imra Thu Mar 2 00:21:54 2006 Volume 2 : Issue 1341
In this issue of the imra daily Digest:
Journalist: Olmert received apartment bribe
Unity Coalition for Israel Office Opens in Israel
ZOA:New Poll: Only 50% of Palestinians Want Hamas
to Recognize Israel While 83% Support 'Right of Return'
Director-General of the Palestinian Land
Authority Kidnapped in Gaza City
IDF: Kassam cells can escape shelling
Dubai Reaffirms Policy of Refusing Entry to Israelis
Travel Warnings Regarding Arab Countries
PCPO Poll of Palestinians:Hamas should 62.2% stop the Qassams,
94.5% Collect unlicensed weapons, 83.3% Don't give up right of return
[corrected]
U.S. EASES POLICY ON HAMAS
Excerpts:Realistic Suicide Bombings Are Approved 1 March 2006
5 Qassam rockets land in south
Report: U.S. asked PA to help Kadima Party
PA Chairman Abbas to transfer
broad security powers to Hamas
MEMRI: The Difficulties of
Forming the New Government in Iraq
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Journalist: Olmert received apartment bribe
Journalist Yoav Yitzhak says acting prime minister got apartment discount in
exchange for expediting construction permits. Olmert: Claims are ridiculous
and untrue
Ynet 02.28.06
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3222228,00.html
Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert received a USD 320,000 discount on an
apartment in an upscale Jerusalem project in exchange for expediting
construction permits, journalist Yoav Yitzhak charged Tuesday.
The apartment was purchased in October 2004 for USD 1.2 million, which
according to Yitzhak means the developers lost money on the transaction.
The journalist says a separate case currently probed by the State
Comptroller - another Olmert house, which reportedly sold for more than the
market price - pales in comparison to the amounts of money involved in the
other deal.
Yitzhak claims that Olmert expedited construction permits on behalf of the
contractors while he served as Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor and
oversaw the Israel Land Administration.
The developers admitted to giving Olmert a discounted price, but said they
did so because Olmert was the first to purchase an apartment in the project.
The Prime Minister's Office, however, dismissed the charges.
"Today, as is the case every day, Yoav Yitzhak tries to 'expose a new
sensation', and today, as is the case every day, the exposure has no truth
to it".
The response also notes that Olmert contract with the developers clearly
notes he is entitled to cancel the deal if the contractor cannot obtain all
the permits.
"In complete contradiction to Yoav Yitzhak's claims, thus far, a year and
half after the transaction, the project didn't obtain the permits," the
statement reads.
Meanwhile, according to real-estate agents familiar with the area in
question, Olmert paid a legitimate, fair price, considering the location and
the fact the acting prime minister purchased the apartment long before it is
slated to be completed.
Ronny Sofer, Neta Sela and Ido Efrati contributed to the report
(02.28.06, 20:05)
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Unity Coalition for Israel Office Opens in Israel
PRESS RELEASE
UCI Office Opens in Israel
Unity Coalition for Israel - February 28, 2006
**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**
Shawnee Mission, Kansas - Celebrating its fifteenth year, Unity Coalition
for Israel's CEO/Founder, Esther Levens, announced today the opening of a
new office in Israel. "This is a culmination of years of hard work with so
many great people by our side," Levens said.
Levens' purpose of opening an office in Israel "is to give our membership a
direct pulse of what is going on in the country. We can't just simply rely
on what is reported in the media to direct our course of action. We need to
be ahead of the curve by being proactive to help Israel's future."
Former Director of Community and Christian Relations for Consulate General
of Israel in New York, David Nekrutman, will head this office. Nekrutman was
instrumental in enhancing the relations between Christians and the State of
Israel during his 2000-2004 tenure with the Israeli government. He has
worked extensively with the major leaders in the Christian world and was
instrumental in creating such initiatives as the International Day of Prayer
for the Peace of Jerusalem and The Israel Experience, a Christian college
student ambassador program for the State of Israel.
"It is an honor and a privilege to advance UCI's work," Nekrutman said.
Eight months ago, Nekrutman and his family made Aliyah and now they reside
in Netanya. He pointed out that UCI is a very unique organization, whereby,
Christians and Jews are proactively working together to advocate on Israel's
behalf. Nekrutman said that "As an Orthodox Jew, faith is an important part
of my life. To see people from both faiths coming together to help support
and advocate for Israel is an historic moment. I want to play an active role
in enhancing this remarkable relationship."
Nekrutman will partner with Judith Nusbaum and Chana Givon in the Israel
office. Nusbaum and Givon are long time volunteers for UCI and have worked
extensively with the Knesset's Christian Allies Caucus.
For those interested in contacting the Israel office you may reach the UCI's
Israel team by phone at 011-972-52-591-7901 or by e-mail at
israelpulse@israelunitycoalition.org
FOR MORE INFORMATION, please contact UCI's Headquarters at 913-648-0022.
Who We Are: Unity Coalition for Israel
Founded in 1991, we are the largest worldwide coalition of Jewish and
Christian organizations, with more than 200 groups representing millions of
people dedicated to Israel. Though we have many different backgrounds, we
have one common goal: A Safe and Secure Israel.
Israel is not just a Jewish issue. Millions of Christians resolutely endorse
the principle of peace with security for the state of Israel. Because we
work closely together and speak with a united voice, our message is being
heard!
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: ZOA:New Poll: Only 50% of Palestinians Want Hamas
to Recognize Israel While 83% Support 'Right of Return'
NEWS RELEASE
Zionist Organization of America
Jacob & Libby Goodman ZOA House, 4 East 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
(212) 481-1500 Fax: (212) 481-1515
February 28, 2006
Contact Morton A. Klein at: www.zoa.orgAttn: NEWS EDITOR
NEW POLL: ONLY 50% OF PALESTINIANS WANT
HAMAS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL WHILE 83%
SUPPORT 'RIGHT OF RETURN'
New York - A new Palestinian poll published to gauge Palestinian
opinion following last month's election triumph of the Islamist terrorist
group, Hamas, has found that only 50% of Palestinians want a Hamas-led
Palestinian Authority (PA) to recognize Israel while an overwhelming 83.3%
of Palestinians insist on the so-called 'right of return,' by which tens of
thousands of Palestinian Arabs who fled Israel during the 1948-9 war and
millions of their descendants would flood Israel and destroy it from within.
The poll was carried out by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion during
February 16 - 20 from a random sample of 1003 Palestinian adults over the
age of 18 (Independent Media Review Analysis, February 28).
ZOA National President Morton A. Klein said, "These poll results
merely confirm what previous polls taken of Palestinians over the years have
shown - that Palestinians overwhelmingly reject the right of Israel to exist
as a Jewish state while only one-half of Palestinians seem to be supportive
of the idea of recognizing Israel. Almost 13 years after Oslo, after Israel
gave away half of Judea and Samaria and all of Gaza, after all these major
concessions, Palestinians attitudes to Israel have not changed and they
still reject Israel's existence as a Jewish state. Poll after poll,
Palestinians have affirmed by similar, huge majorities that the 'right of
return' is an essential element of their convictions and as long as that
remains the case, Palestinians will not undertake the necessary steps to
prepare themselves to live in peace with Israel. Obviously, if Palestinians
overwhelming believe that they should inundate Israel by the millions and
destroy the Jewish state from within, then they do not accept the right of
Israel to exist as a Jewish state. As matter of fact, to this day there is
not a single PA map which displays Israel as a sovereign state - in Israel's
place, all one sees is the word Palestine.
"It is also disturbing that one-half of Palestinian society does not
want the Hamas terrorist group which it just decisively voted into office to
agree to various degrees of recognition of the State of Israel. First, it is
unclear from this poll whether this result refers to an unequivocal, genuine
recognition of Israel, or merely some diplomatic formula for accepting
Israel while in reality still rejecting it and working for its demise.
Second, even in the first, best case scenario, it would mean that literally
exactly half of all Palestinians are opposed to genuinely recognizing
Israel. We urge the United States that as long as an unreformed Hamas is
part of a PA government, there should be no further negotiations, funding or
concessions to it and no discussion of establishing a Palestinian state."
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Director-General of the Palestinian Land
Authority Kidnapped in Gaza City
PCHR
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights
Security Chaos and Proliferation of Small Arms
Use of Arms in Clan and Personal Disputes
Field Update
1 March 2006
Director-General of the Palestinian Land Authority Kidnapped in Gaza City
On the afternoon of Wednesday, 1 March 2006, unidentified gunmen kidnapped
Atef El-Khodari, the director-general of the Palestinian Land Authority,
from his office in Gaza City.
PCHR's initial investigation indicates that the gunmen had been travelling
in a white "Mitsubishi" jeep. They kidnapped El-Khodari from the offices of
the Palestinian Land Authority in the Southern Remal neighbourhood of Gaza
City. He was then taken to an unknown location. Preliminary information
indicates that the kidnapping is related to his work with the land
authority.
