[imra] Daily digest - Volume: 2 Issue: 1357 (8 messages)

imra Mon Mar 27 04:25:09 2006 Volume 2 : Issue 1357

In this issue of the imra daily Digest:

Russian FM on Hamas, PA etc.
[weapons to Hezbollah is Lebanese matter]
Votes Received by parties that failed
to meet threshold - 2003, 1999
[Dying to please dumb America?]
Despite terror warnings, Israel to open Karni crossing
Excerpts: India-Iran togetherness.
Arab failure to interact with Iran.26 March 2006
PCPO Poll: 62.7% PA shouldn't honor commitments to Israel,
47.2% dissolve PA, 74.4% content with Hamas gov't w/out PLO
CABINET COMMUNIQUE
PSR Poll:52.4% Support armed attacks against Israeli
civilians inside Israel, 60.8% Hamas shouldn't recognize Israel,
66.9% Armed confrontation helped,
78% Hamas would find alternative funding
The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance
- An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Russian FM on Hamas, PA etc.
[weapons to Hezbollah is Lebanese matter]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

INFORMATION AND PRESS DEPARTMENT
_______________________________

32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya pl., 119200, Moscow G-200; tel.: (095) 244 4119,
fax: 244 4112
e-mail: dip@mid.ru, web-address: www.mid.ru

www.ln.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/7D6C84A28371CCF0C3257139004F7E5A?OpenDocument

Unofficial translation from Russian

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov's Interview with Arab
Media, Moscow, March 15, 2006

424-21-03-2006

Question: My question concerns the visit of the Hamas delegation to Moscow.
First came the resounding invitation of President Putin, then your meeting
with the delegation, and lastly, yesterday's event in Jericho. Will it
influence your diplomatic efforts for resolving the Middle East crisis?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: As to the Hamas visit to Moscow, I believe this
first contact was useful. After Hamas had won in legitimate, democratic,
free and fair elections and received a majority in the Palestinian
Legislative Council, there were no grounds not to forge contacts with this
organization, which must become conscious of its responsibility for the fate
of the Palestinian people. Particularly since throughout its previous
activity, apart from the armed struggle - a form which we disapprove, just
as we do violence from the other side - Hamas has been doing a lot to solve
economic and social problems in the Palestinian territories. In many
respects this found reflection in the vote of the voters who appreciate this
role of Hamas.

I'll say straight away that Khaled Mashaal, who led the Hamas delegation,
explicitly reiterated that the chief objectives of a government to be formed
following the PLC elections would be tackling economic and social problems,
mobilizing assistance to the Palestinians and ensuring the normal
functioning of all life-support systems in the PNA areas. He also said the
assistance coming in to Palestine, either via PNA's channels or those of
Hamas, would entirely be used exactly for these purposes. Responding to my
straightforward question, Mashaal expressed acceptance of a mechanism of
independent international monitoring being set up which would guarantee that
all the foreign aid is spent for civilian needs, for the needs of the
population of Palestine, for the needs of the structures that ensure the
life of Palestinians and is not used for other, nonpeaceful needs. We
consider this an important statement. Now in contacts with the World Bank,
with the office of James Wolfensohn and with the Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East we are striving to devise a mechanism
which would reassure donors, as the donor community, especially in Europe,
is interested in aid to Palestine continuing, not only in a humanitarian
form, but also in the form of maintaining the Palestinian administrative
structures on which the functioning of the Palestinian territories depends.

We also placed before the Hamas delegation the full range of questions
touched upon in the well-known statement of the Quartet, and underscored the
necessity of dealing with these matters, the need for Hamas to become a
truly political force and legitimize its armed units by integrally
incorporating them in PNA security structures. We stressed, of course, the
Quartet's position on the need to recognize all existing Palestinian-Israeli
accords and ensure a continuity in the negotiation process on settlement
between the Palestinians and Israel, which, as you yourselves understand,
presupposes the necessity to recognize Israel both as a negotiating party
and as the state which upon completion of the peace process, under the
Roadmap, must live side by side with the state of Palestine in peace and
security. The Hamas delegation discussed with us the questions which I have
just set out, the questions which were placed by the Quartet. We had not
expected that the position of Hamas would make a U-turn overnight, but I
would like to state the very important shifts which suggest the sense of
responsibility of Hamas in its new capacity. First and foremost, it is
readiness to consider the matters concerning the Roadmap. Moreover, our
interlocutors quite justly stressed that if this theme was to be considered,
then only in the form in which the Roadmap was approved by the Quartet. They
recalled that Israel had made, I believe, 14 reservations concerning the
Roadmap. The reservations are being viewed by the Palestinians as prejudging
the outcome of the talks on a final status for the Palestinian territories,
primarily with regard to borders, refugees, the status of Jerusalem and of
settlements. To which we reminded our interlocutors of UN Security Council
resolution 1515, which approved the Roadmap without any exemptions or
amendments and exactly in the form in which it was agreed upon by the
Quartet. So that I hope that the Hamas leaders are seriously studying the
necessity to express their attitude towards the Roadmap.

We also expect Hamas to be able to join the well-known Arab Peace
Initiative, which was formulated by the leadership of Saudi Arabia and then
backed up at the Arab League summit in Beirut. As I understand another
League summit will be held in Khartoum soon. The delegation of Hamas will be
part of a delegation from Palestine, we expect. This would be extremely
important to ensure from the very first days the engagement of a new
government with President Abu Mazen. In this connection I will note that in
Moscow the Hamas delegation said they respect Abu Mazen as the President,
intend to develop cooperation with him, and recognize his powers, including
those in international affairs. We count on cooperation between Abu Mazen
and Hamas being arranged. In particular, we wish our Palestinian friends
success in the soonest formation of a government and the completion of the
elaboration of its program.

As to our further steps, we presume that the talks in Moscow were not a
one-off action. We arrived at a definite understanding and want to see it
embodied into life. For our part, we are ready to lend support to the
Palestinians at this difficult stage. We are planning to provide financial
aid to the Palestinians. Now we are agreeing the modalities in which this
aid can be provided. We are also convinced that the Quartet at this stage
should take no pause, but should formulate a strategy for its further
actions in the new conditions so as to arrive at the fulfillment of the
Roadmap. This is our principal concern, and we in the contacts with all the
Quartet members that I had last week referred to this and expect that
somewhere in the foreseeable couple of weeks we will be able to begin such
work.

Regarding your specific question about the events that yesterday took place
in Jericho. We are concerned by what happened and how this occurred. Now
each of the parties is telling its own version of the incident. The UN
Secretary General through his deputy Ibrahim Gambari yesterday briefed the
Security Council. This briefing appears to us objective. At any rate, the UN
Secretariat usually tries when preparing briefings not to use unverified
facts.

We are convinced that such incidents should be excluded. At the height of
these events, we through our representatives in the region sent signals to
the parties, including the Hamas leadership, calling for maximum restraint.
Specifically we insistently recommended releasing the hostages and not
succumbing to provocations. As far as I understand, all the hostages have
been released and this matter is closed.

I know that Abu Mazen has returned to Ramallah. This is also important. His
personal involvement in resolving this situation will have a great
significance. Not all the circumstances of what happened are totally clear
to us. We expect that they will be established and that irrespective of this
both the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as the international
observers who were involved in this process will show maximum responsibility
and will not try to create any difficulties for subsequent efforts in the
search for a course of action in this new, changed, far from easy situation.
Each of the parties is, probably, tempted to exploit this or that episode
for political purposes. That is an extremely dangerous game. We do not
support any such things.

Question: How do you evaluate the outcome of the talks with the Iranians in
Moscow and Teheran? In what stage is the project for setting up a JV for
uranium enrichment on Russian soil? How could you respond to the views that
the US is currently trying to remove Russia and the trio and begin direct
talks with the Iranians on this question?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: The talks that were held during the last few weeks
regularly enough in Moscow and Teheran between the Russian and Iranian
sides, unfortunately, did not produce the result we had counted on. Our
offer to establish on Russian soil a JV involving Iran which would in a
guaranteed way supply all the requirements of Iran in fuel for its peaceful
nuclear industry was made in a bid to agree a compromise package which would
ensure a settlement of this problem. It was made in the context of the other
component parts of the overall package, including the need for Iran to come
back to the moratorium on activities related to uranium enrichment, the
return by Iran to the regime of observance of the additional protocol,
Iran's subsequent ratification of this protocol signed by it earlier, and of
course, the necessity of continued work by inspectors from the IAEA to clear
up the questions that still remain unclarified and which relate to the
previous nuclear activities of Iran, which were generally closed to the
world community, although they had to be reported to the IAEA. It was
because of those previous activities that doubts arose among most IAEA
members, which made it impossible to simply carry on work with Iran in the
IAEA in the usual mode. This long eighteen-year period, when Iran did not
report to the IAEA on its nuclear program, gave rise to many questions. The
IAEA has already clarified a whole array of them, but a number of questions
still remain. In order to restore confidence, these questions have to be
resolved. After they have been clarified and confidence has been restored,
we see no obstacles for Iran to continue to fully enjoy its rights as an NPT
member. Such was our scheme, which the European countries shared, which was
backed up by China and which the United States agreed with. But our Iranian
colleagues, as you know, unlike the assurances they gave, including those in
December of last year, resumed in part their enrichment activities in the
form of research. This was, of course, a move going beyond the parameters of
the moratorium, as we understand it. During the subsequent talks, we tried
to agree with the Iranians on returning the status quo. That did not occur.
In accordance with existing agreements the Iran question was twice discussed
in February and March in the IAEA Board of Governors and in accordance with
the agreements the UN Security Council was informed of the results of this
discussion. We favor the Security Council helping the IAEA restore the
normal process with Iran on the fulfillment of the decisions which were
adopted in the IAEA Board of Governors. Without the IAEA, any further work
on Iran will no longer be productive and will not be able to be oriented
towards the solution of the principal task, and we regard as such in the
Iranian nuclear matter the inadmissibility of a violation of the regime for
the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore the UN Security Council,
which is a political organ, must act with extreme caution and not permit
efforts aimed at the strengthening and nonviolation of the nonproliferation
regime to be used for political purposes. The Security Council should
responsibly approach its mandate. Our belief is that, at this stage, it
should limit itself to support of the efforts of the IAEA and calls for Iran
to respond in full measure to these efforts of the Agency, should cooperate
with the Agency in the clarification of the issues still outstanding. Most
importantly, we consider it necessary to work out a clearly defined line of
action, because if a question, not necessarily the Iran question, is flung
into the UN Security Council without a strategy for action to buttress it,
this does not always lead to the desired result, especially as the Security
Council is a machine which, once started, is very difficult to stop. Without
having prior consensus on where this machine can lead us all to, we would
not like to be drawn into any substantive discussion of the Iranian file in
the UN Security Council. To express support for the IAEA - yes, probably,
this has to be done. But it is only the IAEA that can professionally
accomplish the process on the Iranian nuclear file.

