Retracing the path of infamy

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South Asia
COMMENTARY
Retracing the path of infamy
By Ehsan Ahrari IntroductionOn late Friday, October 8, a bill was introduced in the Pakistani parliament that was aimed at allowing President General Pervez Musharraf to break a constitutional pledge that he made with the opposition parties to quit the army by the end of this year. If there was any doubt in the past that he would not abide by that pledge, it is crystal-clear now that he wishes to cling to the legacy of one of his infamous predecessors, General Zia ul-Haq. Like Zia, Musharraf knows where the levers of ultimate power are in his country and he does not want to give them up. Like Zia, he refuses to take off his uniform, fearing that one of his proteges would oust him from office, as he ousted his own mentor, Nawaz Sharif, and as Zia ousted his mentor, the then prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Zia, like all his military predecessors, was known for sabotaging the prospects of the evolution of democracy in his country. Musharraf is currently retracing the very same path of infamy today. Beyond these, there are still more parallels regarding the nature of Pakistan-US relations now and during the dictatorship of Zia. Brief background Musharraf is about to break a pledge made with powerful Islamist parties in the middle of last year that he would quit one of his dual-hatted jobs of army chief and remain as president in his civilian capacity. According to that pledge, he must step down on December 31 of 2004. However, there were doubts about his earnestness related to that promise and his respect for democracy and the constitution. Of course, he ousted democracy from Pakistan in October 1999 in his bloodless coup, and has been wishy-washy about the prospects of reinstating it. He comes from the military culture of Pakistan, where contempt for democracy is well ingrained. The Pakistani pantheon of heroes has only two prominent civilians, Allama Mohammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Iqbal was one of most prominent poets of Islam (not just of Pakistan), who conceived the very idea that Muslims of the subcontinent should have a separate home. Pakistan is the materialization of that very idea. Jinnah was the politician who worked for the realization of Iqbal's idea. The rest of that pantheon has a slew of military dictators - Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia ul-Haq - who don't even form shining examples of successful military leadership. The best statement one can make about Ayub was that he was forced to resign under domestic turbulence. Yahya Khan had the ignominious role of presiding over the dismantlement of East Pakistan into an independent Bangladesh in 1971. Zia created his own infamous legacy of bringing Islamists into mainstream politics by Islamizing Pakistan. His chief purpose was to promote his dictatorship. Pakistan continues to suffer from the deleterious effects of that legacy, especially today. But this is only a partial explanation of what went wrong with Pakistan, especially during the regime of Zia. An important point here is that history has a strange way of repeating itself in that country. When Zia was busy Islamizing Pakistan, the United States went to that country to oust the Soviet Union from neighboring Afghanistan. The last epic battle between democracy and totalitarianism was fought in a Muslim country (Afghanistan), while another Muslim country (Pakistan) played an all-important role of serving as the chief conduit for channeling America's military weaponry to the mujahideen (Islamic freedom fighters). In an ironic coincidence of history, Zia's dubious Islamization of Pakistan came handy in president Ronald Reagan's urgent need to indoctrinate the Afghan fighters with the militant notions of jihad and use them to wage a war on the Soviet Union. Zia gleefully obliged, for he knew the double-edged nature of that development. Popularity of militant jihad was to be used in the 1980s for declaring another jihad inside Indian-administered Kashmir, a development that brought the South Asian sub-continent to the brink of a nuclear war in 1999. Perhaps the Reagan administration was too busy defeating the Soviet Union and winning the Cold War at the global level to recognize the long-term implications of reviving military jihadism. Zia, on the contrary, knew exactly what he was doing. Under the Reagan presidency, ousting the Soviet Union from Afghanistan was of primacy concern to the US. Democracy had to wait for another day - as it turned out, more than a decade - to become a reality in Pakistan. Pakistan played its role beautifully and dutifully as a "pawn" in America's grand chess game. Keep this entire situation in mind while examining three very important variables. First, consider Musharraf's palpable sabotage of democracy in Pakistan (just like Zia). Second, his importance today in the global "war on terrorism" of President George W Bush (much the same way Zia was to Reagan's obsession of defeating the Soviet Union). Finally, the fact that Bush is so gung-ho about implanting democracy in the Muslim Middle East, but not in Pakistan. Here the similarities between Zia's and Musharraf's