PCHR expresses concern over this serious incident, which is a continuation
of the internal security chaos seen in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in
recent months. The Centre calls upon the Palestinian National Authority,
represented by the Attorney-General, to investigate this incident and to
bring the perpetrators to justice.
Public Document
**************************************
For more information please call PCHR office in Gaza, Gaza Strip, on +972 8
2824776 - 2825893
PCHR, 29 Omer El Mukhtar St., El Remal, PO Box 1328 Gaza, Gaza Strip.
E-mail: pchr@pchrgaza.org, Webpage http://www.pchrgaza.org
-----------------------------------
If you got this forwarded and you want to subscribe, send mail to
request@pchrgaza.org
and write "subscribe" in the subject line.
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: IDF: Kassam cells can escape shelling
IDF: Kassam cells can escape shelling
Margot Dudkevitch, THE JERUSALEM POST Mar. 1, 2006
www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1139395509002&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Heavy IDF artillery barrages on unpopulated areas in the northern Gaza Strip
may hamper terrorists' movements, but efforts by the army to avoid harming
innocent civilians often means that those firing Kassam rockets are able to
escape unharmed, a senior Artillery Corps officer told The Jerusalem Post.
"Before we fire shells, we take great care to ensure that there are no
innocent civilians or farmers in the targeted site," he said. "If someone
plans a rocket attack ahead of time, they can reach the site and fire the
rocket and flee within two minutes."
A number of dud shells, or shells without explosives, are often fired to
allow artillery units to get their bearings on the target before firing
"real" shells, the officer said.
"In order not to harm Palestinian civilians, we fire duds, which act as an
indicator and guide us when they fall. Then the direction of the target is
corrected and real
shells are fired."
While the firing of duds is a relatively short process, it can take longer
if units are firing at a number of targets at the same time, he said. "If
there are several targets, we can fire three duds at each target," he said.
The heavy barrages of artillery fire in response to rocket attacks have
residents of communities near Gaza suffering countless nights of interrupted
sleep.
With the upsurge of Kassam attacks, the Artillery Corps has become an
integral component in the IDF's response to rocket fire. While artillery is
only one of the tools at the army's disposal, no single action will stop the
Kassams, the officer said.
The advantages of artillery often outweigh its disadvantages, he said. "The
distance capability of artillery fire is 19.5 to 20 kilometers. This means
that we can launch in-depth strikes without having to deploy soldiers and
risk lives," he said.
Another advantage of the artillery is its availability, no matter what the
weather conditions, he added. "At two or three in the morning, with heavy
rain falling, artillery
is immediately available, unlike other measures."
While other officers admitted that more aggressive action would need to be
taken to bring a complete halt to the rocket fire, they rejected suggestions
that the army's hands were tied or restrained by current government policy.
"We have at our disposal an array of options. The ongoing battle against the
Kassam rockets consists of a combination of artillery, intelligence and air
power," one of the officers said.
Defense Ministry sources noted that while Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has
ordered the army to escalate its response, a widespread ground offensive in
Gaza is not on the agenda.
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Dubai Reaffirms Policy of Refusing Entry to Israelis
Dubai Reaffirms Policy of Refusing Entry to Israelis
Israel National News (INN) - Wednesday, March 1, 2006 / 1 Adar 5766
By Michael Freund, INN International Affairs Correspondent
www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=99471
Despite heavy criticism in Washington over its continued enforcement of the
anti-Israel Arab boycott, the Government of Dubai has reiterated its refusal
to allow Israeli citizens to enter Dubai.
"We don't give a permit for Israeli passport holders to enter the country,"
Mohammed Ali al-Mohari of the Entry Permits Section of Dubai's Interior
Ministry said in a telephone interview. "It's a rule."
Asked to explain the reason behind the policy, Al-Mohari laughed and said
that he thinks this is the case for most Arab countries. "This is how it is
in most of the Arabic lands, I am sure," he said.
He added, though, that the holder of a foreign passport bearing stamps which
indicated that he or she had once visited the Jewish state would not
encounter any problems entering the country.
Dubai's refusal to allow Israelis to set foot on its soil also features
prominently on a government-run website belonging to the Gulf Arab nation.
On the website of the Dubai Government's Department of Tourism & Commerce
Marketing, under the section titled "Visa Regulations" it states that,
"Nationals of 'Israel' may not enter the U.A.E.", a reference to the United
Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a constituent state.
The reaffirmation of Dubai's policy of barring entry to Israelis came just
one day after Democratic and Republican legislators in Washington blasted
the country's ongoing participation in the Arab boycott of the Jewish state.
Dubai's continued enforcement of the anti-Israel trade ban was first
revealed in a report in Monday's Jerusalem Post.
Republican Senator Ted Stevens and Democratic Senator Barbara Boxer both
lambasted Dubai for its policy on Israel, as did former presidential nominee
Senator John Kerry, who said, "This boycott not only violates at least the
spirit of U.S. law, it is inconsistent with everything we believe in as
Americans."
They spoke at a hearing of the US Senate Commerce Committee, which convened
Monday to discuss US President George W. Bush's controversial plan to sell 6
American ports to Dubai Ports World, a company owned by the Government of
Dubai.
At the hearing, Edward H. Bilkey, the chief operating officer of Dubai Ports
World, was grilled by Senators after confirming that his firm's parent
holding company does enforce the Arab boycott. He insisted, however, that
this would not have any impact on the administration of American ports were
the proposed acquisition to be completed.
In response, the Anti-Defamation League issued a statement calling on the
Bush Administration to drop the ports deal.
"That Dubai Ports World is owned by the emirate of Dubai, which actively
supports the Arab economic boycott of Israel, should be grounds enough to
torpedo any deal with the United States on port operations," said ADL
National Director Abraham H. Foxman. "Dubai should not benefit from America's
open trade policies unless it discontinues its anti-Israel activity."
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Travel Warnings Regarding Arab Countries
Travel Warnings Regarding Arab Countries
(Communicated by the National Security Council Counter-Terrorism Division)
Wednesday, 01 March, 2006
In light of the recent upsurge in terrorist activities by "Global Jihad" in
Israel's neighbors, including against foreign nationals and Israelis, the
National Security Council Counter-Terrorism Division underscores the
existing warnings regarding travel to Arab countries in general, and those
neighboring Israel in particular, and recommends that Israeli citizens
refrain from visiting or staying in these countries.
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: PCPO Poll of Palestinians:Hamas should 62.2% stop the Qassams,
94.5% Collect unlicensed weapons, 83.3% Don't give up right of return
[corrected]
[IMRA: Questions 9, 10, 11 are corrected - there were typos in the original
English translation from PCPO that reversed the results - the Arabic version
was always correct]
Poll No 150. (duties or policies the Palestinians demand from Hamas).
Date: 28 February 2006
Dear Madam,
Dear Sir,
It's our pleasure to contact you today on the 12th anniversary of the
foundation
of our polling and research center, the Palestinian Center for Public
Opinion, by sending to you the results of our poll no. 150.
The target of this present poll is to examine the Palestinian public opinion
for a set of burning key issues, especially after the victory of Hamas in
the last legislative elections. It is pressing to know which issues, duties
or policies the Palestinians demand from Hamas to implement in the coming
few weeks. It is furthermore important to know the people's attitude towards
the extension of the constitutional competencies and jurisdictions of the
PA-President, Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, and the grade of his popularity, and the
possible participation of Fateh in the coming government with Hamas. Last
but not least, this poll examined the behaviour of the Palestinian voter in
the light of the discrepancy between the forecast poll results and the real
outcome of the elections.
We in the PCPO do believe that we have made with this poll a further step
towards the democratization of the Palestinian society, and a further step
also, so tiny it may be, towards the achievement of peace in our region.
If you wish to view the whole poll results, so all you need is to revert to
our website: www.pcpo.ps
Please feel quite free to contact us immediately if you have any questions
or inquiry on any issue of this poll.
With our good wishes and best regards,
Dr. Nabil Kukali
Director of PCPO
In a recent study on the Palestinian public opinion
prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali
(51.5%) are in favour of Fateh's participation in a government of a national
unity.
(69.6%) support to various degrees the PA president, Mr. Mahmoud Abbas.
(41.5%) are of the opinion that Mr. Ismael Haniyyeh is the best personality
to lead the coming Palestinian government.
(83.3%) oppose to various degrees the waiver of the right of home-return.
(69.8%) are in favour of the resumption of the negotiations with Israel.
(93.8%) demand from Hamas to improve the economic conditions and to abate
the rate of unemployment.
(80.4%) are in favour of the continuation of the ceasefire with Israel.
(69.6%) trust to various degrees the local public opinion polls.