As to the third question, there are many situations where multilateral
formats of communication with this or that side exist. There is the Contact
Group on the former Yugoslavia and there is the Quartet of international
mediators and there is the format on Iran that has spontaneously emerged:
the European trio, Russia, China and the United States. But the presence of
all these formats does not mean that none of the participants should have
any bilateral contacts with the side concerned. That was the vein in which
we acted when we spoke with Hamas. We spoke on the basis of the agreed
positions of the Quartet. It has been in such a format that we have been
working with the parties in the former Yugoslavia when we have been
promoting the agreed positions of the Contact Group. It was in this vein
that Russia worked with Iran when we sought Iran's consent to the joint
proposal of the Six. If the Europeans, the Chinese or the Americans pursue
the same line, I see nothing terrible in this. Sometimes additional direct
contacts can help move the matter off dead center. If that happens, I will
only welcome it.

Question: Allow me to return to the Middle East theme. Still, Hamas is not
going to recognize Israel and generally does not recognize the Roadmap, as
they consider it "dead." So that the situation is in an impasse. Does Russia
have any new ideas how to get out of it?

Your assessment of the situation in Lebanon, especially as an internal
dialogue is under way there, particularly on sharp issues, such as arms
supplies to Hezbollah, the Shebaa Farms, and Taliban-Semitic relations
against the background of UN Security Council resolution 1559?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I cannot agree that the Roadmap is dead. Too little
time has passed since the real work with Hamas began. It is not only us that
are conducting it. Many Arab capitals, and the Arab League are conducting
this work. I repeat it, some time is required for Hamas to fully become
conscious of its responsibility in its new capacity. I think that the people
of Palestine are awaiting just this. Let us not forget that the Roadmap,
when it was just worked out by the Quartet, received the most diverse
characterizations, including the description that it was dead from the
moment of its approval. Such remarks were then being heard not from the
Palestinians and not from the Arabs. After many months the UN Security
Council nevertheless approved this document. Now it is a part of
international law. It has acquired an entirely different status. I am
convinced that the Hamas leadership will carefully acquaint themselves with
this document, by holding necessary consultations with Abu Mazen and with
other Palestinians who were involved in the process of the consultations
while elaborating the Roadmap, who know its history and know the UN's
position on the Roadmap. I am convinced that the situation is far from
hopeless. The Roadmap is the way to a just settlement of the Palestine
problem, the most acute, the most chronic, the most explosive problem of the
contemporary world. We consider that the rumors of its death are strongly
exaggerated.

As to Lebanon, we are very concerned that Lebanese society has not yet
managed to forge an internal consensus. We welcome the initiatives for
commencing an intra-Lebanese dialogue, which I understand is still in its
initial stage, but which is the only way to settle intra-Lebanese problems.

Yesterday at the talks with Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid Muallem
we discussed this question. I sensed the sincere keenness of Muallem to
assist this intra-Lebanese dialogue evolving normally, I sensed the
readiness of the Syrian side to fully normalize its relations with Lebanon,
including the exchange of embassies and a demarcation of borders. Of course,
and I cannot but agree with this, Syria presumes that the demarcation of the
border should be started from its northern part, because to start from the
Shebaa Farms area is probably unrealistic, considering the too many
complexities which the problem of these Farms involves. We discussed this
theme both in New York with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the day
before yesterday in Moscow with his Special Representative Terje
Roed-Larsen, who is a well-versed person in Middle Eastern affairs, and with
Javier Solana. We are convinced that this problem should be tackled and that
it should be tackled ultimately on the basis of a direct agreement between
Syria and Lebanon. Hopefully, that's the way it'll be. But so far, in my
personal opinion, the time for that has not yet come, although to put it off
indefinitely would be undesirable.

Regarding arms supplies to Hezbollah we shall be ready with the utmost
seriousness to consider any specific facts of such supplies. Statements
periodically appear that such supplies are being made. In a number of cases
they are not corroborated by facts and the words simply remain words. We
cannot act on such a basis and cannot use our capabilities in order together
with the other Quartet members to settle the problem if we do not have any
specific facts. In a number of instances, as was the case recently, it
concerns arms supplies with the consent of the Lebanese army. In such
situations we also can hardly help in any way. But we will try to help cut
short any illegal supplies if they are documented and if we have concrete
information.

Question: Does Hezbollah have the right to have arms?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Hezbollah, whoever says whatsoever and no matter
what external factors may be involved with the phenomenon of Hezbollah, this
is still a Lebanese phenomenon. Hezbollah is rooted in the circle of
Lebanese Shiites. The Lebanese themselves should tackle its problems. The
less external interference there is, the simpler it will be to do that, but
this is an inter-Lebanese problem. To a significant extent the settlement of
the status of Hezbollah in Lebanese society will help the settlement of the
problem of the Shebaa Farms.

Question: How much does your policy towards the Middle East, towards Hamas
and Iran influence your relations with the United States?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Our actions towards Hamas, the Palestine problem,
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and our relations with Israel, with the
PNA, with Syria, with Lebanon, with Egypt, with all countries of the region,
with Jordan, with the Arab League and indeed with all who are some way or
another involved in efforts to settle the conflicts in the Middle East are
absolutely transparent in the sense that we are not conducting any closed
games. We are acting, first and foremost, on the basis of existing
collective understandings in the form of the resolutions of the UN Security
Council, in the form of the decisions of the Quartet of international
mediators. We have absolutely nothing to hide from anybody. If we are
convinced that for implementing the available collective understandings, for
attempting to save the Palestinian-Israeli peace process it is extremely
important to convey the Quartet's point of view to Hamas, we are doing that
openly and telling the world about it. We do not maintain any secret, covert
contacts either with Hamas or with the Muslim Brethren. I hope you
understand what I am talking about.

As to how much our Quartet partners like or dislike these actions, I do not
think that our motives are not understandable to them. We are talking about
these motives, we are talking about the results of our contacts. At the end
of the visit to Moscow of the Hamas delegation, we briefed all our
colleagues in the Quartet. Yesterday and today I also told them all about
how the talks with Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid Muallem had
passed here. We only welcome when some one of the Quartet members assumes
the initiative to promote the common positions. More often than others,
incidentally, the US so does, thanks to whose efforts and those of
Condoleezza Rice personally more than once very acute situation was resolved
last year and the year before last, including, by the way, the situation in
Jericho. It was resolved and a scheme had been agreed which, unfortunately,
yesterday crumbled. But at the same time on a number of other incidents the
United States and personally US Secretary of State Rice, and before her
Colin Powell, assumed the main burden of efforts to prevent a scuttling of
the decisions of the Quartet. Just as in a number of other critical stages
in Middle East settlement the EU assumed the principal role. We also
welcomed this. Therefore I hope that our partners will perceive our
understandable, honest, open efforts likewise.

Question: To what extent do relations with the United States influence the
situation in the region?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: To us, each vector of our foreign policy is
self-valuable. We do not regard our multivectorness as a zero-sum game: we
have discussed something with somebody, agreed on something and this will be
directed against somebody else. The contemporary world is such, and the
Middle East all the more so, that without collective efforts nothing can be
accomplished. Collective efforts presuppose a joint elaboration of a
position which cannot admit extremes in either direction, which cannot
unambiguously state: "in this crisis this is the culprit and that is the
victim." That simply is never the case, and even less so can such a position
be taken in politics. There is a need for compromises which, far from
undermining the foundations of international law, would take into
consideration the lawful interests of each of the parties. There is the
diplomatic, or political, proverb that "a stable settlement is a settlement
which neither party is completely satisfied with." That is a sense of
dissatisfaction is bound to be there, but there can be no stable settlement
which one party declares its 100 percent victory, and the other its 100
percent defeat. That's how it might happen in Kosovo, unfortunately. This is
a separate theme. Let us not delve into it. Hence all that which we are
working out within the Quartet together with the US, EU and UN is a
compromise, but a compromise which, in my conviction, is called upon to move
settlement forward. I am convinced that this collective creativity can only
benefit if we, the Quartet members, take counsel more with the countries of
the region, in particular, with Egypt and Jordan. They are two countries
which are very active in the search of solutions to various conflicts, to
the exacerbations of the Palestinian-Israeli situation and which are keen to
cooperate with the Quartet.

