Staff in January 2001 at which time Able Danger activities ceased.
The plan contained recommendations on a strategic approach to transnational terrorism. It did not contain the expected level of tactical detail necessary to operationalize the plan. The Joint Staff rolled the Able Dangerplan into ongoing contingency planning. A later planning effort developed by the Joint Staff had a component which was similar to the product of Able Danger.
Following the November 2000 termination of the analytic effort at the Raytheon facility in Garland, USSOCOM established its follow-on analytic capability at its headquarters in Tampa.
Did the Department inappropriately destroy Able Danyer-generated information?
The LIWA intelligence oversight officer determined during the course of LIWA’s support to USSOCOM that the data it had compiled was not in compliance with DoD intelligence oversight policies, specifically with regard to retention of U.S. persons information. Additionally, a required Terms of Reference, or TOR, authorizing LIWA to support USSOCOM was not in place in early 2000. LIWA had to develop procedures to deal with the U.S. persons information issue, but apparently could not resolve the problem in time. We were told that LIWA purged its data files and destroyed hard copy material related to Able Danger in the March-April timeframe.
As best we can ascertain, USSOCOM had Raytheon purge the majority of its Able Danger-related information upon completion of the Garland effort in November 2000. A small percentage of information - roughly only 1% - was transferred back to USSOCOM headquarters although we received varying reports of exactly how much of the original Able Danger information still resides in USSOCOM servers. A USSOCOM analyst who was present during the time of Able Danger told us that the purged information included software applications, open sourcedead ends and other non-relevant data. Only the data needed to write the campaign plan and to facilitate the establishment of an analytic data mining capability at USSOCOM headquarters was retained.
Did the LIWA or other Able Danger-related activities produce unique information on the 911 1 hijacker Mohammed Atta prior to 2001?
Of the approximately 50 persons interviewed by the team, five people recalled a chart containing the picture and the name of Atta.
Orion produced link charts derived solely from open source information. Orion’s charts included photographs of terrorists. We were told that LIWA did not produce charts with photographs. Three Orion personnel knowledgeable of Orion products provided to LIWA told us that they were certain that the charts did not contain a picture or a reference to Atta or any of his aliases. In addition, these personnel told us that an “Al Qaeda” chart was provided to LIWA only as an example. The chart was originally prepared for use in a training course on counterterrorism analysis. We were told that Orion provided the chart on Al Qaeda to LIWA on October 21,1999 without any supporting data. That is, additional analysis would have been required to validate the individuals and associations depicted on the chart. There may have been subsequent updates to this chart that were provided to LIWA, but again, Orion personnel told us that Atta’s photograph was not included.
The review team could not identify the precise data sets that were used for data searches and nodal analyses during the time of Able Danger.
In an attempt to discover open source information on Atta with the use of contemporary and more advanced tools, the Army G2 directed INSCOM to conduct searches against open source information with emphasis on theNovember 1999 to May 2000 timeframe. This time was chosen to bracket the period during which a chart with Atta’s name andlor picture might have been produced.
Searches were conducted on 20-21 August 2005 by the Intelligence Information Services office at HQ INSCOM, the 1 st I0 Command, and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). A very large volume of data was searched by multiple search engines running against fourteen government and commercial data stores. The searches did not discover any information on Atta in the specified timeframe.
USSOCOM also conducted searches against an extensive repository of information, including all of the Able Danger information previously transferred to USSOCOM headquarters from the Garland facility. Thosesearches also did not discover any information on Atta in the specified time frame.
We asked Orion, the company which provided open source analysis support to LIWA, to conduct a search of its own files. Orion reported that its search did not uncover a chart with information on Atta or any data thatmight have produced it.
However, we did discover a chart during our data searches that was dated as of May 1999 and produced by Orion that was similar to that described by CAPT Scott Phillpott. The chart bears the photos and names ofMohammed Atef and Mohammed Ajaj, but not Mohammed Atta.