(17.2%) changed their mind upon voting for the candidates of the electoral
districts on the election day, and (14.0%) did
the same upon voting for the national lists.
(50.8%) agree to various degrees the recognition of the State of Israel by
Hamas.
Beit Sahour: Information Section
For the latest poll prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali, conducted and published by
the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) during the period from
February 16 - 20, 2006, a random sample of (1003) Palestinian adults over 18
years old representing the different demographic specimen of the people
living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip was
interviewed. The poll results have shown that the majority of the
Palestinian people is in favour of the participation of Fateh in a
government of a national unity with Hamas. Dr. Nabil Kukali, the director of
PCPO, said the most important findings of the poll is that the majority of
the Palestinians is in favour of granting the PA President broader
constitutional competencies and added that (54.9%) believe that the
condition of the Palestinian society after the victory of Hamas in the
legislative elections will become better than at present.
Dr. Kukali further pointed out that (41.5%) of the Palestinians (54.7% in
Gaza Strip and 39.4% in the West Bank) are of the opinion that Mr. Ismael
Haniyyeh is the best personality to lead the coming Palestinian government.
The first task the Palestinian people unanimously demand from Hamas is the
improvement of the economic condition and the abatement of the rate of
unemployment, Dr. Kukali said. This is followed in the rank of importance
by: combating the corruption, enforcing reforms and changes to the
governmental performance, putting an end to the phenomenon of lawlessness,
prevalence of security and safety, collection of the unlicensed weapons,
imposition of the sovereignty of the law, the continuation of the ceasefire
with Israel, resumption of the peace process and the halt of firing
Al-Qassam rockets from Gaza, he added.
Dr. Kukali further indicated that (83.3%) of the Palestinians (89.8% in Gaza
and 79.8% in the West Bank) oppose to various extents the waiver of the
right of home-return and its substitution by the financial compensation of
the refugees instead, and added that the majority of the Palestinian people
oppose the phenomenon of abduction of foreigners and the attack on the
offices of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) and on the
residences of the European Union in Gaza in the background of the abuse of
prophet Mohammed by Danish media.
Dr. Kukali explained that the discrepancy arising between the forecast
polling results and the outcome of the legislative elections is attributable
to a series of factors, the most important of which in the rank of their
substance are as follows: (a) the voters didn't tell the truth about their
real intentions for whom they are voting when asked about that by the
interviewers; (b) the intention of the voters to cast their votes against
Fateh for Hamas, however not for other minor lists, and (c) the change of
the voters' mind in the last minute before balloting. "The findings of this
present poll came to explain the discrepancy between the results of the poll
conducted before January 25th, 2006 and the real outcome of the elections,
namely (14.0%) of the voters changed their mind when voting for the national
lists and (17.2%) did the same when voting for the candidates of the
electoral districts", Dr. Kukali remarked. These rates of "changing one's
mind in the last minute" were in the West Bank with 19.3% at the level of
the electoral districts much higher than in Gaza with only (4.2%); and the
rate at the level of the national lists reached in the West Bank (23.1%)
against (5.9%) in Gaza Strip, he added. In conclusion, the results of the
poll show clearly that a considerable rate of the Palestinian people, namely
(69.6%) still trusts to various degrees the local polls.
Findings
Q.1 Some people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in favour of the
participation of Fateh in a government of national unity with
Hamas. Others oppose that. Which of the following two options is next
to your opinion?
28 February 2006Response
51.5% 1. Participation of Fateh in the formation of the coming government.
48.5% 2. Non-participation of Fateh in the formation of the coming
government.
Q.2 What is the degree of your support at present to Mr. Mahmoud Abbas?
28 February 2006Response
18.1% 1. Strongly support him
51.5% 2. Somewhat support him
18.1% 3. Somewhat don't support him
08.8% 4. Strongly don't support him
03.5% 5. Don't know
Q.3 Are you in favor of granting the Palestinian President more extended
constitutional competencies, or not?
28 February 2006Response
51.3% 1. Yes
45.3% 2. No
03.4% 3. Don't know
Q.4 Which personality you think is efficient to preside the upcoming
Palestinian cabinet?
28 February 2006Response
41.5% 1. Ismael Haniyyeh
12.1% 2. Mahmoud Al-Zahar
07.4% 3. Khaled Mish'al
06.7% 4. Salam Fayyad
06.5% 5. Marwan Bargouthi
05.8% 6. Mohammad Dahlan
03.6% 7. Ahmed Sa'adat
03.1% 8. Mustafa Barghouthi
01.9% 9. Azeez Aldweak
01.5% 10. Saeb Ereikat
09.9% 11. Other
Q.5 Hereunder is a series of reasons, which could have conduced to the
discrepancy between the forecast poll results and the
actual results of the Palestinian legislative elections. Which of
these reasons are plausible
(answer please with "yes") and which are implausible (answer please
with "no") for you personally ?
1. The candidates and the different lists were not convincing to the
people.
Yes:58.8%No:40.5%Don't Know:0.7%
2. The voters didn't tell the truth about their real intentions, for whom
they were going to vote,when asked by the interviewers.
Yes:71.7%No:27.8%Don't Know:0.5%
3. The partiality of the research and polling centers for certain
candidates or lists.
Yes:35.7%No:59.9%Don't Know:4.4%
4. The voters changed their mind in the last moment.
Yes:63.1%No:35.7%Don't Know:1.2%
5. The intention of the voters to ballot against Fateh for Hamas, but not
for other minor parties or factions, believing that these are incapable of
effecting a substantial change in the electoral representation.
Yes:65.2%No:32.7%Don't Know:2.1%
6. Non-compliance of the constituencies supporting various streams with
their candidates and lists,and therefore voted randomly.
Yes:52.4%No:46.2%Don't Know:1.4%
7. Ambiguity in the understanding of the electoral system. People couldn't
differentiate between"electoral districts" and "proportional
representation".
Yes:41.0%No:56.8%Don't Know:2.2%
8. The big number of the candidates in the electoral districts confused the
voters.
Yes:50.0%No:49.7%Don't Know:0.3%
9. Unintended statistical errors committed by the research and polling
centers.
Yes:31.5%No:64.2%Don't Know:4.3%
Q.6 Are you interested in the polls which are conducted in the territories
of the Palestinian Authority, or not?
28 February 2006Response
19.5% 1. Very interested
51.5% 2. Somewhat interested
16.5% 3. Somewhat not interested
11.4% 4. Absolutely not interested
01.1% 5. I don't know
Q.7 Up to which extent in general do you trust what you read and/or hear
from the polls carried out in the Palestinian territories?
28 February 2006Response
12.3% 1. Too much trust
57.3% 2. Somehow trust
19.0% 3. Don't trust them so much
10.0% 4. Don't trust them at all
01.4% 5. I don't know
Q.8 I am going to read to you a series of policies and duties, which Hamas
could follow. I would like you to tell me whether you
strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly
disagree with each of them.
Response strongly agree somewhat agree somewhat disagree strongly disagree
Don't know
1. Continue the truce with the Israelis.
strongly agree:48.5%somewhat agree:32.0%somewhat disagree:11.3%strongly
disagree :8.1%Don't know:0.1%
2. Improve economic conditions and diminish unemployment.strongly agree:
71.0%somewhat agree:22.8%somewhat disagree:5.7%strongly disagree :0.3%Don't
know:0.2%
3. Combat corruption.
strongly agree:72.6%somewhat agree:17.5%somewhat disagree:8.8%strongly
disagree :0.9%Don't know:0.2%
4. Recognize the State of Israel.
strongly agree:16.1%somewhat agree:34.7%somewhat disagree:17.0%strongly
disagree :31.5%Don't know:0.7%
5. Cease fire Al-Qassam rockets at Israel from Gaza.
strongly agree:27.7%somewhat agree:34.5%somewhat disagree:25.8%strongly
disagree :10.6%Don't know:1.4%
6. Resume the peace process with Israel.
strongly agree:32.2%somewhat agree:37.5%somewhat disagree:20.0%strongly
disagree :9.5%Don't know:0.8%
7. Employ new Hamas activists in the PA
strongly agree:37.4%somewhat agree:36.7%somewhat disagree:18.8%strongly
disagree :5.4%Don't know:1.7%
8. Collect unlicensed weapons.
strongly agree:54.7%somewhat agree:39.8%somewhat disagree:11.8%strongly
disagree :2.9%Don't know:0.8%
9. Carry out reforms and changes in the PA.
strongly agree:61.1%somewhat agree:24.1%somewhat disagree:11.5%strongly
disagree :2.8%Don't know:0.5%
10. Apply force against such groups or organizations that violate the truce
conditions.
strongly agree:29.2%somewhat agree:24.2%somewhat disagree:29.4%strongly
disagree :16.0%Don't know:1.2%
11. Put an end to lawlessness and enforce security and safety.
strongly agree:64.7%somewhat agree:19.7%somewhat disagree:12.1%strongly
disagree :2.8%Don't know:0.7%
12. Impose the sovereignty of law everywhere.
strongly agree:64.8%somewhat agree:17.3%somewhat disagree:11.9%strongly
disagree :5.6%Don't know:0.4%
13. Waive the "right of home-return" and accept financial compensation
instead.
strongly agree:5.5%somewhat agree:10.3%somewhat disagree:17.8%strongly
disagree :65.5%Don't know:0.9%
14. Pass the "Law of Parties"
strongly agree:32.3%somewhat agree:27.1%somewhat disagree:20.6%strongly
disagree :14.0%Don't know:6.0%
Q.9 Please express your attitude towards the phenomenon of abducting
foreigners and Arabs in the Palestinian territories, whatever
the reasons may be.