I and Russia as a whole advocate that, apart from continuing the activities
of the Quartet, forms should be found which would enable in particular
Egypt, Jordan and perhaps the LAS Secretary General not merely cooperate
with the Quartet, but also participate in the elaboration of positions which
the Quartet discusses.

Question: What is the difference between the export of democracy and of
Soviet ideology?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Indeed the USSR had an ideology and politics. A
part of this politics was the export of the ideology. We well know how much
this costs, how much effort it takes and where it ends if somebody tries to
make somebody happy against his will. Changes have to ripen. I am convinced
that all of us and the entire world are moving in one and the same
direction. It is democracy, which in each country will have its own face,
because ours are different histories, cultures and civilizations; it is the
path of market and market relations, but of a civilized market, not of the
market through which contemporary Russia went through in the first years of
disintegration and which we are now trying, at enormous pains, to tidy up,
but of a market where just rules and fair competition will prevail and where
economic levers won't be used for achieving political aims. We are all
moving in this direction. But trying to cause everybody to move at one speed
or especially follow one model, be it democracy or market, is unrealistic
and impossible. Therefore the efforts being made to artificially speed this
process are wasted efforts. I hope that a good example is the work that was
done in the G8 with regard to the Greater Middle East, when at the end of
the day the idea of promoting democratic change was discussed with the
countries of the region. When these countries were asked, "you need help?"
they said: "No, we won't reject it. But we ourselves will determine the
forms, extent and areas of help for ourselves." The result was, in my
opinion, a not bad concept of the Broader Middle East and North Africa,
which is now a joint project of the G8 and the countries of the region. I am
very pleased that this year Russia as President of the Group of Eight will
together with Jordan be cochairing the 3rd session of the Forum for the
Future.

Question: Did Russia know of the decision of the Americans and British to
leave Jericho? Are there any international legal grounds for making
Palestinian prisoners leave the PNA territory or, as a last resort, placing
them under international supervision?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: To your first question my answer is negative. We
did not know about the intention of the American and British monitors to
leave Jericho.

Regarding the international legal grounds, I am not an expert on the
agreement of 2002. Probably those who worked out this agreement and who
arranged for the mechanism for its implementation should help you satisfy
your curiosity. But I will stress that all those who are involved in the
present situation must, of course, show maximum restraint and
responsibility.

Question: Great fears now exist with regard to Iraq. Why is it being felt
that Russia really does not play any role in Iraq?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: You want us to be engaged in restoring order in
Iraq? I have the feeling that you bear in mind the military situation only.
We indeed play no role in the military situation, and thank God. We play a
role in efforts which are called upon to help ensure a normal life for the
Iraqi people. More than a hundred of our specialists continue working in
Iraq. Many went away from there during the hostilities, but many stayed,
ensuring by their work under bullets and shells at least some power supply
for areas of that country. Now our companies continue working there in
conditions of considerable risk, restoring the projects which were destroyed
in the period of bombings and shellings. I hope that we shall be able to
observe an improvement in the present security situation, which so far,
unfortunately, is degrading. Already an ever larger number not only of
journalists, but also of officials from the states which have their troops
in Iraq call the situation a civil war. The Iraqis themselves are
increasingly using this term. We are committed to our pledges to help the
friendly Iraqi people restore their economy. A tragedy is taking place
there. I hope that although the role which our companies and our economic
specialists play there is inconspicuous, your readers and listeners will
learn about it.

Regarding Iraq's neighbors. There is a school of thought that the neighbors
are to blame for everything. Militants are penetrating via the neighbors,
and the neighbors are trying to keep this or that group in Iraq from
reaching agreements with another group. We're talking about an entirely
different thing. Immediately after the end of combat operations was
announced slightly less than two years ago and when the talk of arranging a
political process began, we suggested that the very first step be something
like a conference, whose core would consist of Iraq's major political,
ethnic and religious forces, together with whom all of Iraq's neighbors, the
Arab League, the OIC and the members of the UN Security Council would
gather, and that the neighbors together with the other participants induce
the Iraqis to agree on the basic parameters for a settlement process. I am
convinced that if this had been done, then the political process would have
been much more stable. This is still not too late. Better late than never.
Now the principal slogan in Iraq is national consensus, something which we
spoke of from the outset. It would have been better if national consensus
had become the basis for settlement, but once this did not happen, then let
us at least now try and form this national consensus in some way. Again I am
convinced that this is best to be done not through secret talks, but by
inviting all the main Iraqi forces and the neighbors of Iraq, because each
of the neighbors has its influence on some or other confessions and groups
in Iraq. Everybody knows about that. Then why keep the neighbors from a
positive influence, while at the same time accusing them of a negative
influence? I think that the idea of a new meeting along the lines of the
meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, along the lines of the meeting which took place
recently in Cairo with the invitation of all the Iraqi groups, all the
neighbors and the United Nations Security Council members, remains relevant
and, perhaps, its relevance is actually increasing.

* * *

A video recording of the interview is posted on the Russian MFA's Web site
in the Video section ( www.mid.ru ).

March 20, 2006

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Votes Received by parties that failed
to meet threshold - 2003, 1999

Votes Received by parties that failed to meet threshold - 2003, 1999

[The qualifying threshold is now 2%]

28 January 2003 elections: The qualifying threshold (1.5%) from all valid
votes is 47,226 votes.
www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/eng/results/regions.asp

37,855 Green Leaf (Ale Yarok)
36,202 Herut
20,571 Progressive National Alliance
12,833 Greens (Hayerukim)
07,144 Yisrael Aheret
05,468 Ahavat Yisrael
02,023 Tzomet
01,961 Center
01,925 Democratic Action Organization
01,566 Citizen and State
01,284 Men`s Rights in the Family (Ra-ash)
01,181 Lahava
00,894 Za-am - Social Justice
00,833 Leeder

====
1999 Elections for Knesset
The qualifying threshold (1.5%) from all valid votes is 49,641 votes

www.knesset.gov.il/elections/asp/eresults.asp

44,953 Penina Rosenblum
37,525 Power for Pensioners (Koah LaGimlaim)
34,029 The Green Leaf Party
26,290 The Third Way
13,292 Israel Green Party (HaYerukim)
07,366 Hope (Tikva)
06,540 The Casino Party
06,311 Lev - Immigrants for Israel
04,324 The Negev Party
04,128 Tzomet - The Movement for Renewed Zionism
02,924 The Natural Law Party
02,797 The Progressive Center Party (for Romanian immigrants)
02,151 Democratic Action Organization (Daam)
02,042 The New Arab Party
01,257 Men`s Family Rights
01,164 Tradition of the Fathers (Moreshet Avot)

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: [Dying to please dumb America?]
Despite terror warnings, Israel to open Karni crossing

Despite terror warnings, Israel to open Karni crossing
By Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondent 26 March 2006

[IMRA: Why "dumb America"? Because Rice pushed Israel to reopen Karni even
though Kerem Shalom could have handled the critical traffic.

Why "dumb Israel"? Because Israel reopened Karni even though Kerem Shalom
could have handled the critical traffic.

The mishandling of this challenge by the Olmert Administration is a sign of
things to come if Kadima forms the next ruling coalition.]

Under American pressure, Israel agreed over the weekend to reopen the Karni
crossing Sunday to goods traffic into and out of the Gaza Strip.

Rice has been showing great interest in the smooth running of the crossings
between Israel, the Gaza Strip and Egypt, having brokered the "crossings
agreement" in November 2005.

Last Thursday, the assistant administrator for the U.S. Agency for
International Development in the region, James Kunder, visited the area to
assess the situation ahead of the Palestinian Authority's new Hamas
government assuming its duties.

Livni told Rice that Israel would make every effort to reopen the crossings,
barring security contingencies, and will act to prevent a humanitarian
crisis in the Gaza Strip. She stated that Israel would not maintain any
contact with the Hamas government.

Mofaz presented the steps Israel will take:

* Karni crossing, the primary channel for transporting goods into and out of
the Gaza Strip, will reopen Sunday in both directions. The crossing was shut
down by Israel because of reported security alerts, but was partially
reopened last week, after American intervention, to goods entering Gaza.
According to UN data, the goods that have entered the Strip included staples
such as wheat, flour, oil and milk products; disposable diapers; beef and
fruit. Palestinian farmers lost millions of dollars on export goods they
could not get out.

* Kerem Shalom crossing, where the borders of Israel, Egypt and the Gaza
Strip meet, will remain open to goods entering Gaza. Mofaz told Rice that
the Palestinians "are refusing to transfer goods through Kerem Shalom, out
of irrelevant considerations." According to UN data, only six trucks passed
through the crossing last week, laden with flour and humanitarian aid.

* Mofaz also ordered the Sufa crossing reopened.

In his conversation with Rice, Mofaz complained about security lapses at the
Rafah crossing, which is managed by the Palestinians under European
supervision. They also discussed the implications of the upcoming swearing
in of the Hamas government, expected to take place on Wednesday. Mofaz
warned that "the reality will be much more complicated" if Hamas does not
disavow terrorism, recognize Israel, nullify its covenant and honor signed
agreements with Israel.