regimes concerning the US become especially interesting. Both Reagan (then) and Bush (now) would prefer democracy. However, for Reagan, the ouster of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan was more important. By the same token, Bush wants to establish democracy in the Muslim world; however, for him winning the war on terror is considerably more significant than insisting on the emergence of Pakistan as a democracy, at least in the near future. Sabotaging democracy with a purpose By capturing power in October 1999, Musharraf ousted democracy from Pakistan. It is hard to believe that he would work assiduously for the return of democracy, or would give up the ultimate base of his power, his role as army chief of staff, as an important first step toward democracy. That is like expecting a brewery owner to dedicate his life to promote anti-alcoholism. Musharraf has the same contempt for civilian leadership and democracy as any military officer of that country. Man for man, Pakistani military officers (actually army officers, since the army is the predominant service of that country) disparages civilian leaders as corrupt and inept, as if they are describing a lower breed. In that contempt, they almost never fail to put their own kind on a rhetorical pedestal. What emerges from such lopsided discussions is the belief that civilian leaders cannot do anything right and an army officer can't do any wrong, once he captures power. Such a portrayal leaves no room or patience for the evolution of democracy in that country. However, when one examines the 54-year history of Pakistan, one sees a series of blunders committed, even the loss of its eastern wing, and wars fought with India, all under military dictators. So, despite past promises of Musharraf that he would give up his position as the army chief of staff, few Pakistanis believed him. Besides, he had studied the brief history of his country well enough to know that as a civilian head of state there is a good chance that he would end up either in a dungeon or be forced into exile in Saudi Arabia or Turkey (his favorite state), once he became a civilian head of state. And, like his military predecessors (especially Zia), he was not willing to take that chance. The chief problem of Pakistan related to democracy is that, since the army has kept power for 29 out of 54 years of that country's existence, there is not a healthy corps of experienced civilian leadership waiting in the wings to take over power and govern effectively. Besides, in a democracy - even the fledgling ones - the failure of one group of elected officials results in their ouster through the use of ballot boxes. A new slate of elected officials is given a chance to govern and prove their worth to the voters. In Pakistan, the army has used the inept or corrupt performance of the elected officials as an excuse to oust them. So the checkered record of military intervention emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy that the civilian leadership will fail once it enters into office, thereby "proving" the dubious argument of Pakistani army officers that civilians are inept or corrupt. This denunciation of civilian leadership becomes a rationale - such as it is - for the military's control and exercise of political power. However, the real purpose underlying this argument - as well the real purpose of the sabotage of democracy in Pakistan - is the fear of the army that, if democracy were to emerge as a permanent basis of governance in their country, a natural outcome would be the institutionalization of civilian supremacy over the military; and, equally important, the end of the army's privileged status in the Pakistani polity. Come to think of it, that very fear helps the army maintain its firm control of political power in Algeria. That very same fear also drove the army in maintaining its firm grip on power in Turkey. It was the warning of the European Union - that Turkey would not become a part of the EU unless the supremacy of civilian authority was firmly entrenched in that country, and unless the army renounced its interference in politics - that has played a crucial role in the emergence of Turkey as a democracy. It will be a long time before one can definitely state that the polity of Turkey is fully democratized. However, that country has indeed made a good start toward the emergence of a tradition of supremacy of civilian authority, an extremely vital precondition for the emergence of democracy. Unfortunately, there is no such force pushing Pakistan in the direction of democracy. The British Commonwealth countries originally made a feeble attempt by ousting that country from amid their ranks. However, the Commonwealth does not carry with it financial rewards and political prestige a la membership in the EU. 