28 February 2006Response
52.6% 1. Strongly oppose
26.0% 2. Somewhat oppose
15.8% 3. Somewhat support
02.9% 4. Strongly support
02.7% 5. Don't know.
Q.10 Do you approve or disapprove of the attacks carried out on the bureaus
of the European Union in Gaza Strip in the
background of the abusive cartoons of Prophet Mohammed published by
the Danish newspapers?
28 February 2006Response
62.7% 1. Disaprove.
35.3% 2. Approve.
02.0% 3. Don't know.
Q.11 A group of school pupils attacked recently in Hebron the residence of
the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) in a protest against
the abusive prophet Mohammed cartoons. Do you think that the way that
protest has been made is of benefit to the basic issue, or not?
28 February 2006Response
76.9% 1. It's of no benefit to the basic issue.
20.5% 2. It's of benefit to the basic issue.
02.6% 3. Don't know.
Q.12 In view of the political and economical conditions the country at
present undergoes, are you optimistic or pessimistic about
the future?
28 February 2006Response
62.4% 1. Optimistic.
30.8% 2. Pessimistic.
06.8% 3. Don't know.
Q.13 Will the Palestinian society, according to your opinion, be in the next
weeks after the victory of Hamas in the recent legislative
elections?
28 February 2006Response
54.9% 1. Better than at present.
30.7% 2. Unchanged.
11.8% 3. Worse than at present.
02.6% 4. Don't know
Q.14 In the recent legislative January 25th election, for which of the
following lists or list combinations did you vote?
28 February 2006Response
28.1% 1. National List of Change and Reform (Hamas) and its candidates in
the electoral districts.
11.5% 2. National List of Change and Reform (Hamas) and some of Hamas
candidates, plus independents, in the electoral districts.
05.8% 3. National List of Change and Reform (Hamas) and candidates of Fateh
in the electoral districts.
04.1% 4. Other national lists (excluding Fateh & Hamas) and candidates of
Hamas in the electoral districts.
08.0% 5. Fateh national list and candidates of Hamas in the electoral
districts.
22.3% 6. Fateh national list and its candidates in the electoral districts.
08.8% 7. Fateh national list and some of Fateh candidates and Independents
in the electoral districts.
02.0% 8. Other national lists (excluding Fateh and Hamas) and candidates of
Fateh in the electoral districts.
03.8% 9. Other national lists (excluding Fateh and Hamas) and in the
electoral districts candidates of minor political parties and independents.
05.6% 10. Refuse / Don't know
Q.15 In the elections held on January 25th, 2006, did you vote for the
national list you have already decided before, or did you
change your mind when you have cast your vote?
28 February 2006Response
86.0% 1. My decision remained unchanged.
14.0% 2. I changed my decision.
Q.16 If your answer to the above-mentioned was that you have changed your
decision; please tell me when did this change
happen?
28 February 2006Response
07.5% 1. Inside the polling-booth.
22.4% 2. Before entering the polling-booth
21.6% 3. On the eve of the election day
23.1% 4. Two days before the election day
07.5% 5. 3 - 4 days before the election day
09.7% 6. 5 - 6 days before the election day
08.2% 7. A week or more before the election day.
Q.17 What are the reasons that let you change your mind and vote on the
Election Day for another list than the one decided before?
28 February 2006Response
08.9% 1. The wish of the spouse (wife/husband)
12.6% 2. The wish of the family
13.3% 3. Being convinced by a friend.
08.1% 4. Effect of the election campaign.
11.9% 5. The element of relationship.
15.6% 6. Material enticement.
02.2% 7. Enticement into a job.
03.7% 8. Presentation of a symbolic gift.
17.7% 9. Personal conviction.
03.0% 10. Provision of facilities by the candidate for the transport of
voters on the election day.
03.0% 11. Otherwise, please specify
Q.18 In the election held on 25.1.2006, did you vote for the district
candidate you have already decided before, or did you change
your mind when casting your vote ?
28 February 2006Response
82.8% 1. My decision remained unchanged.
17.2% 2. I changed my decision.
Q.19 If your answer to the above-mentioned was that you have changed your
decision; please tell me when did this change
happen?
28 February 2006Response
06.0% 1. Inside the polling-booth.
18.7% 2. Before entering the polling-booth
29.5% 3. On the eve of the election day
25.9% 4. Two days before the election day
05.4% 5. 3 - 4 days before the election day
07.8% 6. 5 - 6 days before the election day
06.7% 7. A week or more before the election day.
Q.20 What are the reasons that let you change your mind and vote on the
Election Day for another candidate(s) than the one(s) you
have decided before?
Response 28 February 2006
07.1% 1. The wish of the spouse (wife/husband)
11.9% 2. The wish of the family
16.7% 3. Being convinced by a friend.
03.6% 4. Effect of the election campaign.
20.2% 5. The element of relationship.
09.5% 6. Material enticement.
01.8% 7. Enticement into a job.
03.0% 8. Presentation of a symbolic gift.
19.6% 9. Personal conviction.
01.8% 10. Provision of facilities by the candidate for the transport of
voters on the election day.
04.8% 11. Otherwise, please specify
Methodology
"All interviews took place on the basis of random choices of respondents'
homes, i.e. face-to-face", Mr. Elias Kukali, a staff member of the Research
& Studies Section at the PCPO, said. The choices were taken from a total of
(156) site. These sites are randomly chosen in accordance with PCPO's long
experienced methodology. The margin of error was (�3.1%) at a significance
and confidence levels of (5%) and (95%) respectively.
Elias Kukali added "the percentage of female respondents was (49.3%) whereas
that of the male respondents reached (50.7%). He said the composition of the
sample according to the residential area was as follows: (65.4%) West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, and (34.6%) Gaza Strip. Average age of the random
sample of the respondents was (35.0) years.
Mr. E. Kukali further pointed out that the allocation of the sample in
respect of the type of residence was as follows: (51.1%) city, (33.4%)
village and (15.5%) refugee camp. Number of individuals currently living in
the house (of all ages): (6.97) person.
The distribution of the sample with regard to the marital status of the
respondents was as follows: (25.3%) single, (69.5%) married and (5.2%)
otherwise.
Contact Persons: Dr. Nabil Kukali & Elias Kukali
Tel: 00970 2 277 4846, Telfax: 00970 2 277 2034
Mobile: 00972 547 216 643 / 00970 599 726 878
P.O. Box 15, Beit Sahour - Palestine
Email: kukali@p-ol.com
Website: www.pcpo.ps
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: U.S. EASES POLICY ON HAMAS
U.S. EASES POLICY ON HAMAS
WASHINGTON [MENL] -- The Bush administration has significantly eased its
opposition to Hamas and no longer sees the Islamic movement as an
intractable obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.
Officials said the administration has agreed to an international effort to
help a Palestinian government controlled by Hamas. They said the
administration has set guidelines to ensure continued U.S. financial and
other support to a Hamas government that accepts democratic principles and
renounces violence.
"We accept Islamist parties if Islamist parties accept the rules of the
game," William Jordan, head of the State Department's North Africa bureau,
said. "It's up to Hamas to decide whether to accept the rules of the game."
Officials acknowledged that the new administration policy departed from the
State Department ban on Hamas as a terrorist organization. Under federal
law, the United States and its citizens are banned from supporting or
engaging a group deemed terrorist.
====
NOTE: The above is not the full item.
This service contains only a small portion of the information produced daily
by Middle East Newsline. For a subscription to the full service, please
contact Middle East Newsline at:
editor@menewsline.com for further details.
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Excerpts:Realistic Suicide Bombings Are Approved 1 March 2006
Excerpts:Realistic Suicide Bombings Are Approved 1 March 2006
Realistic Suicide Bombings Are Approved
by Dr. Joseph Lerner
The article "The "rational" suicide bomber", which follows, disguishes
between the realistic (Hamas) which is acceptable and the Utopian (Al Qaeda)
which strives for " a Utopian entity which supposedly solves all of life's
problems". The distinction defies reality.