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Excerpts: India-Iran togetherness.
Arab failure to interact with Iran.26 March 2006

Excerpts: India-Iran togetherness.Arab failure to interact with Iran.26
March 2006

+++ARAB NEWS (Saudi) 26 Mar.'06:"India, Iran Emphasize Closer Ties"Nilofar
Suhrawardy, Arab News -
QUOTES FROM TEXT:
"India-Iran relations ... called for strengthening bilateral cooperation,
especially in the energy sector"
"A meeting of the India-Iran Joint Commission ... to discuss multi-faceted
relations"
"India which gets most of its oil from the Gulf ... has hundreds of
thousands of its citizens working there"
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXCERPTS:

NEW DELHI, 26 March 2006 - Sending a message that the India-Iran relations
have not been affected by New Delhi's vote against Tehran's nuclear program,
Prime Minister ...and visiting Iranian Vice President ...yesterday called
for strengthening bilateral cooperation, especially in the energy sector.
"The two leaders emphasized the importance they attach to the civilizational
ties ... and the need for further strengthening bilateral cooperation,
particularly in the energy sector," ... .
A meeting of the India-Iran Joint Commission would be convened soon to
discuss multi-faceted relations between the two countries.
"They agreed on the need for an early meeting of the India-Iran Joint
Commission," .... Energy-hungry India is in negotiations with Iran for the
supply of gas via a pipeline that would run through Pakistan, with a next
round of talks scheduled for late April.
India plans to initially draw 60 million cubic meters of gas from the
pipeline and increase the quantity to 90 million cubic meters within two to
three years.
Despite initial opposition, US President George W. Bush said during a visit
to India this month that he had no objections to New Delhi buying gas from a
country that Washington accuses of supporting terrorism and attempting to
make a nuclear bomb.
. . .
Yesterday's meeting is the first high-profile talks between leaders of the
two countries since India in February voted with 26 other nations to refer
Iran to the UN Security Council over its nuclear program.
. . .
The Gulf Cooperation Council hopes to sign soon a free trade agreement with
India, the head of the grouping said yesterday.
"A free trade agreement with India will boost the volume of trade to $15
billion in coming years," GCC Secretary-General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah said
yesterday at a meeting of Gulf and Indian businessmen in the Omani capital.
Trade between India, which gets most of its oil from the Gulf and has
hundreds of thousands of its citizens working there, and the GCC was
estimated at $12.8 billion last year. . . .

+++AL-AHRAM WEEKLY 23-29 Mar. '06 "The Arab exit"By Salama A Salama

QUOTES FROM TEXT:
"[US-Iran] discussions will be confined to Iraq"

"Arab failure to adopt an effective policy vis-a-vis Iraq is largely a
result of Egypt's failure to engage positively with the Iranian regime"
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXCERPTS:
No one had anticipated that the US would invite Iran to hold direct talks
over the situation in Iraq. Nor had anyone expected that such an invitation
would originate with the Shia political power that controls the coalition
led by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the
majority party in the elected Iraqi parliament.
. . ..
America insists discussions will be confined to Iraq and not include
Tehran's nuclear ambitions. ... ..
It is clear that regional balances of power are beginning to be redrawn.
.... Another is the emergence of Iran as a key player in Iraq. ... .
The obstacles in the way of forming a national unity government, which
Washington insists is the only way to avoid civil war, serve only to
underline Iranian influence since Tehran alone is capable of deciding Shia
competition for the post of prime minister.
The rise of Hamas in the Palestinian equation, and the assistance Iran
provides to Hizbullah in Lebanon and its backing of Syria, also lend urgency
to ... contain Iranian influence ... ..
. . .
Arab failure to adopt an effective policy vis-a-vis Iraq is largely a result
of Egypt's failure to engage positively with the Iranian regime and
coordinate positions over shared problems that impact on Arab and Egyptian
interests, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, ... .
Despite Tehran's attempts to normalise relations with Egypt, Egypt has
preferred ..., to direct its normalisation efforts towards Israel. ... .
If US-Iranian talks on Iraq prove to be even a limited success, then the
Arabs will remain shut out of Iraq for a long time to come ... .

Sue Lerner, Associate - IMRA

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: PCPO Poll: 62.7% PA shouldn't honor commitments to Israel,
47.2% dissolve PA, 74.4% content with Hamas gov't w/out PLO

Poll No.151 Date:
26 March 2006

Dear Madam,
Dear Sir,

The target of this survey is to examine the Palestinians' public opinion
with regard to the Israeli national elections, Ehud Olmert's plan and the
new Palestinian government formed by Hamas. We have furthermore made the
attempt to probe the political conditions prevailing after the Israeli raid
on Jericho's prison and the abduction of Mr. Ahmed Saadat, the
Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), and his companions and to cast light on the extent of Israel's
compliance with the deals concluded with the Palestinians. This poll tried
furthermore to explore the public's attitude towards Britain and the USA,
which is said have allowed Israel to raid Jericho's prison. All this besides
other political, economical and security key issues.

If you wish to view the whole poll results, so all you need is to revert to
our website: www.pcpo.ps

Please feel quite free to contact us immediately if you have any questions
or inquiry on any issue of this poll.

With our good wishes and best regards,

Dr. Nabil Kukali
Director of PCPO

In a survey on the Palestinian public opinion prepared by
Dr. Nabil Kukali

(47.2%) Agree to various degrees to the dissolution of the Palestinian
Authority, (50.5%) oppose to various degrees the dissolution of the
Palestinian Authority

(74.4%) Are to various degrees content with the Palestinian government
formed by Hamas.

(82.4%) Are worried about their personal security.

(65.4%) Support to various degrees the PA President Mr. Mahmoud Abbas.

(85.5%) Don't trust Israel's commitment to the accords signed with
Palestinian Authority.

(88.5%) Demand from Britain and the USA to force Israel to return Mr. Ahmed
Saadat and his companions to the Palestinian Authority.

(50.7%) Are opposing to various extents the abduction of foreigners and the
destruction of cultural centers belonging to EU
countries.

(18.6%) Believe that the Israeli Labor Party is the most efficient party for
the settlement of the Palestinian - Israeli conflict.

(49.4%) Believe that the unilateral plan of Ehud Olmert will lead to the
continuation of the conflict in the region.

Beit Sahour: Information Section

In the recent poll prepared by Dr. Nabil kukali during the period from
March )19-23), 2006 and published by the Palestinian Center for Public
Opinion (PCPO), a random sample of (1068) Palestinian adults over 18 years
old, representing the various demographic specimens of the people living in
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, has been
investigated.

The results of the poll revealed that the majority of the Palestinian people
believe that the plan of the acting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
regarding the unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank by September 2010
without reaching a genuine peace agreement with the Palestinians will lead
to the continuation of the conflict in the region and will not warrant the
stability and security of Israel. Dr. Kukali commented on this by saying
that Israel cannot establish permanent borders with the Palestinian
Authority on its own without the approval of the Palestinians. It will be
then difficult for Israel to obtain the security and peace unless it
fulfills the desires and aspirations of the Palestinian people by achieving
a fair peace with them. He added that (18.6%) of the Palestinian society
believe that Labor Party is the most efficient party for the settlement of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One of the most significant findings of
this poll, Dr. Kukali found out, that almost the half of the Palestinians,
specifically (47.2%) are to various degrees in favor of the dissolution of
the Palestinian Authority because it seems that the Palestinian people lost
hope that the present Authority will finally lead to the establishment of a
Palestinian state side by side to the Jewish one on the basis of the
international legitimacy and the principle of land against peace as provided
for in the UN resolutions. Dr. Kukali pointed furthermore out that (74.4%)
of the Palestinians (59.1%) in Gaza and (84.0%) in the West Bank are to
various degrees content with the Palestinian government formed by Hamas
without the participation of Fateh and the other PLO's factions.

Dr. Kukali believes that the majority of the Palestinians are of the opinion
that relying on the political settlements with international warranties
seems to be of no real weight on the ground as long as Israel can revoke
such settlements or agreements at its own discretion. The poll results have
indicated that the majority of the Palestinian public, specifically (63.4%),
don't trust the arguments made by the USA and Britain as a justification for
the withdrawal of their monitors from the jail at Jericho and by doing that
have given Israel the opportunity to capture the PFLP's Secretary-General,
Mr. Ahmed Saadat, and his comrades.

Dr. Kukali referred also to the fact that the majority of the Palestinians
felt insulted upon watching the satellite TV pictures showing the
Palestinian security men captured and humiliated by taking their clothes off
and keeping just the underwear on them. Lastly, Dr. Kukali concluded that
the majority of the Palestinians disagree to abducting foreigners and
demolishing cultural centers belonging to countries of the European Union
and to other countries as a reaction to the US-American and British attitude
in the Israeli raid on Jericho's prison and the subsequent abduction of the
PFLP Secretary General and his comrades.