At least one of the individuals who told us that he saw a photo of Atta on a chart produced for Able Danger in early 2000 described the photo as “grainy” — and not the one used for Atta’s Florida dnvers license shortlyafter he first entered the United States in June 2000. The photo on the drivers license was widely circulated after 9/11. The review team attempted to track down the existence of this other photo. Because Orionproduced charts with photos, the team interviewed the individual who was the Chief Executive Officer of Orion at the time of Able Danger. He told us that Orion did not purchase such a photo. He said that the only photos ofAtta in Orion’s possession were obtained after 9/11. We have not seen a copy of the so-called “grainy” photo.
Did the Department fail to share Able Danger-related information with the FBI?
Claims have been made that during Able Danger three meetings with an FBI agent had been arranged or were in the process of being arranged in September 2000 for the purposes of sharing Able Danger information andthen cancelled by SOCOM officials out of misplaced concern over intelligence sharing protocols. The FBI agent said to be involved did not corroborate those claims. In response to questions posed during the SenateJudiciary Committee’s September 2005 hearing, the Department of Justice denied such claims in a letter to the Committee. I understand that your staff has a copy of this letter. If you do not have the letter, I have a copy and can provide it for the record.
We found no reason to believe that USSOCOM leadership or anyone from the DoD legal community prohibited or prevented the sharing of Able Danger information with other federal agencies. USSOCOM set up a classified “chat room” to further interagency coordination and break down existing stovepipes. It was designed so that any agency could enter anonymously to discuss issues without having to lay out any internal information. We were told that the chat room was not actively used. USSOCOM leadership at the time of Able Danger have said theywere aware of the legal and regulatory guidelines that governed intelligence gathering and dissemination. These guidelines would not have prohibited the exchange of information on suspected terrorists.
The Department has the authorities necessary to share information of interest with respect to collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence about U.S. persons with other U. S. government organizationsand agencies. These authorities have remained unchanged since 1982. The conduct of intelligence activities by DoD intelligence components is governed by the requirements set forth in EO 12333, “U.S. Intelligence Activities,” 4 December 198 1, DoD Directive 5240.1, “DoD Intelligence Activities,” 25 April 1 988, and DoD Directive 5240.1 -R, “Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons,” December 1982. Attorneys from the office of the DoD General Counsel, the Joint Staff, the Army, and USSOCOM were involved in providing legal advice and guidance during all stages of the Able Danger effort. These authorities and regulations also involve strict measures to ensure protection and safeguarding of information on U.S. entities.
Was the Department Responsive to the 9/11 Commission’s Request for Able Danger information?
Mr. Anthony Shaffer, a DIA civilian employee then on temporary active duty, discussed Able Danger with several Commission staffers during an October 2003 Commission staff field trip to Afghanistan. That discussionresulted in two subsequent Commission requests for specific Able Danger documentation in November 2003. The Department conducted document searches and provided a number of documents to the Commission inresponse to these requests between December 2003 - February 2004. The documents provided to the Commission included several briefings which contained nodal analysis charts or diagrams. None of those charts contained any reference to Mohammed Atta or any of the other 911 1 hijackers.
In July 2004, as the 911 1 Commission was nearing completion of its effort, then CDR Scott Phillpott, USN, came forward. He said that he had seen early in 2000 an Able Danger-produced chart that depicted suspectedAl Qaeda networks and that identified Mohammed Atta. CDR Phillpott asked to meet with the 911 1 Commission staff to share that information: the meeting was subsequently arranged by the Department.
The Department responded to all Commission requests for information. No DoD documentation on Able Danger responsive to the requests was at any time withheld from the Commission. It is true that in the course of this recent review, DoD has unearthed additional documents related to Able Danger. These documents were found with considerable effort. Some of these documents would have been responsive to the Commission’s information requests and were generally consistent with the DoD documents already provided to the Commission. None of these newly identified documents, however, add information substantively different than that provided to the Commission.
In summary, the Department undertook its recent review of Able Danger in good faith and with due diligence:
No chart or charts with Atta’s name or photo have been found.
No data sets that contain such information have been found.
Material associated with Able Danger was destroyed, but in each case consistent with standard policies.
The FBI has denied that meetings were scheduled or in the process of being scheduled to pass data to it from Able Danger, or cancelled.
DoD was responsive to the 911 1 Commission’s information requests.