Al Qaeda has objectives in various Arab nations.The Hamas charter
specifies Israel's destruction as part of the worldwide political objective
which will produce the Islamic worldwide Utopia. Singh does not
realize that the London and Madrid bombings were intended to impact the
Iraq situation; a specific national objective. The purpose of every bombing
is stated. In not one instance was a bombing giiven a "Utopian" objective.
Singh regards those attacks in which Muslims as well as non-Muslims are
killed to be "Utopian". But what of the massive bombings in Iraq by
Muslims against Muslims? Singh's distinction between types of suicide
bombers is in essence one of cost-effectiveness
In the well-established continuing tradition Singh challenges the US and its
friends to respect the difference between the two types of suicide bombers
and be responsible for the terrible consequences if they don't.
.That criterion (cost-effective) was set in Dr. Sari Nuseiba's much
publicized petitionioning letter ,June 21,2002, "Urgent Appeal to Stop
Suicide Bombings", which also follows below. It stresses that suicide
bombings "don't contribute towards our national projects" -- they are not
cost-effective. Surely, they proved to be cost-effective.
Nuseiba and signatory friends are not heard now that Hamas is winning. No
public letters, no interviews, Absolute silence?
The Nuseiba letter is poisoned with standard false charges against Israel
as targeting "our children, elderly, villages, cities and our national hopes
and achievements." While the letter was absolutely ineffective against
terrorism, the boiler-plate false charges contributed to inflaming the
atmosphere, serving Hamas. After all, If such a distinguished, peaceful
professor as Dr. Sari Nuseiba says so, it must be true ---
=======================================================================
THE JORDAN TIMES 1 Mar.'06: "The 'rational' suicide bomber" by Pritam Singh
QUOTES FROM TEXT:
"While terrorism is righty viewed as an illegitimate means, nationalism
is a rational, and often legitimate, goal , and it is shared by many people
who are not terrorists. ... nationalist extremists' more realistic
objectives might make it possible to neutralise them by addressing the root
issue (for example, the creation of a viable Palestinian state)."
"By regarding all suicide bombers as irrational fanatics, rather than
drawing distinctions between millenarians and nationalists, the US and its
allies have ceded crucial political ground to groups like Al Qaeda and JI
that insist on the impossibility of negotiating with Islam's "enemies"."
Hamas' victory ...has made the question of who is a terrorist, and how
terrorism should be tackled, more urgent than ever. How Hamas behaves in
government will reveal whether terrorists and suicide bombers are alike in
their implacability.
.... Few weapons in the terrorist's arsenal are as devastating as suicide
bombing - or as poorly understood, ... analysis has apparently given way to
the desire to avoid conferring on the attackers any legitimacy ... . But
this attitude thwarts urgently needed insight into who the suicide bombers
really are, what motivates them, and thus how they might be stopped.
... there are basically two categories of suicide bombers. The first
includes the perpetrators of the attacks on the United States in 2001, the
Bali bombing in 2002, the Madrid train bombing in 2003, and the London
bombings in the summer of 2005. The perpetrators are indifferent as to
whether their victims, both direct and indirect, are Muslim or non-Muslim;
their goal is to terrorise and eventually to destroy a way of life in the
name of a nebulous Dar Al Islam, a utopian entity that will supposedly solve
all of life's problems.
Suicide bombers of this type, while difficult to hunt down and neutralise,
can easily be identified and their criminality exposed, given their vicious
and wanton disdain for ethical, moral, and religious norms. Muslim religious
and political leaders have the intellectual capital to refute their
misplaced religious convictions, and can repeat sura after sura, hadith
after hadith, detailing Islam's rejection of violence and repudiation of the
killing of innocents.
But the second category of suicide bombers ... comprises organisations such
as Hamas and Islamic Jihad that fight for avowedly nationalist goals. While
terrorism is rightly viewed as an illegitimate means, nationalism is a
rational, and often legitimate, goal, and it is shared by many people who
are not terrorists. ... nationalist extremists' more realistic objectives
might make it possible to neutralise them by addressing the root issue (for
example, the creation of a viable Palestinian state).
The distinction... is not always stark. Many people enthralled by
nationalistic struggle, end up rejecting all reasonable compromise and
advocating genocidal goals.
Nevertheless, the distinction is important and seems lost on the US - and a
host of other countries - which have lumped the nationalist groups together
with Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in their lists of terrorist
organisations. This one-size-fits-all approach may be convenient, but the
failure to differentiate among suicide bombers vastly oversimplifies the
realities that define the fight against terrorism.
... Hamas and Islamic Jihad are often no less brutal than Al Qaeda or JI.
But this does not mean that they should be dealt with in the same way.
Indeed, while the demands of millenarians can never be met, thus leaving
repression as the only means to deal with them, nationalism may be (and
often is) effectively addressed through political means: when the legitimate
and more widely shared nationalist goals are met, the radical fringe often
loses its wider appeal and withers away.
Failure to recognise this works to the advantage of religiously motivated
terrorists ... energy spent on fighting terrorism is spent on repression,
leaving legitimate nationalist goals unaddressed and strengthening popular
support for terrorism of all kinds.
... groups like Al Qaeda can claim ...popular nationalism as a means of
pursuing their ultimate utopian aims. Moreover, although Muslim religious
and secular leaders are able to isolate millenarian terrorists and undercut
their popular support, they lack the moral capital to completely discredit
nationalist extremists groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as long as the
Muslim laity shares some of their goals.
To the powerless, nationalist suicide bombers look like a great equaliser.
Israeli Apache and Cobra gunships armed with Hellfire missiles regularly hit
their targets from great distances, as do F-16 fighter jets armed with
laser-guided munitions, but not without frequent "collateral damage" to
innocent civilians. Suicide bombers who target innocent Israeli civilians -
and sometimes legitimate military objectives - rightly or wrongly appear to
counterbalance Israeli "strategic" strikes.
Thus, despite repeated condemnation by establishment figures within the
ummah (the worldwide community of Muslims), some forms of suicide bombing
may enjoy the quiet admiration of many. As long as no distinction is made
between nationalist extremists and fanatical terrorists like Al Qaeda, the
latter will be able to masquerade as the defenders of Muslims who are seen
as "driven" to resort to suicide bombing because of military weakness.
America's ill-advised foray into Iraq has further confounded the distinction
between the two types of suicide bombers and created a nearly ideal breeding
ground for a new generation of terrorists. Some are inspired by Al Qaeda,
others by disgruntled Sunnis, but all can claim a nationalist mantle.
Ignoring the various dimensions of suicide bombing, and the outlook of the
groups responsible, America and its allies have been left helpless to
comprehend, much less address, the largely indifferent reaction of many
Muslims to the US-led "war on terror".
By regarding all suicide bombers as irrational fanatics, rather than drawing
distinctions between millenarians and nationalists, the US and its allies
have ceded crucial political ground to groups like Al Qaeda and JI that
insist on the impossibility of negotiating with Islam's "enemies". This
stance carries a high cost: the empathy of the Muslim masses that is
required to defeat those who debase Islam in their name.
The writer is a research associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (ISEAS), Singapore.
+++"Urgent Appeal to Stop Suicide Bombings" June 21, 2002
By Dr.Sari Nuseiba
QUOTES FROM TEXT:
"Suicide bombings deepen the hatred and widen the gap between the
Palestinian and Israeli people. Also, they destroy the possibilities of
peaceful coexistence"
"Military actions are not assessed as positive or negative exclusively,
out of the general context and situation. The assessment is based on whether
they fulfill political ends."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FULL TEXT:
June 21,2002: Palestinian official Sari Nusseiba initiated the following
petition signed by Palestinian leaders:
Urgent Appeal to Stop Suicide Bombings
By Dr. Sari Nuseiba
We the undersigned feel that it is our national responsibility to issue this
appeal in light of the dangerous situation engulfing the Palestinian people.
We call upon the parties behind military operations targeting civilians in
Israel to reconsider their policies and stop driving our young men to carry
out these operations. Suicide bombings deepen the hatred and widen the gap
between the Palestinian and Israeli people. Also, they destroy the
possibilities of peaceful co-existence between them in two neighboring
states.
We see that these bombings do not contribute towards achieving our national
project that calls for freedom and independence. On the contrary, they
strengthen the enemies of peace on the Israeli side and give Israel
aggressive government under Sharon the excuse to continue its harsh war
against our people. This war targets our children, elderly, villages,
cities, and our national hopes and achievements.Military actions are not assessed as positive or negative exclusively, out
of the general context and situation. The assessment is based on whether
they fulfill political ends.
[IMRA: AWhether they are 'cost-effective'.]