Findings

Q.1 Do you think that the plan of the acting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert of the unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank by September 2010
without reaching a genuine peace agreement with the Palestinians will lead
to?
1. A warranty for Israel security 26.5%
2. Instability of Israel security 40.8%
3. Outbreak of disputes and continuation of
wars in the region 31.3%
4. Don't know1.4%

Q.2 What will be, according to your opinion, the impact of the uni-lateral
withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank on the Palestinian side?
1. It will boost the position of Hamas and
weaken the position of Fateh.29.8%
2. It will boost the position of Fateh and
weaken the position of Hamas.12.2%
3. It will absolutely have no effect.55.5%
4. Don't know.2.5%

Q.3 What are the consequences, you think, of a unilateral pullout of Israel
from the West Bank?
1. The establishment of a Palestinian state and
the recognition of the State of Israel.11.7%
2. Extension of the area of the Palestinian
Authority jurisdiction with-out being obliged
to recognize the State of Israel.36.9%
3. Continuation of the conflict in the region.49.4%
4. Don't know.2.0%

Q.4 Which Israeli party, according to your opinion, is in the position to
solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
1. Kadima17.6%
2. Likud14.7%
3. Labor Party18.6%
4. None48.0%
5. Don't know1.1%

Q.5 Do you think, or not, that Hamas is capable of efficiently running the
Palestinian government for the next term?
1. Yes, capable24.4%
2. Capable to some extent40.4%
3. Incapable33.0%
4. Don't know.2.2%

Q.6 Do you agree or disagree to Fateh's decline to participate in forming a
government of national unity after the raid of the Israeli forces on
Jericho's prison?
1. Strongly agree12.6%
2. Somewhat agree42.6%
3. Somewhat disagree28.7%
4. Strongly disagree15.5%
5. Don't know0.6%

Q.7 Mr. Azzam El-Ahmed, Head of Fateh group in the Palestinian Legislative
Council, said:" We don't demand from Hamas to change its program, but advise
it only to separate its program as an authority from its program as a party
". Do you agree or disagree to this advice?
1. Strongly agree23.3%
2. Somewhat agree51.7%
3. Somewhat disagree13.7%
4. Strongly disagree10.7%
5. Don't know0.6%

Q.8 Do you still agree, or now disagree, to the demand of the President of
the Palestinian Authority that Hamas should acknowledge the agreements
concluded with Israel?
1. Strongly agree12.1%
2. Somewhat agree34.7%
3. Somewhat disagree31.4%
4. Strongly disagree21.0%
5. Don't know0.8%

Q.9 After the formation of the Palestinian government under the leadership
of Hamas without the participation of Fateh and the other PLO's factions,
are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?
1. Pessimistic36.5%
2. Optimistic60.8%
3. Don't know2.7%

Q.10 Are you content or discontent with the Palestinian government formed by
Hamas without the participation of Fateh and the other PLO's factions?
1. Extremely content19.6%
2. Somewhat content54.8%
3. Somewhat discontent15.3%
4. Extremely discontent9.6%
5. Don't know0.7%

Q.11 Do you think the Palestinian Authority should abide by the agreements
concluded with Israel, or not?
1. Yes33.2%
2. No62.7%
3. Don't know4.1%

Q.12 Subsequent to the raid of the Israeli forces on Jericho's prison, to
what extent do you trust Israel's commitment to the deals signed with the
Palestinian Authority?
1. Strongly trust1.6%
2. Somewhat trust11.7%
3. Somewhat distrust30.5%
4. Strongly distrust55.0%
5. Don't know1.2%

Q.13 Do you agree or disagree to those demands calling upon the President of
the Palestinian Authority to dissolve the Palestinian Authority?
1. Strongly agree7.1%
2. Somewhat agree40.1%
3. Somewhat disagree25.1%
4. Strongly disagree25.4%
5. Don't know2.3%

Q.14 To which degree are you convinced of the arguments made by the USA and
Britain as a justification for the withdrawal of their monitors at the jail
in Jericho?
1. Totally convinced1.4%
2. Somewhat convinced35.1%
3. Not convinced63.4%
4. Don't know.0.1%

Q.15 Do you agree or disagree to what the Brigades of Abu Ali Mustafa
(military wing of the PFLP) have done, namely abducting foreigners and
demolishing cultural centers belonging to countries of the EU and others as
a reaction to the US-American and British attitude in the Israeli raid on
Jericho's prison and the subsequent abduction of the Secretary-General of
the PFLP and his comrades?
1. Strongly agree14.5%
2. Somewhat agree33.7%
3. Somewhat disagree27.2%
4. Strongly disagree23.5%
5. Don't know1.1%

Q.16 Do you think it's the moral obligation of the USA and Britain to force
Israel to return Mr. Ahmed Saadat and his comrades to the Palestinian
Authority?
1. Yes88.5%
2. No10.1%
3. Don't know1.4%

Q.17 Whom do you burden the responsibility for the raid on Jericho's jail
and the capture of the PFLP Secretary-General, Mr. Ahmed Saadat, and his
companions?
1. The Palestinian Authority10.5%
2. Britain15.1%
3. USA14.7%
4. The three parties58.6%
5. Don't know1.1%

Q.18 Did you feel insulted when watching the TV pictures of the satellite
stations showing the Palestinian security men captured and just keeping
their underwear?
1. Yes, to a high degree80.7%
2. Yes, to an intermediate degree16.0%
3. No, at all 1.3%
4. Don't know2.0%

Q.19 Which of the following two parties, Fateh or Hamas, you think should
bear the responsibility for not-forming a government of national unity?
1. Fateh35.0%
2. Hamas24.4%
3. Both of them 35.3%
4. Don't know5.3%

Q.20 Do you evaluate the general economic situation in the Palestinian
territories as?
1. Good4.6%
2. Middling33.6%
3. Bad60.9%
4. Don't know0.9%

Q.21 Up to which extent are you at present worried about the subsistence of
your family?
1. Very worried31.6%
2. Worried52.7%
3. Not so worried9.8%
4. Not worried at all4.2%
5. Don't know1.7%

Q.22 To what extent are you worried about your personal security?
1. Too much worried33.5%
2. Worried48.9%
3. Not so much worried12.7%
4. Not worried at all4.1%
5. Don't know.0.8%

Q.23 What is the degree of your support at present to Mr. Mahmoud Abbas?
1. Strongly support him13.0%
2. Somewhat support him52.4%
3. Somewhat don't support him 22.1%
4. Strongly don't support him11.2%
5. Don't know1.3%

Methodology

"All interviews took place on the basis of random choices of respondents'
homes, i.e. face-to-face", Mr. Elias Kukali, a staff member of the Research
& Studies Section at the PCPO, said. The choices were taken from a total of
(156) site. These sites are randomly chosen in accordance with PCPO's long
experienced methodology. The margin of error was
(+/-2.99) at a significance and confidence levels of (5%) and (95%)
respectively.

Elias Kukali added "the percentage of female respondents was (47.0%) whereas
that of the male respondents reached (53.0%). He said the composition of the
sample according to the residential area was as follows: (62.0%) West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, and (38.0%) Gaza Strip.

Mr. E. Kukali further pointed out that the allocation of the sample in
respect of the type of residence was as follows: (49.9%) city, (32.2%)
village and (17.9%) refugee camp.

Contact Persons: Dr. Nabil Kukali & Elias Kukali
Tel: 00970 2 277 4846, Fax: 00970 2 277 4892
Mobile: 00972 547 216 643 / 00970 599 726 878
P.O. Box 15, Beit Sahour - Palestine
Email: kukali@p-ol.com
Website: www.pcpo.ps

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: CABINET COMMUNIQUE

CABINET COMMUNIQUE
(Communicated by the Cabinet Secretariat)

At the weekly Cabinet meeting today (Sunday), 26.3.06:

1. Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's made the following remarks:

"This morning, we are holding the last Cabinet meeting before Tuesday's
elections. This will be the last meeting of the Government that Ariel
Sharon led for the past five years. Even as we are on the threshold of new
elections and the subsequent formation of a new Government, there is no
doubt that the spirit and path of Ariel Sharon will continue to an important
component in the public and diplomatic affairs of the State of Israel for
years to come.

Elections for the 17th Knesset will be held in two days. I call on all
Israeli citizens to realize their right to participate in the elections and
to vote. There is no more appropriate and significant expression of civil
rights than of voting and thus determining the fate of the country and the
composition of its government. Therefore, I call on all Israeli citizens to
vote."

2. Agriculture and Rural Development Minister Ze'ev Boim, Health Minister Ya
'akov Edery, Agriculture and Rural Development Minister Yossi Yishai, Health
Ministry Director-General Avi Yisraeli and Defense Ministry Deputy
Director-General Victor Bar-Gil briefed ministers on the Government's
response to the bird flu issue ( http://tinyurl.com/jbm88 &
http://tinyurl.com/gpmz7 ). The flu broke out in three waves. The first
wave was on 16.3.06 at Hulit, Ein Hashelosha, Nahshon and Sde Moshe; 714,000
birds, including 118,000 that were infected, were culled. The second wave
was on 19.3.06 at Nur Oz and Amioz; 470,000 birds, including 180,000 that
were infected, were culled. The third wave was on 23.3.06 at Bekaot; 16,000
birds were culled. The total cost of the culled birds was NIS 21 million.

Health Minister Edery and Health Ministry Director-General Yisraeli briefed
ministers on contacts with the Palestinians, in the framework of which
preventive medicines and information on the treatment of bird flu were sent
to them.

Acting Prime Minister Olmert thanked all those who struggled against bird
flu and emphasized that there had been an impressive effort to control and
contain it in order to prevent it from spreading. All elements acted
properly and bird flu must continue to be dealt with responsibly and with
due consideration.

3. Public Security Minister Gideon Ezra, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Ministerial Committee on the Struggle Against Violence, briefed ministers on
the Committee's work.

Deputy Attorney-General Livnat Mashiach briefed ministers on the status of
legislation related to the need to struggle against violence.