We have briefed Members of this Committee previously on the review. We have also briefed the staffs of the HPSCI, HAC-D, SSCI, and SJC as well. You are welcome to any documents that we have on the subject that are not restricted by any ongoing legal proceedings.
The individuals here today are prepared to answer your questions on what they discovered in the course of the review.
The DoD Inspector General has an ongoing formal investigation into Able Danger. The DoD IG is also investigating the security revocation case of Mr. Anthony Shaffer. The IG’s office has informed me that its Able Danger investigation is expected to be completed in May 2006. Should any new information come to light as a result of the IG’s investigation, we will pursue any new avenues of discovery that are necessary.
Able Danger was one of the Department’s earliest attempts at employing data correlation through emerging information technology capabilities. our capability has improved considerably in the last 5-6 years.
Today, USSOCOM and the Army’s Information Dominance Center, or IDC, house state-of-the-art capabilities. These two centers and others in DoD have significant capability to process, analyze, fuse, and graphically display data at rates exponentially greater than our initial pre-9/11 efforts. Today these centers are collaborating on a continual basis, enhancing our ability to coordinate and conduct intelligence and operations in counter terrorism, counter proliferation, information operations, and unconventional warfare.
Several Members of this Committee have visited at least one of these centers. To those Members who have not yet had the opportunity to visit either center, I recommend a visit in the near future. We could not haveachieved these successful efforts without the support of Congressman Weldon and your subcommittees.Thank you.
I would be happy to answer any questions you have.
Saxton:
Thank you again Mr. Secretary, I understand your collegues at the table are there for purposes of answering questions and they do not have opening statements.
Cambone:
They do not.
(Ms. Tauscher or Ms. McKinney or Ms. Sanchez or Ms. McMorris) Not sure which one of these four is the one speaking. These are the only four females on the two subcommittee’s.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I have a question.
Saxton:
Maam, we’re gonna go in regular order here.
Female:
I understand that but my question is a parlimentary inquiry. I would like to know if we will be allowed to offer opening statements for the record.
Saxton:
If you would like to offer opening statements in writing for the record I see nothing wrong with that.
Female:
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and also does that include questions for the record?
Saxton:
Sure.
Female:
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Saxton:
Mr. Everett.
Everett:
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Let me do a couple things first, housekeeping here since the FBI is not here represented I would like to unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter from the DoJ in response to Sen. Specters query to FBI Director Mueller concerning AD and a letter to Sen. Specter and Sen. Leahy from former Sen. Slate Gordon on the 9/11 commission, concerning the same AD information.
Saxton:
These letters will also be entered into the record without objection.
Everett:
I listened carefully to the opening statements of you Mr. Chairman and of the ranking members and I’m really impressed with the lack of knowledge we have concerning AD, the committee has concerning AD. However I would also like to point out that there is one member of the house armed services committee who is very close to this issue so at this time I would like to yield my ten minutes of questioning to Mr. Weldon, Curt.
Weldon:
I thank the gentlemen for his time and I thank the witnesses for coming and I thank Chairman Hunter who is ill today and could not be here for scheduling this hearing and also for his request to initiate the IG investigation of the treatment of witnesses who simply came to tell the truth. We were at a point in time where one of our witnesses was within two days of having not only his classified status removed but having his personal pay and health care benefits for his kids removed and put on a status that Mark Zine his attorney says he has never seen before. Where he was persona non-grata but yet he could not talk to Congress or the media.
That’s been corrected with the help of Gordon England, I thank him for that, and Sec. Rumsfeld. Because of their intervention along with the new Director of DIA to allow for a thorough investigation of the treatment of Lt. Col. Shaffer and others we can procede forward.
I want to thank Dr. Cambone for coming in, he was the first one I called officially when this story broke in the NYT’s. And as you remember Dr. Cambone you came in and said to me, “you know Congressman, you know more about this program then I do.” You don’t refute that statement do you?
And you said that because it was the Congress and this Committee back in 1999 and 2000 that was agressively pushing the prototype that the LIWA had established at Fort (unk) that we were all so impressed with.
In fact it was on November the 4th of 1999 that the suggestion of then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Amery that we convened a meeting with the Deputy Director of the FBI and the CIA using the LIWA model and proposed an actual collaborative center.