Therefore, there is a need to re-evaluate these acts considering that
pushing the area towards an existential war between the two people living on
the holy land will lead to destruction for the whole region. We do not
find any logical, humane, or political justification for this end result.
Signatories: Below are some of the Palestinian intellectuals and public
figures who have signed the petition:
Dr. Sari Nuseiba Dr. Hanan Ashrawi Saleh Rafat
Salah Zuheika Mamdouh Nofal Hanna Sineora
Dr. Mohammad Ishtiya Ibrahim Kandalaft Dr. Eyad El-Sarraj
Dr. Moussa El-Budeiri
Dr. Joseph Lerner, Co-Director IMRA
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: 5 Qassam rockets land in south
5 Qassam rockets land in south
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3222787,00.html
Qassam attacks continue as five rockets land in southern Israel; security
officials say firing will continue while IDF operates in area; local
residents plan demonstration, say 'government just doesn't care'
Shmulik Hadad YNET 1 March 2006
Five Qassam rockets were fired at Israel from Gaza on Wednesday. All of the
rockets fell in the vicinity of Kibbutz Karmiya and Kibbutz Zikim, south of
Ashkelon, and one rocket fell in the Mediterranean Sea. A number of other
rockets fell in the territory of the Palestinian Authority.
The "Red Dawn" rocket warning system identified the launches and sounded
off, alerting local residents.
In recent days, most of the rockets have fallen in an area south of
Ashkelon, and the area remains on high alert. Security officials said they
believed the rocket fire would continue in the coming hours and into the
night.
Lachish District Commander Effie Mor said that the rockets were being fired
due to IDF operations south of the area. "As a district we are prepared for
all rockets being fired at all times. As a model, we have the Sderot
station, a model which works very well."
'Government has simply forgotten us'
Southern Command Chief Yoav Galant visited Sderot Wednesday, and was briefed
by its mayor on Qassam rocket attacks on the southern city, and the feelings
of many residents that nothing is being done.
Flyers were handed out in communities bordering Gaza calling on local
residents to arrive for demonstration on Friday at Yad Mordechai Junction.
The flyers called on residents to "make sure we are not forgotten. We set up
a forum that will concentrate our activities, so that our
voices are heard, and for the security of the residents. We heard that many
friends think that the Qassam rockets should be hidden so as not to harm the
local economy. We understand the fear, but we turn to every one of you as an
individual and call on you not to be silent, but rather to come and take
part in our activities. Every community takes care of protecting its
residents, but that's not all. The government has simply forgotten us." The
flyers were signed by the "No More Qassams Forum."
(03.01.06, 22:13)
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: Report: U.S. asked PA to help Kadima Party
Report: U.S. asked PA to help Kadima
According to London-based Arabic-language daily al-Quds al-Arabi, U.S. Envoy
Welch asked leader Abbas to postpone formation of Hamas-led government till
after Israeli elections on March 28 to boost Kadima's odds
Roee Nahmias YNET 1 March 2006
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3222403,00.html
American interference in elections? Washington has asked the Palestinians to
delay the formation of a Hamas-led government until after the March 28
general elections in Israel for fears that the Islamic group's effective
control of Palestinian affairs might weaken Kadima's showing in the poll.
According to the London-based Arabic daily al-Quds al-Arabi, David Welch,
the U.S. Envoy for Near Eastern Affairs, told leader Mahmoud Abbas on a
visit last week that Washington wishes to see the formation of a Hamas-led
government delayed.
Under Palestinian law, Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas' designated prime minister, has
five weeks to form a government since Abbas officially appointed him to form
a new administration on February 21.
Palestinian sources told the newspaper that the Bush administration believes
Hamas' presence at the helm will boost the showing of "the Israeli extreme
right" at the polls. Washington is especially concerned that Likud's victory
in the elections will hinder its efforts to revive Palestinian-Israeli peace
talks. The source said Washington prefers a Kadima win.
The paper reported that the U.S. government has no immediate agenda to
revive long-stalled peace talks and is postponing a more active role in the
region till after the elections in Israel.
Abbas told U.S. officials that Hamas should be allowed to govern and "there
are no attempts to unseat a Hamas-led government in the future."
After his meeting with Palestinian officials on Saturday, Welch said the
U.S. continues "to be devoted to the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian
people and we shall remain so."
Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said Welch told Palestinian officials
that U.S. aid would be redirected, but did not specify.
Erekat noted that hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. aid flow directly
into infrastructure projects every year, and not into Palestinian government
coffers.
Abbas said in a weekend interview that the Welch told him the United States
respects the "democratic choice of the Palestinian people."
(03.01.06, 10:31)
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: PA Chairman Abbas to transfer
broad security powers to Hamas
PA Chairman Abbas to transfer broad security powers to Hamas
By Arnon Regular, Haaretz Correspondent 1 March 2006
www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/689095.html
Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas intends to transfer broad
security powers to the future Hamas government, including the national
defense branch, preventive security, the civilian police and civil defense,
he said on Tuesday.
The national defense branch, which consists of 25,000 policemen, is the
largest branch and is defined as the Palestinian army. The other three are
subject to the Palestinian Interior Ministry.
In an interview to Al-Jazeera television in Qatar earlier this week, Abbas
said that the only security branch which would not be subjected to the
government would be General Intelligence, headed by Tawfik A-Tirawi. This
branch remains subject to his ministry, he said.
"We'll grant Hamas authority over the Palestinians' national security
because we need to have one body controling the situation to ensure
security. I don't intend to deprive Hamas of what I demanded in the past
from Yasser Arafat," he said.
This is the first time that Abbas has stated his intention to impart broad
security powers to Hamas. According to sources close to Abbas, his statement
was meant to clarify his intention to give Hamas partial security powers.
The Palestinian Constitution subjected the three security branches to the
interior minister when Abu Mazen was forming his first government in 2003.
Under pressure from the international community, then PA chairman Arafat
agreed to renounce his control over some of the branches.
However, the sources said Abbas, who is defined by the constitution as
"supreme commander of the armed forces," did not intend to renounce control
over the branches, but rather to give Hamas the role of supervising them,
not actually controling them.
Abbas also said in the interview that he is in favor of forming a unity
government with Hamas "on the basis of a joint Fatah-Hamas platform. If no
agreement is reached Hamas will form it by itself because it has a
parliamentary majority."
Hamas leaders have stated that they do not seek direct control of foreign
affairs and defense ministries, but will ask for authority to supervise
these ministries' activities.
In recent weeks Abbas has transferred security authorities from the
government to his own ministry. He appointed Interior Minister General
Nasser Yusuf as his deputy for security affairs and put head of preventive
security Rashid Abu Shabak in charge of "internal security in the West Bank
and Gaza."
------------------------------
From: imra@netvision.net.il
To: imra@imra.org.il
Subject: MEMRI: The Difficulties of
Forming the New Government in Iraq
Inquiry & Analysis - Iraq
March 2, 2006
No. 269
The Difficulties of Forming the New Government in Iraq
By Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli*
Introduction
In the second parliamentary elections in Iraq, conducted on December 15 of
last year, four political groups emerged with an overwhelming control of the
seats in parliament. These groups, together controlling 252 of the total 275
seats, are the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) associated with Shi'ite political
parties (130 seats)(1); the Kurdish Alliance (53 seats); the Iraqi Accord
Front representing the Sunnis (44 seats); and the Iraqi National List of
former prime minister Ayad Allawi primarily comprising secular candidates
(25 seats). The remaining 23 seats are divided among various parties and
individuals, the most significant being the Iraqi Front for National
Dialogue, another Sunni party, whose 11 seats complement the 44 seats of the
Iraqi Accord Front.
The results of the elections were contested on grounds of fraud and
irregularities, which delayed the final allocation of seats by almost two
months. The investigation by a team of U.N. and Arab League experts found
few irregularities: The ultimate results announced by the Independent
Electoral Committee on February 10, 2006 were nearly identical to the
preliminary results. The international team also identified "the pressing
need at this juncture of Iraq's history for a veritable national unity
representing all the segments of the Iraqi people."(2)
The Leading Political Figures
The four leading winning groups in the elections are made up of various
components which, in a crunch, may follow their own religious, sectarian,
tribal, regional, or even personal interests. Indeed, the tensions and
disagreements within and among them could undermine the prospects of forming
a stable and effectively operating government in the next four years.
The UIA itself is a confederation of four political parties and independent
candidates - the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
under Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; al-Da'wa Party, under the current Prime Minister
Ibrahim al-Ja'fari; the Fadhila Party [Virtue Party] under Dr. Nadeem
al-Jabiri; and the Sadrists, the supporters of the young Islamic radical
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The Kurdish Alliance is made up of the two leading
Kurdish parties - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal
Talabani, the current president of Iraq, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
under Mas'oud Barzani, the President of Kurdistan.