Acting Prime Minister Olmert discussed the needs both to devote greater
resources to the struggle against violence and to change the priorities of
the law enforcement authorities. To these ends, he discussed the need to
fashion new policies, including among educational institutions and said
(inter alia): "The State of Israel cannot absorb such violence and such
victims. It invests super-human resources, unlike any other country in the
world, in order to defend itself against external violence, against various
murderers and terrorists who try to infiltrate into the country in order to
hurt us, and it shows in this struggle extraordinary resourcefulness and
ability in coordinating all agencies, capabilities and technologies to
achieve results. And on the other hand, it daily faces internal violence,
including murder, which can be prevented if we utilize our strength and our
forces." See http://tinyurl.com/r998f for further details.

4. Ministers discussed extending the validity of the State of Emergency
pursuant to Article 39 of Basic Law: The Government
( http://tinyurl.com/2v5nk ) and decided to propose that the Knesset - in
accordance with Article 133 of the Knesset bylaws - declare a State of
Emergency for one year; this is in continuation of the Knesset's 30.5.05
decision to declare a State of Emergency from 14.6.05 to 13.6.06, and is due
to the current security-diplomatic situation in the country. A series of
essential laws (including - inter alia - the 1948 Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance; http://tinyurl.com/zba4p )that confer important authority to
deal with the prevailing security situation depend on the extension of the
State of Emergency. Security officials reported that during 2005-2006,
considerable use was made of the authority anchored in the emergency laws
to - inter alia - construct the security fence ( http://tinyurl.com/ghfg4 ).
It was also reported that between 2003-2006, considerable use was also made
of the authority conferred under the 1948 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(see above for link).

The Justice Ministry is currently coordinating interministerial staff work
on reconsidering legislation affected by the State of Emergency, and has
been requested by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and Law,
Constitution and Justice Committee to submit a plan for severing legislation
from the State of Emergency.

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: PSR Poll:52.4% Support armed attacks against Israeli
civilians inside Israel, 60.8% Hamas shouldn't recognize Israel,
66.9% Armed confrontation helped,
78% Hamas would find alternative funding

PSR Poll:52.4% Support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside
Israel, 60.8% Hamas shouldn't recognize Israel, 66.9% Armed clonfrontation
helped, 78% Hamas would find alternative funding

PSR poll No. 19
Survey Research Unit: Poll No. 19 - Press Release

20 March 2006
PRESS RELEASE
Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. (19)

On The Eve of The Formation of the New Palestinian Government, Hamas'
Popularity Increases and Fateh's Decreases, but a Majority of the
Palestinians Wants the Continuation of the Peace Process and the
Implementation of the Road Map

16-18 March 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center
for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during
March 16-18, 2006. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face
to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid
Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p19etables1.html

16-18 March 2006

01) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the performance of Mahmud Abbas
since his election as president of the PA?
1) very satisfied 9.2
2) satisfied 52.2
3) not satisfied 28.3
4) not satisfied at all 8.2
5) DK/NA 2.1

02) If new presidential elections were to take place in the PA, whom do you
prefere to see president of the PA?
1) Mahmoud Abbas 36.5
2) Mahoud Zahhar 25.2
3) Mustafa Barghouti 15
4) Others 12.1
5) No Opinion/ Don't know 11.3

03) And if you were to select a vice president, whom would you choose?
1) Mahmoud Zahhar 10.5
2) Mohammad Dahlan 8
3) Marwan Barghouti 19.8
4) Mustafa Barghouti 5.9
5) Ahmad Quri' 1.9
6) Ismael Haneyeh 30
7) Saeb Erikat 5.6
8) Farouq Qaddomi 7.2
9) Others 3.7
10) No Opinion /Don't know 7.4

04) To whom of the following lists did you vote in the legislative elections
that took place in January 25, 2006?
1) alternative 1.7
2) independent Palestine 2.6
3) Abu Ali Mustafa 2.9
4) Abu al Abbas 0.4
5) freedom and social justice 0.2
6) change and reform 46.2
7) national coalition for justice and democracy 0.2
8) third way 1
9) freedom and independence 0.3
10) Palestinian justice 0.1
11) Fateh 44.4

05) If new elections are held today and the same lists that took part in the
last PLC elections were nominated, for whom would you vote?
1) alternative 1.4
2) independent Palestine 3.5
3) Abu Ali Mustafa 2.6
4) Abu al Abbas 0.3
5) freedom and social justice 0.3
6) change and reform 47
7) national coalition for justice and democ 0.3
8) third way 0.8
9) freedom and independence 0.4
10) Palestinian justice 0.2
11) Fateh 38.9
12) none of the above/ DK/NA/ Do not remember 4.4

06) Given the results of PLC elections which took place about two months
ago, some say that Hamas won because most voters wanted first and foremost
(select one only)
1) a fighting authority that resists occupation 6.7
2) a clean authority that fights corruption 35.6
3) a strong authority that ends anarchy and chaos 9.4
4) an Islamic authority that rules according to Sharia and religion 36.6
5) other reasons specify ---- 9.3
6) DK/NA 2.4

07) Some say that Fateh Lost these elections because most voters first and
foremost (select only)
1) punished it for the failure of the peace process 5.1
2) punished it for the spread of corruption in the PA 51.9
3) punished it for its inability to put an end to anarchy and chaos 17.2
4) it was divided leaderless 18.9
5) other reasons specify ----- 3.7
6) DK/NA 3.3

08) And why in your opinion did the Left (such as the PFLP, the DFLP, Fida,
People's Party, and al Mubadara) lose the elections
1) because it was divided 27.1
2) because of its political positions 15.5
3) because of lack of trust in its leadership 33.8
4) others specify ------- 11
5) DK/NA 12.5

09) Do you expect Hamas to succeed or fail in its work in leading and
managing the affairs of the PA?
1) Certainly succeed 18.7
2) Succeed 51.7
3) fail 19.2
4) certainly fail 3.1
5) DK/NA 7.3

10) The PLO and the PA have recognized the state of Israel as part of the
peace process which was based on the Oslo Agreement. Hamas refused and still
refuses to recognize Israel. What do you think? Now that it has won the
elections, should Hamas recognize or not recognize the state of Israel?
1) It should recognize the state of Israel 35.7
2) It should not recognize the state of Israel 60.8
3) DK/NA 3.5

11) The Western donor community provides the PA economic and financial
assistance reaching about one billion dollars every year. Do you think the
PA can or can not do without this assistance?
1) it certainly can do without it 7.5
2) it can do without it 23
3) it can not do without it 40.1
4) it certainly can not do without it 27.8
5) DK/NA 1.7

12) For the assistance to continue, the donor community demand that Hamas
must recognize the state of Israel. Do you think Hamas should accept this
demand and recognize Israel?
1) Certainly yes 11.6
2) yes 25.5
3) no 42
4) certainly no 17.2
5) DK/NA 3.7

13) If Hamas refuses to recognize Israel, do you think the donor community
will indeed stop assisting the PA?
1) certainly it will stop the assistance 18.4
2) it will stop the assistance 32
3) it will not stop the assistance 35.3
4) certainly it will not stop the assistance 10
5) DN/NA 4.3

14) If the donor community does cut off its aid, do you believe the PA would
collapse?
1) certainly it will collapse 17.7
2) it will collapse 33.5
3) it will not collapse 38.1
4) certainly it will not collapse 7.9
5) DK/NA 2.8

15) If the donor community cut off support to the PA, do you think Hamas
would find alternative sources, for example from Arab and Muslim countries?
1) certainly it will find 24.5
2) it will find 53.5
3) it will not find 15.4
4) certainly it will not find 3.8
5) DK/NA 2.8

16) What do you think will happen? Do you expect Hamas to agree to the
demands of the donor community by recognizing Israel or will it not agree to
do that?
1) certainly it will agree 5.3
2) it will agree 35.1
3) it will not agree 42.5
4) certainly it will not agree 10.7
5) DK/NA 6.4

17) If Israel agrees to conduct peace negotiations with a Hamas-led PA, do
you think the Hamas-led PA should or should not negotiate with Israel?
1) certainly it should negotiate 26.2
2) it should negotiate 48.9
3) it should not negotiate 16.7
4) certainly it should not negotiate 5.2
5) DK/NA 3

18) A conflict exists at the moment over who should control the security
services the cabinet led by Hamas or president Mahmud Abbas from Fateh.
What do think, who should control the security services?
1) the cabinet 24.5
2) the president 27.1
3) both 37.1
4) one part should come under the cabinet and another under the president
7.9
5) other specify ----- 0.7
6) DK/NA 2.7

19) Are you worried or not worried about your personal freedom now that
Hamas has won the elections?
1) very worried 8.1
2) worried 22.2
3) not worried 43.3
4) not worried at all 25.4
5) DK/NA 1

20) In your opinion, the elected PLC should enjoy
1) Same powers as those of president Mahmud Abbas 32.4
2) Greater powers than those of President Mahmud Abbas 44.2
3) Less powers than those of President Mahmud Abbas 19.1
4) DK/NA 4.3

21) We would like to ask you about your expectations from the PLC you had
just elected. Do you want it to
1) implement the Road Map Plan 53
2) not to implement the Road Map Plan 39.7
3) DK/ NA 7.3

22) And with regard to the arms in the hands of the armed factions, do you
want it to
1) to pass laws to collect arms from all armed groups whereby the PA
security services would be the only armed force in PA areas? 49.3
2) to pass laws to keep arms of the armed factions in the hands of the armed
factions 27.1
3) not to interfere in the issue of the arms of the factions 20.8
4) DK/NA 2.8