'Savior' of the Bush presidencyMusharraf only reluctantly joined Bush's war on terror. From the perspective of protecting its northern front, the Taliban government provided Pakistan the best possible guarantee. As an Islamist government, it eliminated Hindu India's influence from the country, a reality all Pakistani leaders cherished. In addition, the Taliban were the product of Pakistani madrassas (seminaries). As such, they were not likely to turn against Pakistan. So when Washington approached Islamabad to help it dismantle the Taliban regime in the wake of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Musharraf did not have much of a choice but to agree. One can only imagine what message was delivered to him via diplomatic channels. A safe guess is the he was told in no uncertain terms, "either you are with us or you are with the Taliban and al-Qaeda". Musharraf did not have to think too long or too hard to know what his decision ought to be. Pakistan did cooperate with the US in providing basing facilities and sharing intelligence. However, there was no zeal driving that sentiment until the last three months or so of 2003, when Islamist terror-related activities started to escalate. It was Ayman al-Zawahiri's - al-Qaeda's No 2 in command - public denunciation of Musharraf by name as a "lackey of America" and, more important, two attempts on Musharraf's life last December that proved to be the clinchers. Those events pushed Pakistan in the same corner as the US. Musharraf knew then that he became the target of al-Qaeda's version of the declaration: "either you with us or you are with the American infidels". His regime, from then on, emerged as a zealot participant in Bush's "war on terror". There is no turning back now. Musharraf must oust al-Qaeda from his country. The trouble with that proposition is that al-Qaeda as a movement has permeated into Pakistan's polity so thoroughly that there is no eradication of it, at least not merely by conducting brutal military campaigns. That will only create increased sympathy for al-Qaeda. But as a frontline "warrior" of the "war on terror", Musharraf might even be able to guarantee the reelection of Bush, if, for no other reason than through sheer luck, he can either capture or kill one or more top leaders of al-Qaeda. No one is more aware of the significance of such a happenstance than Musharraf and Bush. What is democracy among friends? An important adage of South Asia and the Middle East is that friends don't quibble or fight over formal rules involving issues of mutual concern. Formal rules should be insisted on and be enforced among strangers. Friends, according to this frame of reference, reach compromises over all issues, trivial or crucial. It appears that that rule is being applied over the reinstatement of democracy in Pakistan between Musharraf and Bush. Even though he is a product of Western culture, Bush knows what is at stake in Pakistan, and what America's priorities ought to be, of course, from his perspectives. Musharraf and Bush seem to have reached an understanding that, as long as he maintains the intensity of his military campaign against al-Qaeda, Bush will not, publicly or through diplomatic channels, insist on the imminent reinstatement of democracy in Pakistan. An added dimension of this understanding is that Musharraf has persuaded Bush about how indispensable he really is vis-a-vis the "war on terror". As long as America's understanding of Pakistani domestic politics remains shallow, Musharraf can get away with selling Bush his version of explanation: that the United States is better off with Musharraf carrying the heavy burden of fighting al-Qaeda in Pakistan. The clincher in Musharraf's argument is that he continues to periodically deliver al-Qaeda functionaries to the US. Besides, between now and November 2, the role of Musharraf in Bush's reelection campaign remains extremely crucial. If he is reelected, Bush will still extend the lease on Musharraf's sabotage of democracy. The eradication of al-Qaeda would still be the primary objective of the US. Putting it all togetherReagan used Pakistan to wage a decisive confrontation against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. That confrontation is generally regarded as the winning battle leading to the eventual implosion of the communist superpower. At the end of that melee, the US went home, leaving Pakistan to become a highly explosive place as Islamists remained highly proactive within its own borders, and as Islamists eventually took over Afghanistan. Those types of forces, along with al-Qaeda, are determined to convert Pakistan into another radical Islamist stronghold. The Americans returned to Afghanistan in 2001 to fight another fateful battle, the global "war on terror". As Reagan used Pakistan to defeat the Soviet Union in the 1980s, Bush is now using it to win his campaign in the region. Even though there is no likelihood that the "war on terror" will be won any time soon, chances are the US will leave once again, when or if the top leadership of al-Qaeda and the Taliban is eradicated. But that development is not likely to help Pakistan become a stable democracy. In fact, regardless of the near-term outcome of the "war on terror", Pakistan is heading toward further radicalization and increased instability, as one autocrat - Musharraf - is determined to institutionalize his personal rule by eliminating all chances of the emergence of democracy. In this sense, Musharraf is well on his way of retracing the path of infamy of Zia. Wittingly or unwittingly, Bush is very much a part of Musharraf's inauspicious journey. Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst. (Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)