There are four leading figures and groupings in the Sunni parties. The Iraqi
Accord Front, including the Conference of the People of Iraq, under 'Adnan
al-Duleimi; the Islamic Party, under Tariq al-Hashemi; the National Dialogue
Front, under Sheikh Khalaf al-'Alyan; and the Council for National Dialogue,
under Saleh al-Mutlak.
The Selection of a Prime Minister
Under the Iraqi constitution, the party with the largest number of seats
designates the prime minister, although it is the President's Council (the
President of the Republic and his two Vice Presidents) which asks a member
of parliament to form a new government.
While the election results were being contested, the UIA, the group with the
largest number of parliamentary seats, was engaged in an intense internal
contest for the selection of its candidate for the post of prime minister.
Initially, four candidates competed, but eventually the real competition was
reduced to that between the current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari from
al-Da'wa Party and 'Adil Abd Al-Mahdi, the vice president from SCIRI. The
new prime minister will serve for four years under the constitution approved
in a referendum in October 2005.
The Method for Selecting the Prime Minister
The two key candidates and their supporters advocated two opposing methods
of selection: Abd al-Mahdi supporters favored selection based on consensus;
al-Ja'fari supporters favored selection by a vote among the 130 UIA members
of parliament. The second method emerged with the upper hand, thanks greatly
to the weight of the 30 Sadrists who all voted for al-Ja'fari. The London
daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat has reported that, on the eve of the voting, Muqtada
al-Sadr called some of the Shi'ite leaders and threatened a civil war if
al-Ja'fari was not selected.(3) Given al-Sadr's record of erratic behavior,
the story cannot be readily discounted. It was also suggested that as a quid
pro quo for the Sadrists' votes for him, al-Ja'fari will drop all legal
cases against them, most of them arising from the rebellion in Najaf and
Karbala in 2004 and, more significantly, the arrest warrant pending against
al-Sadr for the murder of a major Shi'ite figure, Abd al-Majid al-Khoei,
shortly after the
occupation of Iraq.(4)
When the votes were counted, al-Ja'fari received 65 votes and Abd Al-Mahdi,
64. Al-Ja'fari was declared the winner, but his margin of victory
represented neither a great vote of confidence for someone who had already
been serving as a prime minister for almost a year, nor a propitious start
for the challenges ahead.
Al-Sadr emerged from this exercise as a person with political clout, which
he quickly used in a series of well-publicized visits to neighboring
countries where he was treated as a significant political figure. In the
course of less than four weeks, he was received by the heads of state of
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan. One way or another, al-Sadr has
become part of the Iraqi political landscape - a force to be reckoned with.
Al-Sadr has two potent opponents - the Kurds and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the
leader of SCIRI. If these two political groups should join forces with
Allawi and the Sunnis, an entirely new political situation could emerge.
Foreseen Delays in Forming a Government
The formation of the first Iraqi government following the elections of
January 30, 2005 took approximately four months. At that time, there were
only two major groups negotiating a deal, and one of the two, the UIA, had
an absolute, though not a two-thirds, majority in the National Assembly.
This time, there are four major groups in the newly-elected parliament, and
none with an absolute majority. To form a new government, and with it the
right to govern, a candidate needs the support of all of the UIA and at
least one more group from among the four. Given that al-Ja'fari is not
popular outside his own Da'wa party and the Sadrists, who jointly control
fewer than half of UIA's 130 seats, it is hardly surprising that various
groups are already maneuvering to identify alternative candidates.
The process of forming a coalition is likely to be neither easy nor quick.
Already many of the potential partners have declared their conditions, or
red lines - a euphemism for a veto - about potential candidates and about
critical issues. Notwithstanding his admonition that whoever draws these
lines "will find himself [entangled] inside them,"(5) Talabani reminded the
UIA that nomination does not necessarily mean appointment, and that while
al-Ja'fari can be approved in parliament by a simple majority of 138
members, he would in fact need 184 votes, or two-thirds of the members of
parliament, to be able to govern effectively, and to effect certain changes
that would require two-thirds of the votes in parliament.(6) The Kurds have
their own conditions about the federalism of Kurdistan and about the future
of Kirkuk, as will be explained below.
Contentions About Political Figures
The political figure who raises the highest level of contention is
al-Ja'fari himself. He has been criticized for performing poorly as prime
minister. The country remains in a severe state of turmoil and is subject to
daily terrorist attacks. Frightened by random violence, many Iraqis rarely
venture out of their homes. The supply of electricity and gasoline remains
irregular, and the high rate of unemployment shows no sign of abating. Above
all, al-Ja'fari is now seen as beholden to the erratic Islamist cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr, whose supporters' votes were crucial to putting al-Ja'fari
ahead of his closest competitor. There is a genuine concern that
al-Ja'fari's government might, under pressure from al-Sadr, pull Iraq
further into an Iranian-style theocracy.
The other political figure who raises a great deal of contention is Ayad
Allawi, the former prime minister, who is a secular Shi'ite. Al-Ja'fari,
and, even more, the Sadrists who supported him, have declared their
opposition to Allawi's joining the new government. Al-Ja'fari's objection
may have to do with Allawi's past Ba'thist association, and the Sadrists
cannot forgive him for crushing, with considerable force, their rebellion
against the Shi'ite marja'iyah in Najaf and Karbala and against the
multinational forces in 2004. Moreover, Allawi's secularism is anathema to a
group which firmly believes that the only good government is a government
based on shari'a (Islamic law). (7)
Political Maneuvering
There is a broad consensus among the various political groupings, including
elements of the UIA, that the new government should be a government of
"national salvation," that brings under its umbrella all the political
forces in Iraq. The United States stands firmly behind this proposition, for
it is indeed unlikely that the Sunni-guided insurgency can be brought under
control unless the Sunni representatives in Parliament are fully represented
in the new government.
The two Sunni groups in Parliament, which together control 55 seats, have
entered into a broader coalition with Allawi's National List, thereby
creating the second largest faction in Parliament with 80 seats. The new
group is called the Council for National Action (majlis al-'amal al-watani),
which will act as an integrated parliamentary faction in negotiations with
the designated prime minister on the formation of a new government. They
expect to increase their number to 88 by attracting individuals or
representatives from small groups. In the words of one of its members -
Izzat al-Shahbandar - all the faction's components are nationalist groups
which reject ethnic politics. Its mission "is national unity, without which
Iraq will descend into the abyss."(8)
Another problem for al-Ja'fari is posed by the head of the UIA, Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim, who heads SCIRI and who believes that the post of prime minister
belongs to his party because it has a much larger political base than
al-Ja'fari's Da'wa Party, and is negotiating with prospective coalition
partners behind al-Ja'fari's back. While he is on record in support of the
democratic choice of al-Ja'fari, his actions are not consistent with his
words. He is known to have been holding talks, jointly with Adil Abd
Al-Mahdi who was defeated by al-Ja'fari by one vote, with the Kurdish leader
Jalal Talabani and with the Sunni leader 'Adnan al-Duleimi. Al-Hakim has
also met separately with the other Kurdish leader Mas'oud Barzani, the
president of Kurdistan.(9) Given Al-Hakim's disappointment at the selection
of al-Ja'fari over SCIRI's candidate Abd al-Mahdi, it is a safe assumption
that he is not exactly conducting meetings to mobilize support for the
candidacy of al-Ja'fari.
While SCIRI and its leader al-Hakim have maintained a strategic alliance
with the Kurds, al-Ja'fari, as prime minister, has had less than warm
relations with Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq. Their conflicts and
disagreements made front page news for a long time in the free Iraqi press.
The Kurds have been particularly disappointed with al-Ja'fari's refusal to
place the Kirkuk issue on the agenda. Talabani and al-Ja'fari have even
feuded over one of Saddam's palaces, an issue finally resolved with the help
of the Kurdish militia, the Peshmerga.
Al-Ja'fari must also not ignore the fourth component of the UIA, the Fadhila
Party [the Virtue Party] which has its own agenda and its own demands which,
if not satisfied, might cause it to bolt into the arms of a different
political configuration. The Al-Fadhila party seems not to have taken part
in the negotiations for the next government.
Another criticism of al-Ja'fari, voiced by the Najaf News Network, is that
by insisting on his reelection, Al-Ja'fari has galvanized all the forces,
national and international, that are opposed to the Shi'a rise to power in
Iraq, thus forcing him to make concessions to the detriment of the Shi'a and
to their fundamental interests.(10)
Critical Issues Facing the Formation of Government
When the maneuvering subsides, and the actual bargaining goes into high
gear, there will be a number of issues, some extremely thorny, placed on the
negotiating table. Among them are the following:
The Coalition Government
Since no political party commands an absolute majority in the new
parliament, a coalition government is inevitable. The questions are what
kind of coalition will be formed, who will be in it and at what a price.