23) What do you expect to happen to the Palestinians and Israelis now that
Hamas has won Palestinian elections?
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop
17.8
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue 40.8
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to
negotiations 34.1
4) DK/NA 7.3

24) There is a proposal to absorb the members of armed groups belonging to
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh into the security services whereby all armed
forces become part of the Palestinian Authority. Do you support or oppose
this proposal?
1) strongly support 28.8
2) support 52.6
3) oppose 12.6
4) strongly oppose 3.3
5) DK/NA 2.6

25) Would you welcome or not welcome a further Israeli disengagements and
withdrawals in the West Bank whether they were unilateral or by agreement?
1) definitely welcome 32
2) welcome 53.9
3) do not welcome 10.3
4) definitely do not welcome 2.2
5) DK/NA 1.6

26) Do you prefer to see the Palestinian Authority and Israel negotiate
further disengagements or withdrawals in the West Bank or do you prefer to
see Israel withdraw unilaterally without negotiations?
1) I definitely prefer to see the PA and Israel negotiate the withdrawal and
disengagement 51.7
2) I think I prefer to see the PA and Israel negotiate the withdrawal and
disengagement 20.9
3) I think I prefer to see Israel unilaterally withdraw without negotiations
16
4) I definitely prefer to see Israel unilaterally withdraw without
negotiations 6.9
5) DK/NA 4.4

27) Who will benefit politically more from further Israeli unilateral
disengagement? Fateh or Hamas
1) Fateh 8.2
2) Hamas 16.5
3) both equally 50.4
4) neither one 21.6
5) DK/NA 3.3

28) If the PA decides to declare unilaterally an independent Palestinian
state would you support or oppose such a declaration?
1) definitely support 12.5
2) support 46.7
3) oppose 32.2
4) definitely oppose 5.2
5) DK/NA 3.3

29) And would you support such a declaration if it were negotiated with
Israel?
1) definitely support 19.7
2) support 60.6
3) oppose 15.1
4) definitely oppose 1.9
5) DK/NA 2.7

30) And generally speaking do you prefer to see the Palestinian Authority
and Israel negotiate their differences or try to solve them unilaterally?
1) I definitely prefer to see them negotiate differences 57.3
2) I think I prefer to see them negotiate differences 24.6
3) I think I prefer to see them solve their differences unilaterally 9
4) I definitely prefer to see them solve differences unilaterally 5.3
5) DK/NA 3.8

31) And if both sides decide to go the unilateral path in handling the
conflict between them who do you think will benefit from such a decision,
Israel or the Palestinians?
1) Israel 41.3
2) Palestinians 13.8
3) both 25.9
4) neither 15.1
5) DK/NA 4

32) Will a decision to handle the conflict unilaterally increase or decrease
the chances to eventually reach a final status settlement?
1) definitely increase the chances 5.8
2) increase the chances 22.3
3) decrease the chances 50.5
4) definitely decrease the chances 8.6
5) no change 6.6
6) DK/NA 6.3

33) Is it possible in your opinion to achieve in the future full economic,
political, and physical separation from Israel?
1) Certainly possible 8.2
2) possible 39
3) not possible 40.6
4) certainly not possible10.8
5) DK/NA 1.5

34) And if such a separation was possible, would you support or oppose it?
1) I would strongly support it 19.6
2) I would support it 55
3) I would oppose it 21.3
4) I would strongly oppose it 2.8
5) DK/NA 1.3

35) Do you support or oppose the current ceasefire between Palestinians and
Israelis?
1) strongly support 18.4
2) support 53.5
3) oppose 22.1
4) strongly oppose 4.5
5) DK/NA 1.5

36) If a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established
and recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the efforts to reach
full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state?
1) Would strongly support 16.3
2) Would support 57.9
3) Would oppose17.8
4) Would strongly oppose 6.2
5) DK/NA1.7

37) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and
Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by
Israel, how soon do you think will reconciliation between the two peoples be
achieved?
1) Reconciliation is not possible ever 44.5
2) Only in many generations to come 18.1
3) Only in the next generation 11.6
4) Only in the next decade 5.7
5) On the next few years 12.4
6) No Opinion /Don't know 7.6

38) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I..
1) Strongly support 14.2
2) Support 38.2
3) Oppose 40.2
4) Strongly oppose 5
5) DK/NA2.5

39) Do you believe that armed confrontations so far has helped achieved
Palestinian national and political rights in ways that negotiations could
not achieve?
1) Definitely yes 24
2) Yes 42.9
3) No 25.4
4) Definitely no 5.7
5) DK/NA 2

40) The following is a list of problems confronting the Palestinians today,
tell us which one is the most important problem?
1) spread of unemployment and poverty 43.7
2) continuation of occupation and its daily practices 24.5
3) internal anarchy 6.6
4) spread of corruption and lack of internal reforms 23.6
5) others (specify ----------- ) 1.2
6) DK/NA 0.4

41) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state and the settlemnet of all issues in dispute, including the
refugees and Jerusalem issues, there wil be a mutual recognition of Israel
as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the
Palestinians people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?
1) Definitely agree14.1
2) agree 52.3
3) disagree 24.2
4) definitely disagree 7.8
5) DK/NA 1.6

42) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this issue? Do most
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support or oppose the recognition of
Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the
Palestinian people at the end of the peace process?
1) Majority supports 57.5
2) Majority opposes 34.1
3) DK/NA 8.4

43) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?
1) Yes 91.3
2) No 5.1
3) DK/NA 3.6

44) If yes, Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or
remain as it is in the future?
1) Will increase 19.2
2) Will remain as it is 9.4
3) will decrease 64.6
4) DK/NA 6.8

45) Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your
family, is assured or not assured?
1) Completely assured 2.3
2) Assured 22.6
3) Not assured 59.3
4) Not assured at all 15.7
5) DK/NA0.2

46) How would you evaluate the current status of democracy and human rights
in the Palestinian Authority? Would you say it is
1) Very good 5.4
2) Good 28.9
3) Fair 26.3
4) Bad 24.4
5) Very bad 13
6) DK/NA 1.9

47) Generally, do you see yourself as
1) Religious 47.9
2) somewhat religious 47.7
3) not religious 3.8
4) DK/NA 0.5

48) Generally, do you see yourself as
1) supportive of the peace process 64.4
2) opposed to the peace process 14
3) between support and opposition 20.9
4) DK/NA 0.7

49) Which of the following political parties do you support?
1) PPP 0.5
2) PFLP 3.3
3) Fateh 34.4
4) Hamas 36.7
5) DFLP 0.6
6) Islamic Jihad 2
7) National initiative (almubadara) 0.9
8) Independent Islamists 4.6
9) Independent Nationalists 2.4
10) None of the above 14.4
11) Other, specify 0.3

50) Regarding the Jericho Jail incursion and the Israeli arrest of Ahmad Sa'adat,
do you view that the UK and the US as implicated in this operation?
1) yes, implicated 93
2) no, not implicated (go to Q52) 4
3) DN/NA (go to Q52) 3

51) Various Palestinian reactions to the jail incursion were witnessed. From
among the following reactions which one would you approve?
1) only peaceful reactions 37.7
2) In addition I would also approve of attacks on a and burning of
American and British facilities 8.9
3) In addition to all of the above, I would also approve of kidnapping of
American and British nationals 11.5
4) In addition to all of the above, I would approve of armed attacks on
American and British nationals 25.4
5) I do not approve of any reaction 13.5
6) DK/NA 2.9

52) People talk these days about the accuracy and impartiality of public
opinion polls and those who conduct them after they all fail to predict the
outcome of the legislative elections. How often do you trust polls?
1) I always trust polls 21.2
2) I sometime trust them and sometime do not 59.3
3) I never trust polls 17.1
4) DK/NA 2.4

53) Do you believe that people are truthful in the responses they give to
pollsters?
1) people are always truthful 16.2
2) people are sometimes truthful and sometime untruthful 68.8
3) people are always untruthful 11.1
4) DK/NA 3.9

54) And what about you? Were your responses to our questions today truthful
or untruthful?
1) my responses to all the questions were truthful 85.4
2) my responses were sometime truthful and sometime untruthful 14.3
3) my responses were were always untruthful 0.3
4) DK/NA0

------------------------------

From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance
- An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault

Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
with the Wechsler Family Foundation

Vol. 5, No. 20 - 24 March 2006

The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance
An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault

Dore Gold

On December 27, 1962, President John F. Kennedy told Israeli Foreign
Minister Golda Meir: "The United States has a special relationship with
Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to what it has with Britain
over a wide range of world affairs."

The U.S. and Israel had a joint strategic interest in defeating aggressors
in the Middle East seeking to disrupt the status quo, especially if they had
Moscow's backing. In 1970 when Syria invaded Jordan, given the huge U.S.
military commitment in Southeast Asia at the time, it was only the
mobilization of Israeli strength that provided the external backing needed
to support the embattled regime of King Hussein. That same year, Israeli
Phantoms downed Soviet-piloted MiG fighters over the Suez Canal, proving the
ineffectiveness of the military umbrella Moscow provided its Middle Eastern
clients.

In 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor of Iraq's Saddam Hussein,
severely reducing Iraqi military strength. Ten years later, after a U.S.-led
coalition had to liberate Kuwait following Iraq's occupation of that
oil-producing mini-state, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in October
1991 thanked Israel for its "bold and dramatic action" a decade earlier.

In the 1980s, several memoranda of understanding between the U.S. and Israel
on strategic cooperation were followed by regular joint military exercises,
where U.S. forces were given access to Israel's own combat techniques and
vice versa. The U.S. Marine Corps and special operations forces have
particularly benefited from these ties, though much of the U.S.-Israel
strategic relationship is classified.

Saudi Arabia has tried to tilt U.S. policy using a vast array of powerful PR
firms, former diplomats, and well-connected officials, with the result being
that America is still overly dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Given the
ultimate destination of those petrodollars in recent years (the propagation
of Islamic extremism and terrorism), a serious investigation of those
lobbying efforts appears to be far more appropriate than focusing on
relations between the U.S. and Israel.

A Special Relationship Spanning Decades

It was mid-morning on December 27, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy
hosted the Foreign Minister of Israel, Golda Meir, in Palm Beach, Florida,
for a heart-to-heart review of U.S.-Israel relations. Kennedy's language was
unprecedented. In the secret memorandum drafted by the attending
representative of the Department of State, Kennedy told his Israeli guest:
"The United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East
really comparable only to what it has with Britain over a wide range of
world affairs "1

According to a new paper prepared by two of America's top political
scientists, Professor John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago and
Professor Stephen Walt from the Kennedy School at Harvard University,
"neither strategic nor moral arguments can account for America's support for
Israel." The explanation for U.S. backing of Israel, according to these
academics, is the "unmatched power of the Israel lobby."2 Yet their analysis
is not grounded in any careful investigation of declassified U.S. documents
from the Departments of State or Defense.

What led Kennedy in 1962 to declare that the U.S.-Israel relationship was
even comparable to America's alliance with the British? Since the early
1950s, the U.S. defense establishment has understood Israel's potential
importance to the Western Alliance. Thus, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Omar Bradley, assessed in 1952 that only Britain, Turkey,
and Israel could help the U.S. with their air forces in the event of a
Soviet attack in the Middle East.3 But against whatever Israel could
tangibly offer the U.S., there was always a need to politically juggle
America's ties with Israel and its efforts to create strategic relations
with the Arab states.

The first limited U.S. arms supply to Israel preceded Kennedy. During the
Eisenhower years, when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' plans for a
Baghdad Pact collapsed with the 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in
Iraq, the U.S. began to upgrade its defense ties with Israel. Kennedy
started his presidency trying to build on a new relationship with Egypt's
Nasser. But by 1962, Nasser intervened with large forces in Yemen, bombed
Saudi border towns, and threatened to expand into the oil-producing areas of
the Persian Gulf.

Israeli Actions That Served U.S. Interests

The U.S. and Israel had a joint strategic interest in defeating aggressors
in the Middle East seeking to disrupt the status quo, especially if they had
Moscow's backing. This became the essence of the U.S.-Israel alliance in the
Middle East. It would repeat itself in 1970 when Syria invaded Jordan. Given
the huge U.S. military commitment in Southeast Asia at the time, it was only
the mobilization of Israeli strength that provided the external backing
needed to support the embattled regime of King Hussein.

In 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor of Iraq's Saddam Hussein,
severely reducing Iraqi military strength. Ten years later, after a U.S.-led
coalition had to liberate Kuwait following Iraq's occupation of that
oil-producing mini-state, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney thanked Israel
for its "bold and dramatic action" a decade earlier. Indeed, Cheney would
add in an October 1991 address: "strategic cooperation with Israel remains a
cornerstone of U.S. defense policy."

During those years, Israel became one of the main forces obstructing the
spread of Soviet military power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1970
Israeli Phantoms downed Soviet-piloted MiG fighters over the Suez Canal,
proving the ineffectiveness of the military umbrella Moscow provided its
Middle Eastern clients in exchange for Soviet basing arrangements. When in
the 1980s the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron made the Syrian port of Tartus
its main submarine base, Israel offered Haifa to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which
had already begun to house U.S. ships in 1977. U.S.-Soviet arms control
agreements in the 1980s over arms deployments in Central Europe increased
the importance of NATO's flanks - including its southern flank - in the
overall balance of power between the superpowers.

This expanding cooperation was made concrete in the 1980s by several
memoranda of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Israel on strategic
cooperation, signed in 1981 and 1983. According to the Congressional
Research Service, the strategic cooperation agreements were followed by
regular joint military exercises, where U.S. forces were given access to
Israel's own combat techniques and vice versa. The U.S. Marine Corps and
special operations forces have particularly benefited from these ties. The
U.S. European Command took a particular interest in Israeli combat
helicopter training ranges.

By 1992, the number of U.S. Navy ship visits to Haifa had reached 50 per
year. Admiral Carl Trost, the former Chief of Naval Operations, commented
that with the end of the Cold War and the shifting American interest in
power projection to the Middle East, the Sixth Fleet's need for facilities
in the Eastern Mediterranean had actually increased.

Do U.S. and Israeli interests diverge sometimes? Like any two countries,
such differences can be expected. During the Cold War, Israel needed U.S.
security ties in order to increase its own capabilities to deal with hostile
Arab states. But Israel did not seek to become a target of the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, it signed an MOU with the U.S. in 1981 which singled out the
USSR as a joint adversary of both countries. The MOU underscored that "the
parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all
threats from the Soviet Union to the region."4 In the 2003 Iraq War, most
Israeli military leaders identified Iran as the greater threat to the Middle
East at the time. Nonetheless, Israel certainly did not oppose the efforts
of the U.S.-led coalition to topple Saddam Hussein.5

One complaint about the U.S.-Israel defense relationship has been the
constraints Israel has put on it as a result of Israel's firm commitment to
its doctrine of self-reliance. As Carl Ford, the Principal Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Bush (41)
administration, confided to a Senate Caucus in October 1991: "Another
limitation, of course, is the longstanding view on the part of Israel, one
which I think most of us share the viewpoint on...that not one ounce of
American blood should be spilled in the defense of Israel." He suggested
that changes needed to be introduced to make "our operations and
interactions with Israel the same as they are with Great Britain and
Germany."

This comment was significant since detractors of the U.S.-Israel
relationship like to insinuate that Israel seeks to get America to fight its
wars for it. The truth is completely the opposite: while U.S. forces have
been stationed on the soil of Germany, South Korea, or Japan to provide for
the defense of those countries in the event of an attack, Israel has always
insisted on defending itself by itself. If Israel today seeks "defensible
borders," this is because it wants to deploy the Israel Defense Forces and
not the U.S. Army in the strategically sensitive Jordan Valley.

Much of the Relationship Is Classified

There are other issues affecting the public discourse on U.S.-Israel defense
ties. Much of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship is classified,
particularly in the area of intelligence sharing. There are two direct
consequences from this situation. First, most aspects of U.S.-Israel defense
ties are decided on the basis of the professional security considerations of
those involved. Lobbying efforts in Congress cannot force a U.S. security
agency to work with Israel.

Second, because many elements of the relationship are kept secret, it is
difficult for academics, commentators, and pundits to provide a thorough net
assessment of the true value of U.S.-Israel ties. Thus, Israel is left
working shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S., and finds itself presented by
outside commentators as a worthless ally whose status is only sustained by a
domestic lobby. Nonetheless, what has come out about the U.S.-Israel
security relationship certainly makes the recent analysis of Professors Walt
and Mearsheimer extremely suspect.

Ask About the Saudi Lobby and U.S. Dependence on Middle East Oil

Does Israel have supporters in the U.S. that back a strong relationship
between the two countries? Clearly, networks of such support exist, as they
do for U.S. ties with Britain, Greece, Turkey, and India. There are also
states like Saudi Arabia that have tried to tilt U.S. policy using a vast
array of powerful PR firms, former diplomats, and well-connected officials.
The results of those efforts have America still overly dependent on Middle
Eastern oil with few energy alternatives. Given the ultimate destination of
those petrodollars in recent years (the global propagation of Islamic
extremism and terrorism), a serious investigation of those lobbying efforts
appears to be far more appropriate than focusing on relations between the
U.S. and Israel.

* * *

Notes

1. "Memorandum of Conversation, Palm Beach, FL, December 27, 1962, 10:00
a.m.," in Nina J. Noring (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961-1963, Volume XVIII: Near East 1962-1963 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1995), pp. 276-283.
2. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby," London Review of
Books, Vol. 28, No. 5, March 23, 2006,
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/print/mear01_.html.
3. "Military Requirements for the Defense of the Middle East" (A Briefing by
the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Deputy Secretary of
Defense), JCS 1887/61, November 26, 1952, in Paul Kesaris (ed.), Records of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 2, 1946-53, the Middle East.
4. "U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, October 30, 1981, Memorandum of
Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government
of Israel on Strategic Cooperation," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/US-Israel+Memorandum+of+Understanding.htm.
5. Dore Gold, "Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War,"
Jerusalem Viewpoints #518, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, June 1,
2004.

* * *

Dr. Dore Gold, who served as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations in
1997-1999, heads the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-20.htm

Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaakov Amidror, ICA Program Director; Mark Ami-El,
Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13
Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112,
Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community
Studies, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215; Tel. 410-664-5222;
Fax 410-664-1228. Website: www.jcpa.org. � Copyright. The opinions expressed
herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Fellows of the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

The Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) is dedicated
to providing a forum for Israeli policy discussion and debate.

To subscribe to the Jerusalem Issue Brief list, please send a blank email
message to:
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