The starting issue is whether the new government will be another coalition
between the Shi'a and the Kurds, or a national unity government that will
include, in addition to these two groups, the Sunnis and the secular members
of Allawi's party. Hamid Majid Mousa, the Secretary General of the Communist
Party and a member of Allawi's group, has asserted that the attempts to keep
Allawi out have foiled attempts to form a new government.(11)
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Shi'a shrines on February
23, the likelihood of a national government has increased. There is,
however, a growing assumption that the heads of most of the political
parties, with the open support of the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, will demand
that the UIA come up with a candidate other than al-Ja'fari. In this
context, the convening of the parliament, required by the constitution to
take place on February 25, was postponed for two weeks in order to give the
various factions more time to negotiate.(12)
The Issue of Federalism
There is a broad consensus in Iraq that the Kurdish region should remain
federated - in other words, autonomous - under a unified Iraq. Al-Hakim, the
head of SCIRI, has repeatedly announced his intention to create a similar
federated region in southern Iraq. The Sunnis, supported by the Sadrists,
strongly oppose this idea because it will deny the Sunnis the benefits of
oil revenues, as these revenues will accrue solely to the Kurds and the
Shi'a. The opponents of federalism demand a constitutional revision that
would render such a federal structure unconstitutional. The UIA is opposed
to major revisions in the constitution which would deny them the option of
federating the southern governorates on the pattern of the Kurdish north.
The Issue of Kirkuk
The Kurds argue that al-Ja'fari has reneged on a commitment that the
government would discuss the issue of Kirkuk's future - an issue that they
rank second in importance only to federation of the three autonomous Kurdish
provinces. They want the issue resolved through a referendum which they
believe they have the votes to win. The Kurds are unlikely to support any
prime minister who does not offer to deal with this issue in a manner
favorable to their aspirations.
As a condition of supporting al-Ja'fari, the Kurds demand a commitment by
the prospective prime minister to conduct a census of Kirkuk, to be followed
by a plebiscite that would determine whether the city will be incorporated
into Kurdistan. They also demand a major role for the Kurdish ministers in
the new government.(13)
The Kurds realize, as they have said through one of their negotiators Fuad
Ma'ssoum, that they can tip the scales between the UIA's candidate and the
newly established Allawi-Sunni Coalition's candidate.(14) In practice, the
Kurds would prefer a UIA candidate, provided that candidate is not
al-Ja'fari.
The Issue of Deba'thification
There are two extremes on this issue. On one side are the Sadrists, who
demand that the deba'thification of Iraq must go ahead at full speed with
the summary execution of Saddam Hussein; on the other side are the Sunnis,
who feel that they have been sufficiently victimized by the policy of
deba'thification, and that it is time to move on and unify the country.
Holding a middle ground is the Allawi group, which has taken a pragmatic
view about deba'thification, namely that the policy should be applied only
to the most senior elements of the former ruling Ba'th Party. This view is
also shared by the Kurds, whose leader, Talabani, has vowed that, as
president, he will never sign execution orders for Saddam Hussein.
The Issue of a Timetable for Withdrawal
The Sunnis and the Sadrists find themselves in agreement regarding the
demand to set a timetable for the withdrawal of multinational forces from
Iraq. They share the view that insurgency, terrorism and economic
dislocation are caused by the occupation forces, and that the sooner they
leave, the better Iraq is likely to be. For them, setting a timetable for
the withdrawal of foreign forces is second only to preventing the
federalization of Iraq. The Kurds want the multinational forces to stay
until the resistance has been brought under control and the Shi'a, with the
blessings of their spiritual leader Ayatollah al-Sistani, have taken a
pragmatic view.
The Issue of the Militias
There are three significant militias - the Kurdish Peshmerga, SCIRI's
Iran-supported Badr Brigade, and al-Sadr's Jeish al-Mahdi, which may also be
getting support from Iran.
In rather blunt language, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad,
said the United States will not agree to the existence of militias connected
with sectarian elements in the new government. He said the American
taxpayers wish to see their tax money spent properly and they do not wish to
see it spent on [military] forces run by sectarian ministers.(15) The
ambassador's admonition may have been directed primarily at the Badr
Brigade, which is suspected of committing murders and acts of terrorism
against the Sunnis. (See next paragraph.)
Key Security Ministries
There are four key security posts - the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of
the Interior, the National Security Adviser, and the head of the
intelligence service. The U.S. Ambassador, who is directly involved in many
of the negotiations between party leaders about the formation of the new
government, has expressed the view that all the four positions should be
held by individuals not connected with sectarian parties.(16) The most
controversial figure is the Minister of Interior, Banyan Jabber Solagh,
whose ministry was found to be running illegal prisons and torture chambers,
most of whose victims are Sunnis. The Sunnis also claim that the police and
security forces under the Ministry of the Interior are responsible for the
assassination of numerous Sunni clerics, and they want Solagh out. However,
he is a member of SCIRI, which is supported by the Badr Militia. Should
al-Ja'fari succeed in forming a government, it will be difficult for him to
replace Solagh, as doing so would
offend the other branch of the UIA, whose support for al-Ja'fari is far
from solid.(17)
Al-Ja'fari was equally blunt, characterizing the statement by the U.S.
Ambassador as "his government's point of view." He asserted that Iraq "makes
its own decisions, by Iraqi methods and through Iraqi vision, without the
intervention of any [other] country."(18)
When agreement is reached on the issues indicated above - and some will no
doubt be swept under the carpet for consideration at a later date - a new
round of negotiations will start concerning the allocation of the so-called
16 sovereign posts: the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of
the parliament - each with two deputies; the ministers of foreign affairs,
finance, interior, defense, and petroleum; the national security adviser;
and the chief of intelligence. And, finally, the parties will have to agree
on the size of the cabinet and how the posts will be distributed among
competing demands and party interests.
Criticism of the U.S. Ambassador
The U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has maintained a high profile in the
various meetings regarding the formation of a new government. He also been
seen sharing the podium in news conferences involving senior Iraqi leaders,
including the president.
It is not surprising that the ambassador is not well-liked by most of the
Shi'a, who refer to him as "Ambassador of the Sunnis" and as "Abu Omar" or
"Mullah Khlil," after Mullah Omar of the Taliban.(19) Even the daily
al-Sabah, a semi-official newspaper, published an article bearing the
headline "The American Ambassador carries out the responsibility of the high
commissioner." In the opening sentence, the daily said, "The difference
between the function of an ambassador and that of a high commissioner
designated by his country to govern an occupied land has disappeared."(20)
Conclusion
This paper has sought to highlight some of the complexities and issues
involved in the formation of a new Iraq government that is supposed to
govern a country in deep crisis for the next four years.
The chances of concluding the arduous process of forming a coalition may
have been enhanced by the recent terrorist attack on major Shi'ite shrines
in Samaraa, and the subsequent retaliation against Sunni mosques in many
parts of Iraq. The danger of a civil war resulting from violence against the
holy places of both communities could spur action to reach a compromise
faster than would otherwise have been possible. But even a faster process
may be slower than what Iraq needs in terms of a strong and stable
government that is capable of addressing the burning national issues of
security and economic reconstruction. The decision on who will be Iraq's
next prime minister will be of decisive import for the question of how the
country might be successfully navigated through turbulent waters.
* Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of MEMRI's Middle East Economic
Studies Program.
Endnotes:
(1) Including two seats from al-Rissaliyyun (associated with Muqtada
al-Sadr).
(2) D. Abdul Khaliq Hussein, Iraqparliament.com/article/html February 12,
2006.
(3) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 17, 2006.
(4) Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 16, 2006.
(5)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 17, 2006.
(6)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 19, 2006.
(7)Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 12, 2006.
(8)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), February 21, 2006.
(9) www.sotaliraq.com (an independent electronic daily), February 21, 2005.
(10) As'ad Rashid, Does al-Ja'fari Wish to Destroy the Iraqi Shi'a? Karbala
News Agency, February 19, 2006.
(11) Al-Zaman (Baghdad), February 23, 2006.
(12)Al-Quds Al-'Arabi (London), February 24, 2006.
(13)Al-Mada (Baghdad), February 14, 2006.
(14)Al-Zaman (Baghdad) February 20, 2006.
(15)Al-Mada (Baghdad), February 21, 2006.
(16)Al-Sabah (Baghdad), February 21, 2006.
(17) www.annabaa.org (February 17, 2006).
(18)Al-Sabah (Baghdad), February 22, 2006.
(19) As'ad Rashid, Najaf News Network, February 20, 2006.
(20)Al-Sabah (Baghdad), February 22, 2006.
*********************
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent,
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East. Copies of articles and documents cited, as well as background
information, are available on request.
MEMRI holds copyrights on all translations. Materials may only be used with
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The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
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Phone: (202) 955-9070
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